On 08 Sep 2012, at 15:47, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question.
Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how
comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show
that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to
Plato
than to Aristotle.
The problem is that the paper is taking the most fundamental issue for
granted,
Absolutely not. I am open that UDA could lead to a refutation of comp,
either purely logical, or by the possible testing it implies.
My opinion on the truth or falsity of comp is private, and to be
honest, varying.
You want me to be more than what I am. A logician. Not a philosopher.
It is simply not my job.
and it does not actually show anything if the main assumption is
not true
Nor does any scientific theory prove anything if they are false.
and at the end presents a conclusion that is mainly just what is
being taken for granted (we are abstractly digital, and computations
can
lead to a 1p of view).
? The assumption is comp ("yes doctore" + CT). The conclusion is that
physics is secondary and has to be extracted from arithmetic. The
"gift" is that we can use arithmetic to separate the quanta from the
qualia.
The point is technical.
You say "assuming COMP", but COMP is either impossible with respect
to its
own conclusion (truly, purely digital substitutions are not possible
due to
matter being non-digital),
This is not valid, unless you assume to be primitively material, which
is shown to be not the case with the comp hypothesis.
or it is too vague to allow for any conclusion
Unless you have a flaw in mind, the paper illustrate the contrary.
("kinda digital", "digital at some level" are not enough for a strict
reasoning).
You also say that a 1p view can be recovered by incompleteness, but
actually
you always present *abstractions* of points of view, not the point
of view.
What could that mean? How could any theory present a point of view?
I think you are confusing level. You could as well mock the quantum
analysis of the hydrogen atom as ridiculous because the theory cannot
react with real oxygen.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
How am I supposed to argue with
that?
There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption
about what
the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as
axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them
on a
meta-level.
On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the
meta-level can be embedded at the level.
Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is "arithmetization of
metamathematics". It is the main point: the meta can be done at the
lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by
using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides
some light on the 1//3 issue.
But Gödel does not show this. The meta-level can only be embedded at
that
level on the *meta-level*.
This is just false.
Apart from this level, we can't even formulate
representation or embedding (using the axioms of N - except on another
meta-level).
False. I can only suggest you to study the original paper, or to
follow some good course in logic.
You just miss the most original and admittedly astonishing part of
Gödel's proof.
You act like Gödel "eliminates" the meta-level, but he does not do
this and
indeed the notion of doing that doesn't make sense (because
otherwise the
whole reasoning ceases to make sense).
Gödel does not eliminate the metalevel. On the contrary it shows that
machines or formal theory can access to it.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
You just use fancy words to obfuscate that.
It i#s like saying "study the bible for scientific education (you
just don't
understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet)".
No reason to be angry. It is the second time you make an ad hominem
remark. I try to ignore that.
I am not angry, just a little frustrated that you don't see how you
ignore
the main issue (both in our discussions and you paer), while acting
like you
are only showing rational consequences of some belief.
I am not acting like. This is what I do.
I have said nothing about you, actually you seem to be a genuine,
open and
nice person to me. I am just being honest about what you appear to
be doing
in your paper and on this list. It is probably not even intentional
at all.
So, sorry if I offended you, but I'd rather be frank than to argue
with your
points which don't even adress the issue (which is what perceive as
being
obfuscation).
What you call "obfuscation" is just the originality. I take a problem
usually addressed by philosopher or theologian, and I show that if we
assume comp, we can derive testable conclusion.
I know that some philosophers are sick at this, but that is a
tradition in human history. This is discussed in other threads.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I work in a theory and I do my best to
help making things clear. You don't like comp, but the liking or not
is another topic.
Well, I am not saying your being *intentionally* misleading or
avoiding, but
it certainly appears to me that you are avoiding the issue - perhaps
because
you just don't see it.
What issue? The truth of comp? I do not defend it at all, but as a
logician I debunk invalid argument against it.
You are defending your reasoning, while always avoiding the main
point that
your reasoning does either depend on unstated assumption (we are
already
digital, or only the digital part of a substitution can matter),
That is the postulate. Nobody asks you to work in that theory. I do
find comp very plausible, especially due to the fact that its most
startling consequences are verified up to now by QM and observation.
But I am open to the idea that it might be false.
or rely on
a vague (practically digital substitution)
?
or contradictory (purely digital
substitution, which is not possible,
?
Comp assumes that there is a level where my "soul can be put on a
disk". The level is explained to be non constructive. This does not
mean that it is vague. Non constructivity abounds in math and computer
science.
because purely digital is nonsense with
regards to matter) premise.
Not for some level.
The same goes for the derivation of points of view. You just derive
abstractions, while not adressing that abstractions of points of
view don't
necessarily have anything to do with an actual point of view (thus
confusing
your reader which thinks that you actually showed a relation between
*actual* points of view and arithmetics).
I do, in the comp frame. We can never do more than that when doing
science. You could attack Newton for "taking for granted" the sun, the
moon and the apple.
It doesn't matter whether I like COMP or not. I don't find it a very
fruitful assumption,
? Most scienstists believe, since a long time, in comp and
materialism, and I show this can't work.
but that's not the issue.
I illustrate the contrary. You seem to be angry against science or
theory in general, and displeased that I use the scientific
methodology in something belonging *traditionally" to religion. But
that was my goal. I know that some people are shocked by this, but I
take this as a lack of both genuine scientific *and* spiritual
interests.
The ideally correct machine is shown, by using the most standard antic
definitions, to have a genuine theology, but you remain free to
consider them as zombie, if that is your theory.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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