Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 08 Sep 2012, at 15:47, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> even though the paper actually
>>>> doesn't even begin to adress the question.
>>>
>>> Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how
>>> comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show
>>> that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to
>>> Plato
>>> than to Aristotle.
>> The problem is that the paper is taking the most fundamental issue for
>> granted,
>
> Absolutely not. I am open that UDA could lead to a refutation of comp,
> either purely logical, or by the possible testing it implies.
> My opinion on the truth or falsity of comp is private, and to be
> honest, varying.
>
> You want me to be more than what I am. A logician. Not a philosopher.
> It is simply not my job.
OK, but if you are solely a logician, you should concern yourself with
logical proofs. You don't even define the assumption of your paper in a
(theoretically speaking) logical way and your proof contains many
philosophical reasonings.
Especially step 8, which is criticial in your reasoning. It uses occams
razor (which is philosophical, and not necessarily valid in any mathematical
or logical context), you use appeals to absurdity (with regards to aribtrary
inner experience being associated to null physical activity), you use
additional philosophical assumptions (you assume materialist mechanism
cannot mean that physical computations are not *exactly* like abstract
digital computations, just enough to make a practically digital substitution
possible),...
So take my criticism to mean that your proof is simply not what you present
it as, somehow being beyond philsophy (which is always on some shaky
ground).
This is what I perceive as slightly dishonest, because it allows you retract
from the actual point by demanding to be given a precise refutation or a
specific error (as required in logic or math). But your paper is
philosophical, and here this logic does not apply.
If you'd admit that I am perfectly happy with your paper. It does show
something, just not rigorously and not necessarily and not for everyone
(some may rightfully disagree with your reasoning due to philosophical
reasons which can't be proven or be precisely stated).
If someone believes that physics behaves perfectly like abstract
computations would and if he doesn't want to invoke some very mysterious
form of matter (which does not rely on how it behaves and also not on how it
feels or is perceived to be) to sidestep the problem, yes, than your paper
may indeed show that this does not make much sense.
Unfortunately most materialist do actually believe (perhaps unconsciously)
in some very mysterious and strange (and IMO meaningless) kind of matter, so
they won't be convinced by your paper.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>> ("kinda digital", "digital at some level" are not enough for a strict
>> reasoning).
>>
>> You also say that a 1p view can be recovered by incompleteness, but
>> actually
>> you always present *abstractions* of points of view, not the point
>> of view.
>
> What could that mean? How could any theory present a point of view?
> I think you are confusing level. You could as well mock the quantum
> analysis of the hydrogen atom as ridiculous because the theory cannot
> react with real oxygen.
That's the point. A theory cannot conceivably present and acutal point of
view. But then your theory just derives something which you call "point of
view", which in fact may have little to do at all with the actual point of
view.
QM does not claim to show how a hydrogen atom leads to a real reaction of
oxygen, it just describes it.
To make it coherent, you would have to weaken your statement to "we can
derive some description of points of view, or we can show how some
description of points of view emerge from arithmetics", which I will happily
agree with. However, this would destroy your main point that arithmetics and
its point of view is enough as the ontology / epistemology (we need the
*actual* point of view).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> How am I supposed to argue with
>>>> that?
>>>>
>>>> There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption
>>>> about what
>>>> the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as
>>>> axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them
>>>> on a
>>>> meta-level.
>>>
>>> On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the
>>> meta-level can be embedded at the level.
>>> Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is "arithmetization of
>>> metamathematics". It is the main point: the meta can be done at the
>>> lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by
>>> using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides
>>> some light on the 1//3 issue.
>> But Gödel does not show this. The meta-level can only be embedded at
>> that
>> level on the *meta-level*.
>
> This is just false.
Sorry, I meant on *a* meta-level (not the meta-level that can be embedded,
obviously).
If you think it if false, then show me a proof of Gödel that does not rely
on a meta-level (beyond the embedded meta-level in arithmetic). I have never
seen such a proof.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Apart from this level, we can't even formulate
>> representation or embedding (using the axioms of N - except on another
>> meta-level).
>
> False. I can only suggest you to study the original paper, or to
> follow some good course in logic.
> You just miss the most original and admittedly astonishing part of
> Gödel's proof.
Sorry, but you miss that the problem with the paper has nothing to do with
the paper itself or logic.
It's problem is only in that we think it shows something it does not (and
can not due to the basic limitations of the axioms of arithmetic).
