On 09 Jan 2013, at 12:20, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal


You say, "Well, with comp, the mind arise from arithmetic."

Wouldn't a Platonist say instead that arithmetic arises from mind ?

Some Platonist have defended idealism, but the problem then is that we can no more an explanation for mind. With comp, we do get a simple theory of mind (computer science/ mathematical logic), and we can explain both consciousness and the illusion of matter from it, and this leads us back to the root of Platonism: Pythagorism. There is only numbers and numbers computable relations (in the outside view). The inside view get richer, though.

All you need is arithmetical realism: the idea that "43 is prime" in all possible situation, independently of the existence of humans, aliens, bacteria, etc.

Bruno




[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/9/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
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Time: 2013-01-09, 05:13:03
Subject: Re: Wave collapse and consciousness


On 08 Jan 2013, at 17:50, Richard Ruquist wrote:

For the record,

Roger's post illuminates an optimal division between the mind:
the EM, and quantum waves and, fields;

and the body: mainly electrons and photons.

We all seem to agree that the mind is arithmetic.

Well, with comp, the mind arise from arithmetic. Mind is what a
universal numbers can handle, by construction and by first person
indeterminacy selection, which gives a reality far bigger than
arithmetic. Aristhmetic seen from inside go far beyond arithmetic in
machine's mind.



We have some division on if that property extends to the body:
like, for instance, arithmetic photons that seemingly bridge the
duality...

No, matter, once we assume comp, is much more than arithmetic, like
mind.

Bruno





yanniru

On Tue, Jan 8, 2013 at 9:57 AM, Roger Clough
wrote:
Wave collapse and consciousness

According to the discussion below, a field only has potential
existence, it does not exist by itself. It requires a body to
interact with it.
This difference is easily confused in usage. For example, we
may speak of an electromagnetic field as if it is a real physical
entity. But the only "real" part of the field is the electrons
moving in/through it.

Similarly the quantum field of a photon is only a map showing
the probabilities that the photon may exist at certain locations.
When the photon collides with something, the probability
is de facto 1, and we have an actual photon at that location.

So there is no mysterious connection between Cs and the
collapse of qm fields, all that is needed is something such
as a measurement probe to be in the path of the qm field
to cause a collision.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/8/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
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Time: 2013-01-08, 09:37:17
Subject: Re: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so.


Hi Bruno Marchal

IMHO It doesn't matter what type of field. According to the
definition below,
a field is like a map, it is not the territory itself. ".....that
would
act on a body at any given point in that region" The word "would"
tells us that a field only has potential existence, not existence
itself.

A gravitational field does not physically exist, IMHO, but exhibits
the properties of existence, such as our being able to see a ball
tossed in the air rise and fall. But we cannot see the
gravitational field itself.
It has no physical existence, only potential existence.

Or to put it another way, we can not detect a field, we can only
detect what it does. (In that case, pragmatism rules. )

http://science.yourdictionary.com/field

field

"A distribution in a region of space of the strength and direction
of a force,
such as the electrostatic force near an electrically charged
object, that would
act on a body at any given point in that region. "




[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/8/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
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Time: 2013-01-08, 08:36:24
Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so.




On 07 Jan 2013, at 17:26, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

Yes, the theories are nonphysical, and in addition, quantum theories
quantum theory applies to quantum fields, which are nonphysical.


This is hard for me to grasp. What do you mean by "quantum fields"
are not physical?
It seems to me that they are as much physical than a magnetic
field, or a gravitational field. I don't see any difference.
Quantum field theory is just a formulation of quantum mechanics in
which "particles" become field singularities, but they have the
usual observable properties making them physical, even "material".
With computationalism, nothing is *primitively* physical, and
physics is no more the fundamental science, but many things remains
physical, like fields. They do emerge from the way machine can bet
on what is directly accessible by measurement.


May be we have a problem of vocabulary. We might use "physical" in
different sense.


Bruno







[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/7/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
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Time: 2013-01-07, 11:17:56
Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so.


On 06 Jan 2013, at 21:59, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi meekerdb

Not all physicists are materialists, or if they are, they are
inconsistent
if they deal with quantum physics, which is nonphysical.


All theories are non physical, but this does not make a materialist
theory inconsistent. With non comp you can make identify mind and non
physical things with some class of physical phenomena.

Careful, in philosophy of mind, "materialism" means "only matter
fundamentally exists". But comp is already contradicting "weak
materialism", the thesis that some matter exists fundamentally (among
possible other things).

Some physicists are non materialist and even non-weak-materialist
( (which is stronger and is necessary with comp). But even them are
still often physicalist. They still believe that everything is
explainable from the behavior of matter (even if that matter is
entirely "ontologically" justified in pure math).

Comp refutes this. Physics becomes the art of the numbers to guess
what are the most common universal numbers supporting them in their
neighborhood, well even the invariant part of this.

Bruno




[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/6/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
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Time: 2013-01-06, 14:17:42
Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so.


On 1/6/2013 5:30 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi meekerdb

Materialists can't consistently accept inextended structures and
functions such as quantum fields--or if they do, they aren't
materialists.

So no physicists since Schrodinger are materialists. So materialism
can't very well be "scientific dogma" as you keep asserting.

Brent



[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/6/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
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Time: 2013-01-05, 15:37:09
Subject: Re: Is Sheldrake credible ? I personally think so.


On 1/5/2013 6:26 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Richard Ruquist

Empirical data, to my way of thinking, trumps scientific dogma
(such as materialism) any day.

It's rather funny that you keep assailing scienctists as being
dogmatic materialists and yet you think their world picture: curved
metric space, quantum fields, schrodinger wave functions,... is all
immaterial.

Brent

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