On 20 Oct 2012, at 22:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/20/2012 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Dear Stephen,
On 19 Oct 2012, at 19:44, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/19/2012 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Oct 2012, at 22:02, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/17 Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>
2012/10/17 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Life may support mathematics.
Arithmetic may support life. It is full of life and dreams.
Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the
future in order to self preserve . This is only possible in a
world where natural computers are possible: in a world where
the phisical laws have a mathematical nature. Instead of comp
creating a mathematical-phisical reality, is the mathematical
reality what creates the computations in which we live.
So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some)
mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations,
that is, observers.
OK. But harboring self-preserving computation is not enough, it
must do in a first person measure winning way on all
computations going through our state. That's nice as this
explain that your idea of evolution needs to be extended up to
the origin of the physical laws.
I don´t think so .The difference between computation as an
ordinary process of matter from the idea of computation as the
ultimate essence of reality is that the first restrict not only
the mathematical laws, but also forces a matemacity of reality
because computation in living beings becomes a process with a
cost that favour a low kolmogorov complexity for the reality.
In essence, it forces a discoverable local universe... ,
In contrast, the idea of computation as the ultimate nature of
realtity postulates computations devoid of restrictions by
definition, so they may not restrict anything in the reality
that we perceive. we may be boltzmann brains, we may be a
product not of evolution but a product of random computations.
we may perceive elephants flying...
And still much of your conclussions coming from the first person
indeterminacy may hold by considering living beings as ordinary
material personal computers.
Yes, that's step seven. If the universe is enough "big", to run a
*significant* part of the UD. But I think that the white rabbits
disappear only on the limit of the whole UD work (UD*).
Bruno
Dear Bruno,
Tell us more about how White Rabbits can appear if there is
any restriction of mutual logical consistency between 1p and in
any arbitrary recursion of 1p content?
We assume comp. If a digital computer processes the activity of
your brain in dream state with white rabbits, it means that such a
computation "with that dream" exist in infinitely many local
"incarnation" in the arithmetical (tiny, Turing universal) reality.
If you do a physical experience, the hallucination that all goes
weird at that moment exists also, in arithmetic. The measure
problem consists in justifying from consistency, self-reference,
universal numbers, their rarity,
And their very specific correlation with the physical brain states
of sleep.
Of course. But this is taken into account in the theoretical reasoning
where we suppose the "brain state" are obtained by (immaterial)
machine doing the computation at the right level.
We cannot know our "right level", so we are not trying to build an
artificial brain. The measure problem comes from the fact that,
whatever the level is, the physics has to be given by a measure on
computations. That is enough to already derive the logic of the
observable, and that a step toward solving the measure problem,
although some other possible manner might exist.
Bruno
Brent
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