Hi Bruno Marchal Platonism is not at least overtly Berkeley's idealism, but is idealism at least of the type described below.
idealism noun \i-'de-(?-)?liz-?m, 'i-(?)de-\ Definition of IDEALISM 1 a (1) : a theory that ultimate reality lies in a realm transcending phenomena (2) : a theory that the essential nature of reality lies in consciousness or reason [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/10/2013 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-09, 09:55:41 Subject: Re: Wave collapse and consciousness On 09 Jan 2013, at 12:20, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Bruno Marchal > > > You say, "Well, with comp, the mind arise from arithmetic." > > Wouldn't a Platonist say instead that arithmetic arises from mind ? Some Platonist have defended idealism, but the problem then is that we can no more an explanation for mind. With comp, we do get a simple theory of mind (computer science/ mathematical logic), and we can explain both consciousness and the illusion of matter from it, and this leads us back to the root of Platonism: Pythagorism. There is only numbers and numbers computable relations (in the outside view). The inside view get richer, though. All you need is arithmetical realism: the idea that "43 is prime" in all possible situation, independently of the existence of humans, aliens, bacteria, etc. Bruno > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 1/9/2013 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2013-01-09, 05:13:03 > Subject: Re: Wave collapse and consciousness > > > On 08 Jan 2013, at 17:50, Richard Ruquist wrote: > >> For the record, >> >> Roger's post illuminates an optimal division between the mind: >> the EM, and quantum waves and, fields; >> >> and the body: mainly electrons and photons. >> >> We all seem to agree that the mind is arithmetic. > > Well, with comp, the mind arise from arithmetic. Mind is what a > universal numbers can handle, by construction and by first person > indeterminacy selection, which gives a reality far bigger than > arithmetic. Aristhmetic seen from inside go far beyond arithmetic in > machine's mind. > > > >> We have some division on if that property extends to the body: >> like, for instance, arithmetic photons that seemingly bridge the >> duality... > > No, matter, once we assume comp, is much more than arithmetic, like > mind. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> yanniru >> >> On Tue, Jan 8, 2013 at 9:57 AM, Roger Clough >> wrote: >>> Wave collapse and consciousness >>> >>> According to the discussion below, a field only has potential >>> existence, it does not exist by itself. It requires a body to >>> interact with it. >>> This difference is easily confused in usage. For example, we >>> may speak of an electromagnetic field as if it is a real physical >>> entity. But the only "real" part of the field is the electrons >>> moving in/through it. >>> >>> Similarly the quantum field of a photon is only a map showing >>> the probabilities that the photon may exist at certain locations. >>> When the photon collides with something, the probability >>> is de facto 1, and we have an actual photon at that location. >>> >>> So there is no mysterious connection between Cs and the >>> collapse of qm fields, all that is needed is something such >>> as a measurement probe to be in the path of the qm field >>> to cause a collision. >>> >>> >>> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >>> 1/8/2013 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> From: Roger Clough >>> Receiver: everything-list >>> Time: 2013-01-08, 09:37:17 >>> Subject: Re: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. >>> >>> >>> Hi Bruno Marchal >>> >>> IMHO It doesn't matter what type of field. According to the >>> definition below, >>> a field is like a map, it is not the territory itself. ".....that >>> would >>> act on a body at any given point in that region" The word "would" >>> tells us that a field only has potential existence, not existence >>> itself. >>> >>> A gravitational field does not physically exist, IMHO, but exhibits >>> the properties of existence, such as our being able to see a ball >>> tossed in the air rise and fall. But we cannot see the >>> gravitational field itself. >>> It has no physical existence, only potential existence. >>> >>> Or to put it another way, we can not detect a field, we can only >>> detect what it does. (In that case, pragmatism rules. ) >>> >>> http://science.yourdictionary.com/field >>> >>> field >>> >>> "A distribution in a region of space of the strength and direction >>> of a force, >>> such as the electrostatic force near an electrically charged >>> object, that would >>> act on a body at any given point in that region. " >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >>> 1/8/2013 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> From: Bruno Marchal >>> Receiver: everything-list >>> Time: 