The conclusion that Gödel draws does not eliminate the meta-level. It just
eliminates the meta-level (the language that is embedded in arithmetic) on a
meta-meta-level (the language that we use to make sense of this embedding,
eg english).
Yes, it is correct on a meta-meta-level, but in this case it is a statement
about the meta-meta-level and arithmetic, not arithmetic itself.
And yes, we can eliminate the meta-meta-level by embedding that in
arithmetic as well, but then we use a meta-meta-meta-level to make sense of
that. We just create more meta by embedding the meta in arithmetic.
What I wrote may be confusing, but read it a few times, maybe then you will
get what I was getting at all along.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> You act like Gödel "eliminates" the meta-level, but he does not do
>> this and
>> indeed the notion of doing that doesn't make sense (because
>> otherwise the
>> whole reasoning ceases to make sense).
>
> Gödel does not eliminate the metalevel. On the contrary it shows that
> machines or formal theory can access to it.
That is precisly what I meant by "eliminating the meta-level". It can only
access it on a meta-level, it itself can not access it (the notion is
meaningless, because it has no axioms to access it, except on a meta-level).
If you see Gödels paper as a philosphical paper it is actually very valid
IMO - he express what we intuitively know about math (there are some things
about every axiomatic system that the axiomatic system does not capture)
using arithmetic. But he doesn't really prove it within arithmetic (except
on a meta-level), just *with* arithmetic.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> You just use fancy words to obfuscate that.
>>>> It i#s like saying "study the bible for scientific education (you
>>>> just don't
>>>> understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet)".
>>>
>>> No reason to be angry. It is the second time you make an ad hominem
>>> remark. I try to ignore that.
>> I am not angry, just a little frustrated that you don't see how you
>> ignore
>> the main issue (both in our discussions and you paer), while acting
>> like you
>> are only showing rational consequences of some belief.
>
> I am not acting like. This is what I do.
Well, maybe you think you do it, but your paper and how you defend it here
shows something different - that you using a specific philosophical approach
(which you can't show to be accurate rationally, or even put into a clear
assumption) and are emotionally invested in the paper (why bother to defend
with so much effort else).
Again, I am just being frank here and not intending to attack you
personally.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> I have said nothing about you, actually you seem to be a genuine,
>> open and
>> nice person to me. I am just being honest about what you appear to
>> be doing
>> in your paper and on this list. It is probably not even intentional
>> at all.
>> So, sorry if I offended you, but I'd rather be frank than to argue
>> with your
>> points which don't even adress the issue (which is what perceive as
>> being
>> obfuscation).
>
> What you call "obfuscation" is just the originality. I take a problem
> usually addressed by philosopher or theologian, and I show that if we
> assume comp, we can derive testable conclusion.
> I know that some philosophers are sick at this, but that is a
> tradition in human history. This is discussed in other threads.
I feel that you getting a bit emotional here (not that there is something
wrong with that at all, I just wanted to mention it).
Calling it "obfuscation" was a little mean, because it implies that it is
intentional. Sorry.
Your paper is just not very clear, and the many debates regarding it cofirm
that.
Note that this is not your fault, IMO there is no clear way of showing what
you wanted to show. In fact you did a really good job expressing it as clear
as possible. It just not clear enough, because the subject matter is not
clear.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>> but that's not the issue.
>
>
> I illustrate the contrary. You seem to be angry against science or
> theory in general, and displeased that I use the scientific
> methodology in something belonging *traditionally" to religion.
No, I am not angry wth science and theory. I am just not thinking highly at
all about pretending it is something holy that is telling us what to think
and what to do and how to view the world, in the same way that I am not
thinking highly of dogmatic religion. It is harmful IMO and not conducive to
our well-being.
I am only slightly displeased that you act a bit like your reasoning is
beyond doubt by dogmatically rejecting every argument against it (simply
claiming it does not show a flaw, and then asking where the flaw is). You
say that the argument is wrong and that's it - "read the paper" (...and you
will see that you are wrong).
There is no technical flaw in it, because the flaw is that it is not a
precise argument in the first place (vague assumption=vague or wrong
reasoning=vague or wrong conclusion). You never clearly define what YES
doctor means.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> The ideally correct machine is shown, by using the most standard antic
> definitions, to have a genuine theology, but you remain free to
> consider them as zombie, if that is your theory.
I don't consider *anything* zombie, even the most inert matter. Machines
just don't have clearly determined points of view, IMO.
But I think most persons don't have one either, which is maybe too radical
to even seriously propose (without being ridiculed or be met with
hostility).
benjayk
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