Hi meekerdb Very good; that is possibly a new version of Idealism.
Also, Sheldrake and many other philosophers (eg Plato) believe that vision is a two-stage process. First the light from the object enters into our eyes, then we "project" the image back out into the world to where we "see" the chair. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/9/2013 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-08, 12:40:25 Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. On 1/8/2013 6:37 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Bruno Marchal > > IMHO It doesn't matter what type of field. According to the definition below, > a field is like a map, it is not the territory itself. ".....that would > act on a body at any given point in that region" The word "would" > tells us that a field only has potential existence, not existence itself. > > A gravitational field does not physically exist, IMHO, but exhibits > the properties of existence, such as our being able to see a ball > tossed in the air rise and fall. But we cannot see the gravitational field > itself. > It has no physical existence, only potential existence. > > Or to put it another way, we can not detect a field, we can only > detect what it does. (In that case, pragmatism rules. ) Note that we can say the same about chairs. A chair is just a concept in our model of the world. We can't see a chair, only their effect on our vision. Brent > > http://science.yourdictionary.com/field > > field > > "A distribution in a region of space of the strength and direction of a > force, > such as the electrostatic force near an electrically charged object, that > would > act on a body at any given point in that region. " > > > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 1/8/2013 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2013-01-08, 08:36:24 > Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. > > > > > On 07 Jan 2013, at 17:26, Roger Clough wrote: > > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > Yes, the theories are nonphysical, and in addition, quantum theories > quantum theory applies to quantum fields, which are nonphysical. > > > This is hard for me to grasp. What do you mean by "quantum fields" are not > physical? > It seems to me that they are as much physical than a magnetic field, or a > gravitational field. I don't see any difference. Quantum field theory is just > a formulation of quantum mechanics in which "particles" become field > singularities, but they have the usual observable properties making them > physical, even "material". > With computationalism, nothing is *primitively* physical, and physics is no > more the fundamental science, but many things remains physical, like fields. > They do emerge from the way machine can bet on what is directly accessible by > measurement. > > > May be we have a problem of vocabulary. We might use "physical" in different > sense. > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 1/7/2013 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2013-01-07, 11:17:56 > Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. > > > On 06 Jan 2013, at 21:59, Roger Clough wrote: > >> Hi meekerdb >> >> Not all physicists are materialists, or if they are, they are >> inconsistent >> if they deal with quantum physics, which is nonphysical. > > All theories are non physical, but this does not make a materialist > theory inconsistent. With non comp you can make identify mind and non > physical things with some class of physical phenomena. > > Careful, in philosophy of mind, "materialism" means "only matter > fundamentally exists". But comp is already contradicting "weak > materialism", the thesis that some matter exists fundamentally (among > possible other things). > > Some physicists are non materialist and even non-weak-materialist > ( (which is stronger and is necessary with comp). But even them are > still often physicalist. They still believe that everything is > explainable from the behavior of matter (even if that matter is > entirely "ontologically" justified in pure math). > > Comp refutes this. Physics becomes the art of the numbers to guess > what are the most common universal numbers supporting them in their > neighborhood, well even the invariant part of this. > > Bruno > > >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 1/6/2013 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: meekerdb >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2013-01-06, 14:17:42 >> Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. >> >> >> On 1/6/2013 5:30 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >> Hi meekerdb >> >> Materialists can't consistently accept inextended structures and >> functions such as quantum fields--or if they do, they aren't >> materialists. >> >> So no physicists since Schrodinger are materialists. So materialism >> can't very well be "scientific dogma" as you keep asserting. >> >> Brent >> >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 1/6/2013 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: meekerdb >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2013-01-05, 15:37:09 >> Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. >> >> >> On 1/5/2013 6:26 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >> Hi Richard Ruquist >> >> Empirical data, to my way of thinking, trumps scientific dogma >> (such as materialism) any day. >> >> It's rather funny that you keep assailing scienctists as being >> dogmatic materialists and yet you think their world picture: curved >> metric space, quantum fields, schrodinger wave functions,... is all >> immaterial. >> >> Brent >> >> No virus found in this message. >> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com >> Version: 2013.0.2805 / Virus Database: 2637/6007 - Release Date: >> 01/03/13 >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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