2012/5/9 Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> > > > 2012/5/9 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> > >> On 5/9/2012 1:11 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> 2012/5/9 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> >> >>> On 5/9/2012 12:09 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> 2012/5/9 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> >>> >>>> On 5/9/2012 11:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> 2012/5/9 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> >>>> >>>>> On 5/9/2012 2:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 2012/5/9 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> >>>>> >>>>>> On 5/8/2012 4:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 5:52 AM, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> >>>>>> <jami...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Stathis: what's your definition? - JM >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, May 5, 2012 at 6:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> >>>>>> <stath...@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, May 5, 2012 at 10:46 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> >>>>>> <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I have started listening to Beginning of Infinity and joined the >>>>>> discussion >>>>>> list for the book. Right now there is a discussion there >>>>>> >>>>>> Free will in >>>>>> MWIhttp://groups.google.com/group/beginning-of-infinity/t/b172f0e03d68bcc6 >>>>>> >>>>>> I am at the beginning of the book and I do not know for sure, but from >>>>>> the >>>>>> answers to this discussion it seems that according to David Deutsch one >>>>>> can >>>>>> find free will in MWI. >>>>>> >>>>>> One can find or not find free will anywhere depending on how one >>>>>> defines it. That is the entire issue with free will. >>>>>> >>>>>> My definition: free will is when you're not sure you're going to do >>>>>> something until you've done it. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> So if carefully weigh my options and decide on one it's not free >>>>>> will? I'd say free will is making any choice that is not coerced by >>>>>> another agent. >>>>>> >>>>>> Brent >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It's compatible with what Stathis said... unti you've made the actual >>>>> choise, you didn't do it and didn't know what it will be... "the do >>>>> something of Stathis can be you're not sure what you'll choose until >>>>> you've >>>>> chosen it." >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Are you saying that one *never* knows what they are going to do >>>>> until they do it... >>>>> >>>> >>>> .You have some knowledge of what you'll do... but you can only really >>>> "know" retrospectively. Iow, you are your fastest simulator... if it was >>>> not the case it would be possible to implement a faster algorithm able to >>>> predict what you'll do before you even do it... that seems paradoxical. >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't see anything paradoxical about it. A computer that >>>> duplicated your brain's neural network, but used electrical or photonic >>>> signals (instead of electrochemical) would be orders of magnitude faster. >>>> >>> >>> It's paradoxical, because if it could, I could know the outcome, and if >>> I could know the outcome, then I can do something else, and If I do >>> something else, then the simulation of that superphotonic computer is wrong >>> hence the hypothesis that it could simulate my choice faster than me is >>> impossible (because if it could, it *must* take in account my future >>> knowledge of my choice, if it does not, it is no faster to simulate what >>> I'll do than me). >>> >>> >>> That's an incoherent paradox. You've now assumed that not only is >>> your brain simulated, so your action is known in advance, but also that the >>> simulation information is fed back to your brain so it influences the >>> action. That's changing the problem and essentially creating a >>> brain+simulator=brain'. The fact that brain'=/=brain is hardly paradoxical. >>> >> >> Hmm ok... I have to think it a little more. >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> But this is has no effect on the compatibilist idea of free will (the >>>> kind of free will worth having). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> which then by Stathis defintion means that every action is free will >>>>> and coercion is impossible? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Coercion limit your choices, not your will, you can still choose to die >>>> (if the choice was between your life and something else for example). You >>>> can always choose if you can think, it's not because the only available >>>> choices are bad, that your free will suddenly disapeared. >>>> >>>> >>>> So would it be an unfree will if an external agent directly injected >>>> chemicals or electrical signals into your brain thereby causing a choice >>>> actually made by the external agent? >>>> >>> >>> yes >>> >>> >>> >>> Why is it still "you" if your brain is hooked up to something that >>> allows an external agent to control your body? >>> >>> >> I said the contrary... You asked if it would be unfree... I answered >> "yes" (it would be unfree in this case). >> >> >> OK, we agree on that. >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> How is this different from an external agent directly injecting >>>> information via your senses causing and thereby causing a choice actually >>>> made by the agent? >>>> >>>> In the first case *you* choose, >>> >>> >> But you said in the first case 'you' were unfree?? >> >> >> in the second case you don't. >>> >>> >>> ?? That's the reverse of your previous post in which you held that an >>> external agent threatening you does not remove your >>> >> free will. You said it just limited your choices, you still chose. >>> Did you read my post correctly? >>> >> >> Yes I read it correctly. If you fed chemicals and electrical signal to my >> brain then I did not *choose*. >> >> >> That's the first case, but not the second. >> >> >> >> So in the case I'm coerced by an external agent by external means, I can >> still choose only the available choices are reduced (and all of them can be >> bad), If it fed drugs/electrical signal that make me act like a puppet I >> can't choose. >> >> So in the first case (coerced by external means) I can choose and still >> have free will albeit having limited bad choices, in the second case (your >> thought experiment) I don't have free will. >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> Maybe we need to number these: >> >> (1)"...an external agent directly injected chemicals or electrical >> signals into your brain thereby causing a choice actually made by the >> external agent." >> >> To which you answered "Yes (that's unfree)." AND "...in the first >> case I can still choose." >> >> (2) "...an external agent directly injecting information *via your senses >> *..." >> >> To which you answered "...in the second case I don't have free will." >> >> Yet (2) consists only of the external agent talking to you and >> threatening or cajoling. >> >> Brent >> > > And here I made it clear that the first case was what I was talking about > first and the second case was your thought experiment (chemical/electrical > puppeting trick) that came after. > > Whatever, there is no point repeating I answer I can still choose when I > was unfree, I did not say that. >
So: 1- If someone is threatening me via my senses (via a weapons he holds, on some forces he acts upon me... I still have free will, I've still the ability to choose, some choices are more dangerous, I'm coerced to choose what the agressor wants, but still have the possibility to act otherwise upon my will. 2- If someone is using chemical or electrical agent modifying my brain state and having me acting like a puppet, I don't have free will, I don't have anymore the possibility to act otherwise. Quentin > -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
