On 08 Jan 2013, at 15:37, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
IMHO It doesn't matter what type of field. According to the
definition below,
a field is like a map, it is not the territory itself. ".....that
would
act on a body at any given point in that region" The word "would"
tells us that a field only has potential existence, not existence
itself.
A gravitational field does not physically exist, IMHO, but exhibits
the properties of existence, such as our being able to see a ball
tossed in the air rise and fall. But we cannot see the
gravitational field itself.
It has no physical existence, only potential existence.
Or to put it another way, we can not detect a field, we can only
detect what it does. (In that case, pragmatism rules. )
http://science.yourdictionary.com/field
field
"A distribution in a region of space of the strength and direction
of a force,
such as the electrostatic force near an electrically charged object,
that would
act on a body at any given point in that region. "
But they are talking on physical space and physical time, about
physical forces, which means locally measurable in our local physical
reality (which comp explains as being something real, even if emergent
from the first pov of numbers in numberland).
Gravitational fields, in GR, are physical deformation of a physical
space-time. We can't see any force, we can only measure effects, but
this does not make the force non physical. I use physical informally
to denote anything related to what we can observe and measure and made
testable prediction on, in our "physical reality". What is that, andf
where does it come from? That is the question I am interested in, and
comp here does not just suggest an answer, if imposes an answer and
the math suggests that the (ideally correct) machine's theory is more
Platonist than Aristotelian.
With comp, nothing *fundamental* is physical, but the physical is
still something fundamental for our type of consciousness to be
selected in statistically stable and sharable histories.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/8/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-08, 08:36:24
Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so.
On 07 Jan 2013, at 17:26, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Yes, the theories are nonphysical, and in addition, quantum theories
quantum theory applies to quantum fields, which are nonphysical.
This is hard for me to grasp. What do you mean by "quantum fields"
are not physical?
It seems to me that they are as much physical than a magnetic field,
or a gravitational field. I don't see any difference. Quantum field
theory is just a formulation of quantum mechanics in which
"particles" become field singularities, but they have the usual
observable properties making them physical, even "material".
With computationalism, nothing is *primitively* physical, and
physics is no more the fundamental science, but many things remains
physical, like fields. They do emerge from the way machine can bet
on what is directly accessible by measurement.
May be we have a problem of vocabulary. We might use "physical" in
different sense.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/7/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-07, 11:17:56
Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so.
On 06 Jan 2013, at 21:59, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi meekerdb
Not all physicists are materialists, or if they are, they are
inconsistent
if they deal with quantum physics, which is nonphysical.
All theories are non physical, but this does not make a materialist
theory inconsistent. With non comp you can make identify mind and non
physical things with some class of physical phenomena.
Careful, in philosophy of mind, "materialism" means "only matter
fundamentally exists". But comp is already contradicting "weak
materialism", the thesis that some matter exists fundamentally (among
possible other things).
Some physicists are non materialist and even non-weak-materialist
( (which is stronger and is necessary with comp). But even them are
still often physicalist. They still believe that everything is
explainable from the behavior of matter (even if that matter is
entirely "ontologically" justified in pure math).
Comp refutes this. Physics becomes the art of the numbers to guess
what are the most common universal numbers supporting them in their
neighborhood, well even the invariant part of this.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/6/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: meekerdb
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-06, 14:17:42
Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so.
On 1/6/2013 5:30 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi meekerdb
Materialists can't consistently accept inextended structures and
functions such as quantum fields--or if they do, they aren't
materialists.
So no physicists since Schrodinger are materialists. So materialism
can't very well be "scientific dogma" as you keep asserting.
Brent
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/6/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: meekerdb
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-05, 15:37:09
Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so.
On 1/5/2013 6:26 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Richard Ruquist
Empirical data, to my way of thinking, trumps scientific dogma
(such as materialism) any day.
It's rather funny that you keep assailing scienctists as being
dogmatic materialists and yet you think their world picture: curved
metric space, quantum fields, schrodinger wave functions,... is all
immaterial.
Brent
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