Hi Bruno Marchal
You say, "Well, with comp, the mind arise from arithmetic." Wouldn't a Platonist say instead that arithmetic arises from mind ? [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/9/2013 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-09, 05:13:03 Subject: Re: Wave collapse and consciousness On 08 Jan 2013, at 17:50, Richard Ruquist wrote: > For the record, > > Roger's post illuminates an optimal division between the mind: > the EM, and quantum waves and, fields; > > and the body: mainly electrons and photons. > > We all seem to agree that the mind is arithmetic. Well, with comp, the mind arise from arithmetic. Mind is what a universal numbers can handle, by construction and by first person indeterminacy selection, which gives a reality far bigger than arithmetic. Aristhmetic seen from inside go far beyond arithmetic in machine's mind. > We have some division on if that property extends to the body: > like, for instance, arithmetic photons that seemingly bridge the > duality... No, matter, once we assume comp, is much more than arithmetic, like mind. Bruno > > yanniru > > On Tue, Jan 8, 2013 at 9:57 AM, Roger Clough > wrote: >> Wave collapse and consciousness >> >> According to the discussion below, a field only has potential >> existence, it does not exist by itself. It requires a body to >> interact with it. >> This difference is easily confused in usage. For example, we >> may speak of an electromagnetic field as if it is a real physical >> entity. But the only "real" part of the field is the electrons >> moving in/through it. >> >> Similarly the quantum field of a photon is only a map showing >> the probabilities that the photon may exist at certain locations. >> When the photon collides with something, the probability >> is de facto 1, and we have an actual photon at that location. >> >> So there is no mysterious connection between Cs and the >> collapse of qm fields, all that is needed is something such >> as a measurement probe to be in the path of the qm field >> to cause a collision. >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 1/8/2013 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Roger Clough >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2013-01-08, 09:37:17 >> Subject: Re: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. >> >> >> Hi Bruno Marchal >> >> IMHO It doesn't matter what type of field. According to the >> definition below, >> a field is like a map, it is not the territory itself. ".....that >> would >> act on a body at any given point in that region" The word "would" >> tells us that a field only has potential existence, not existence >> itself. >> >> A gravitational field does not physically exist, IMHO, but exhibits >> the properties of existence, such as our being able to see a ball >> tossed in the air rise and fall. But we cannot see the >> gravitational field itself. >> It has no physical existence, only potential existence. >> >> Or to put it another way, we can not detect a field, we can only >> detect what it does. (In that case, pragmatism rules. ) >> >> http://science.yourdictionary.com/field >> >> field >> >> "A distribution in a region of space of the strength and direction >> of a force, >> such as the electrostatic force near an electrically charged >> object, that would >> act on a body at any given point in that region. " >> >> >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 1/8/2013 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Bruno Marchal >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2013-01-08, 08:36:24 >> Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. >> >> >> >> >> On 07 Jan 2013, at 17:26, Roger Clough wrote: >> >> >> Hi Bruno Marchal >> >> Yes, the theories are nonphysical, and in addition, quantum theories >> quantum theory applies to quantum fields, which are nonphysical. >> >> >> This is hard for me to grasp. What do you mean by "quantum fields" >> are not physical? >> It seems to me that they are as much physical than a magnetic >> field, or a gravitational field. I don't see any difference. >> Quantum field theory is just a formulation of quantum mechanics in >> which "particles" become field singularities, but they have the >> usual observable properties making them physical, even "material". >> With computationalism, nothing is *primitively* physical, and >> physics is no more the fundamental science, but many things remains >> physical, like fields. They do emerge from the way machine can bet >> on what is directly accessible by measurement. >> >> >> May be we have a problem of vocabulary. We might use "physical" in >> different sense. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 1/7/2013 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Bruno Marchal >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2013-01-07, 11:17:56 >> Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. >> >> >> On 06 Jan 2013, at 21:59, Roger Clough wrote: >> >>> Hi meekerdb >>> >>> Not all physicists are materialists, or if they are, they are >>> inconsistent >>> if they deal with quantum physics, which is nonphysical. >> >> >> All theories are non physical, but this does not make a materialist >> theory inconsistent. With non comp you can make identify mind and non >> physical things with some class of physical phenomena. >> >> Careful, in philosophy of mind, "materialism" means "only matter >> fundamentally exists". But comp is already contradicting "weak >> materialism", the thesis that some matter exists fundamentally (among >> possible other things). >> >> Some physicists are non materialist and even non-weak-materialist >> ( (which is stronger and is necessary with comp). But even them are >> still often physicalist. They still believe that everything is >> explainable from the behavior of matter (even if that matter is >> entirely "ontologically" justified in pure math). >> >> Comp refutes this. Physics becomes the art of the numbers to guess >> what are the most common universal numbers supporting them in their >> neighborhood, well even the invariant part of this. >> >> Bruno >> >> >>> >>> >>> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >>> 1/6/2013 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> From: meekerdb >>> Receiver: everything-list >>> Time: 2013-01-06, 14:17:42 >>> Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. >>> >>> >>> On 1/6/2013 5:30 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>> Hi meekerdb >>> >>> Materialists can't consistently accept inextended structures and >>> functions such as quantum fields--or if they do, they aren't >>> materialists. >>> >>> So no physicists since Schrodinger are materialists. So materialism >>> can't very well be "scientific dogma" as you keep asserting. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> >>> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >>> 1/6/2013 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> From: meekerdb >>> Receiver: everything-list >>> Time: 2013-01-05, 15:37:09 >>> Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. >>> >>> >>> On 1/5/2013 6:26 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>> Hi Richard Ruquist >>> >>> Empirical data, to my way of thinking, trumps scientific dogma >>> (such as materialism) any day. >>> >>> It's rather funny that you keep assailing scienctists as being >>> dogmatic materialists and yet you think their world picture: curved >>> metric space, quantum fields, schrodinger wave functions,... is all >>> immaterial. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> No virus found in this message. >>> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com >>> Version: 2013.0.2805 / Virus Database: 2637/6007 - Release Date: >>> 01/03/13 >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything- >> l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything- >> l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything- >> l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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