On 17 Aug 2012, at 17:23, Roger wrote:
Wouldn't Godel incompleteness be the fatal flaw in at least some
Turing machines ?
It is a "fatal flaw" in the sense that it prevents all Turing machine,
including all universal machines, to be omniscient, even just about
arithmetic and machines.
But that is not really a flaw, as it provides motivation for Turing
machines to explore reality, and that will be the root of the sense of
life for machine: explore and contemplate.
Meaning, they cannot have a full set of instructions or data.
I don't understand what you mean by "full set of instructions or
data". All universal machine can emulate any other universal machine.
Like Brent said, universal machine are omnicompetent, but still not
omniscient. On the contrary, even concerning just numbers and
machines, all machines can only scratch at the surface.
Bruno
What, you ask, was the beginning of it all?
And it is this ...
Existence that multiplied itself
For sheer delight of being
And plunged into numberless trillions of forms
So that it might
Find
Itself
Innumerably (Aurobindo)
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/17/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Jason Resch
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-14, 11:11:45
Subject: Re: Is matter real ?
Hi Roger,
When I used the term universal system, I meant it in the sense of
Turing universality ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_universali
ty ). It is universal in the same sense of the word as a
universal remote. A Turing universal system is one that can be
used to define/emulate any finite process. In Bruno's proof, if
one believes in digital mechanism, he says that the theory of
everything need only be something that provides Turing universality.
My question to him was whether there might be different
probabilities of expectation based on which Turing universal system
is assumed at the start.
I have some comments interleaved below:
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 9:08 AM, Roger <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
Hi Jason Resch
Personally I believe that the physical universe out there is physical,
What makes something real? Do, you believe, for instance that
there could be other physical universes out there, which we may
never be able to access, but nonetheless, seem real to any life
forms which might develop intelligence and consciousness in those
universes? What, in your theory, delineates possibility from
actuality?
in the traditional sense of the word, and can be characterized for
example by physical experiment. So science is fine, as far as it
goes.
But what we experience of the physical universe is a psychological
or mental construction, so as far as our minds are concerned, it is
a phenomenon.
From there on, things get a little tricky.
There is a related, hotly contested point of debate which seems to
some (but not me) to be a fundamental flaw in Leibniz' metaphysics.
Leibniz was brilliant, but we have learned a great deal since his
time. We should not expect all of his theories to be correct.
Leibniz
discarded the atomic view of matter and let it stand that all matter
can be divided
infinitety many times, so there was nothing finally that one could
point to,
thus something one could call "real".
I am told that the 12 fundamental physical particles cannot be
divided so that
the divisibility argument above does not work. I would agree, but
just
change my definition of real, not as some thing one could point to,
but the possibility of finding something there to point to.
Heisenber's Uncertainty
Theorem rules that out, so in the end I agree with Leibniz's
conclusion --
that matter is not real.
Bruno might say it is real, but not fundamental. It can be
explained by something else.
Also, are you familiar with the many-worlds, or many-minds
interpretation of quantum mechanics?
If not, I think this video provides a great introduction: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEq
fc
The basis of Leibniz's metaphysics is that, instead, only the
monads are real,
since they refer to unitary substances and that these substances,
taken logically,
have no parts.
What do you think about the idea that information is Leibniz's
monad? Perhaps everything from consciousness to physical particles
can be explained as an informational phenomena. Information cannot
be explained in terms of anything else, and in this sense it has no
parts.
John Archibald Wheeler: It from bit. Otherwise put, every "it"
— every particle, every field of force, even the space-time
continuum itself — derives its function, its meaning, its very
existence entirely — even if in some contexts indirectly —
from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, binary
choices, bits. "It from bit" symbolizes the idea that every item of
the physical world has at bottom — a very deep bottom, in most
instances — an immaterial source and explanation; that which we
call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes —
no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in
short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin
and that this is a participatory universe.
Jason
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Jason Resch
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-13, 11:04:33
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible
On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
William,
On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote:
The physical universe is purely subjective.
That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the
means to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp
any first order logical theory of a universal system will do, and
the laws of physics and the laws of mind are not dependent of the
choice of the initial universal system.
Bruno,
Does the universal system change the measure of different programs
and observers, or do programs that implement programs (such as the
UDA) end up making the initial choice of system of no燾onsequence?
Jason
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