Hi 1Z,
I would agree with you but we are not considering an FAPP rule of thumb
for everyday situations, we are considering ontological questions. If our
conjectures and assumptions are contraindicated by experimental evidence,
should that evidence not be relevant to hypostases regarding fundamental
aspects of our Reality? Seriously! Are we just entertaining ourselves with
"who is the smartest guy in the room" games? Bruno and Russell, IMHO, won
that game a long time ago... I am just trying to make sense of philosophy
questions and learning for people that are many orders of magnitude smarter
than me. Does that mean that I am going to to challenge their claims? No!
For to do so would be just a feeble form of idolatry.
I think that Maudlin (and Bruno) have made very deep derivations that
need to be carefully considered, thus I want to be sure that it is not just
another straw man argument. I also happen to be working on a book and thus
want to be sure that my own hypothesis is not junk.
Onward!
Stephen
-----Original Message-----
From: 1Z
Sent: Sunday, January 30, 2011 4:13 PM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness”
On Jan 25, 9:04 am, "Stephen Paul King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
Dear Bruno and Friends,
While we are considering the idea of “causal efficacy” here and not
hidden variable theories, the fact that it has been experimentally
verified that Nature violates the principle Locality. Therefore the
assumption of local efficacy that Mauldin is using for the supervenience
thesis is not realistic and thus presents a flaw in his argument.
Local supervenience doesn't have to be argued from fundamental
physics. It can be argued
from neurology. Mental states arent affected by what goes on outside
the head unless information is conveyed by the sense
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