On 07 Sep 2012, at 14:19, benjayk wrote:
You always refer to studying some paper,
Always the same.
even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question.
Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how
comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show
that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to Plato
than to Aristotle.
How am I supposed to argue with
that?
There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption
about what
the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as
axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them on a
meta-level.
On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the
meta-level can be embedded at the level.
Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is "arithmetization of
metamathematics". It is the main point: the meta can be done at the
lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by
using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides
some light on the 1//3 issue.
Ther is no point of studying your paper, if all it presents are more
abstractions about points of view, without ever showing how to get
from 3-p
descriptions to an actual 1-p of view (of course, since this is
meaningless).
The miracle here is that Gödel's incompleteness renders consistent one
of the definition of knowledge (first person) given by Theaetetus. It
refutes Socrate's refutation of the definition. Of course Socrate
could'nt be aware of CT and Gödel.
You just use fancy words to obfuscate that.
It is like saying "study the bible for scientific education (you
just don't
understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet)".
No reason to be angry. It is the second time you make an ad hominem
remark. I try to ignore that. I work in a theory and I do my best to
help making things clear. You don't like comp, but the liking or not
is another topic.
Bruno
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
In which way does one thing substitute another thing if actually
the
correct
interpretation of the substitution requires the original? It is
like
saying
"No you don't need the calculator to calculate 24,3^12. You can
substitute
it with pen and pencil, where you write down 24,3^12=X and then
insert the
result of the calculation (using your calculator) as X."
If COMP does imply that interpreting a digital einstein needs a
real
einstein (or more) than it contradicts itself (because in this
case
we can't
*always* say YES doctor, because then there would be no original
left to
interpret the emulation).
Really it is quite a simple point. If you substitute the whole
universe with
an emulation (which is possible according to COMP)
It is not.
You are right, it is not, if we take the conclusions of your
reasoning into
account. Yet COMP itself strongly seems to suggest it. That's the
contradiction.
? Comp is "it exists a level such that I survive an emulation of
it".
Then it makes the whole of the observable reality, including
consciousness not Turing emulable. It might seems weird, but I
don't
see a contradiction yet.
If observable reality as a whole is not emulable, there can't be a
level at
which there is a correct emulation, because we can't even
instantiate an
abstract digital emulation into reality (because observable reality
is not
digital).
Contradiction: "... abstract DIGITAL emulation into reality (because
observable reality is not
DIGITAL).
We can emulate digital features in a non digital reality.
But not purely digitally. We have to connect and instantiate the
digital
features in the non-digital reality. And in doing this we
necessarily need
something beyond the digital, and thus the reasoning about us being
digital
is not valid.
We can't put a digital computer into our brains. But a real computer
(and
its requires I/O) is not a digital abstract computer, and thus your
reasoning fails.
But
not only that, it can't exist, because the notion of digital
substitution is
meaningless in a non-digital universe.
I see no reason for that.
Because every "digital substitution" is bound to be ultimately non-
digital.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Of course we could engage in stretching the meaning of words and
argue that
COMP says "functionally correct substitution", meaning that it
also
has to
be correctly materially implementened. But in this case we can't
derive
anything from this, because a "correct implementation" may
actually
require
a biological brain or even something more.
The consequences will go through as long as a level of substitution
exist.
But there can't, unless your assumption is taken as a vague
statement,
meaning "kinda digital substitution".
? If I have a MAC in the head, I am 100% digital. If I survive in a
virtual environment with it, I am 100% digital.
No. A MAC + your head isn't 100% digital. Both your MAC and the rest
of your
head is a physical object, and thus non-digital.
You confuse the notions of "physically digital" and "abstractly
digital".
In this case the brain substitution might not be digital at all,
except in a
very weak sense by using anything that's - practically speaking -
digital
(we can already do that), so your reasoning doesn't work.
You lost me here.
Any actual substitution can't be purely digital, and so the reasoning
doesn't work because it reasons as if the substitution is digital.
benjayk
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