2013-01-08, 08:36:24 >>> Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 07 Jan 2013, at 17:26, Roger Clough wrote: >>> >>> >>> Hi Bruno Marchal >>> >>> Yes, the theories are nonphysical, and in addition, quantum theories >>> quantum theory applies to quantum fields, which are nonphysical. >>> >>> >>> This is hard for me to grasp. What do you mean by "quantum fields" >>> are not physical? >>> It seems to me that they are as much physical than a magnetic >>> field, or a gravitational field. I don't see any difference. >>> Quantum field theory is just a formulation of quantum mechanics in >>> which "particles" become field singularities, but they have the >>> usual observable properties making them physical, even "material". >>> With computationalism, nothing is *primitively* physical, and >>> physics is no more the fundamental science, but many things remains >>> physical, like fields. They do emerge from the way machine can bet >>> on what is directly accessible by measurement. >>> >>> >>> May be we have a problem of vocabulary. We might use "physical" in >>> different sense. >>> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >>> 1/7/2013 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> From: Bruno Marchal >>> Receiver: everything-list >>> Time: 2013-01-07, 11:17:56 >>> Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. >>> >>> >>> On 06 Jan 2013, at 21:59, Roger Clough wrote: >>> >>>> Hi meekerdb >>>> >>>> Not all physicists are materialists, or if they are, they are >>>> inconsistent >>>> if they deal with quantum physics, which is nonphysical. >>> >>> >>> All theories are non physical, but this does not make a materialist >>> theory inconsistent. With non comp you can make identify mind and >>> non >>> physical things with some class of physical phenomena. >>> >>> Careful, in philosophy of mind, "materialism" means "only matter >>> fundamentally exists". But comp is already contradicting "weak >>> materialism", the thesis that some matter exists fundamentally >>> (among >>> possible other things). >>> >>> Some physicists are non materialist and even non-weak-materialist >>> ( (which is stronger and is necessary with comp). But even them are >>> still often physicalist. They still believe that everything is >>> explainable from the behavior of matter (even if that matter is >>> entirely "ontologically" justified in pure math). >>> >>> Comp refutes this. Physics becomes the art of the numbers to guess >>> what are the most common universal numbers supporting them in their >>> neighborhood, well even the invariant part of this. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >>>> 1/6/2013 >>>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>>> From: meekerdb >>>> Receiver: everything-list >>>> Time: 2013-01-06, 14:17:42 >>>> Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. >>>> >>>> >>>> On 1/6/2013 5:30 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>>> Hi meekerdb >>>> >>>> Materialists can't consistently accept inextended structures and >>>> functions such as quantum fields--or if they do, they aren't >>>> materialists. >>>> >>>> So no physicists since Schrodinger are materialists. So materialism >>>> can't very well be "scientific dogma" as you keep asserting. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >>>> 1/6/2013 >>>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>>> From: meekerdb >>>> Receiver: everything-list >>>> Time: 2013-01-05, 15:37:09 >>>> Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so. >>>> >>>> >>>> On 1/5/2013 6:26 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>>> Hi Richard Ruquist >>>> >>>> Empirical data, to my way of thinking, trumps scientific dogma >>>> (such as materialism) any day. >>>> >>>> It's rather funny that you keep assailing scienctists as being >>>> dogmatic materialists and yet you think their world picture: curved >>>> metric space, quantum fields, schrodinger wave functions,... is all >>>> immaterial. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> No virus found in this message. >>>> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com >>>> Version: 2013.0.2805 / Virus Database: 2637/6007 - Release Date: >>>> 01/03/13 >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >>>> . >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>>> . >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>>> . >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >>>> . >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>>> . >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>>> . >>>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything- >>> l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything- >>> l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything- >>> l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything- >> l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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