Hi Bruno Marchal 1) My awareness is nonphysical (because internal) yet exists in time.
2) I suppose you're right about epistemological existence, as long as nobody is thinking about those states. I suppose that 1p would apply there, if we consider thinking as internal perception of an idea. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/16/2013 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-16, 10:57:41 Subject: Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ? On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:03, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Bruno Marchal > > That is only true in heaven, where time does not exist. > > Nothing could exist (on earth) if there were no time > because things (physical or nonphysical) exist in time. I don't grasp that the non physical exist in time. > That is what "to exist" means. To be there, dasein. That's epistemological existence. Bruno > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 1/16/2013 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2013-01-15, 10:07:27 > Subject: Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ? > > > > > On 14 Jan 2013, at 12:31, Roger Clough wrote: > > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > Good question. It's a difficult question to answer, but here's > my best answer at present. > > Monads or substances are the fundamental entites of Leibniz's > universe. > They are all substances of one part. > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- > Here's Bertrand Russell's view of Leibniz's definition of substance > > http://www.ditext.com/russell/leib1.html#3 > > > "Every proposition has a subject and a predicate. > A subject may have predicates which are qualities existing at > various times. (Such a subject is called a substance.) " > > > > Sorry but I don't know what time is. Please read Plotinus, and > forget everything written after, because it is just footnotes on > Aristotle, and this can't work with my favorite working hypothesis. > Of course you can also assume that comp is false, and develop a non- > comp theory, but that is more difficult, and for this I will ask you > much more precision. > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > The phrase " predicates which are qualities existing at various times" > gets me off the hook with regard to wavicles and numbers. Both > quanta and > numbers are substances of one part and so are monads. And all > monads, whatever they be, > must have a fixed identity. > > Subject predicate(s) > (of fixed identity) > > ordinary matter always both 1. physcal matter 2. mental matter > wavicle either 1. physical matter or 2. > mental (quantum) matter > numbers always 2. mental matter. > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 1/14/2013 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2013-01-13, 11:57:48 > Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects > Theory > > > > > On 12 Jan 2013, at 13:01, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > Hi Roger, > > > How can you have a wave without some notion of spatial/temporal > dimensions? > > > > > I don't see why we cannot have purely mathematical waves (easily > related to lines and circles), and physical waves, like water wave > or tsunami, or sound waves. > A propagating wave is a sort of oscillation contagious to its > neighborhood. > > > Summing waves gives arbitrary functions (in some functional spaces), > so simple wave can be see as the base in the space of "arbitrary" > functions (for reasonable functional spaces, there are any natural > restrictions here). > > > The whole problem with QM, is that the wave's physical > interpretation is an amplitude of probability, and that we can make > them interfere as if they were physical. But in MWI, the quantum > waves are just the map of the relative accessible physical > realities. An electronic orbital is a map of where you can find an > electron, for an example. > I would say it is something physical (even if it emerges from the > non physical relations between numbers). > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 12, 2013 at 12:52 PM, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi everything-list, > > I don't believe that Descartes would accept the MWI. > Here's why: > > I think that the ManyWorldsInterpretation of QM is incorrect, > due to the mistaken notion (IMHO) that quantum waves > are physical waves, so that everything is physical and materialistic. > > This seems to deny "quantum weirdness" observed > in the two-slit experiment. Seemingly if both the wave > and the photon are physical, there should be nothing weird > happening. > > My own view is that the weirdness arises because the > waves and the photons are residents of two completely > different but interpenetrating worlds, where: > > 1) the photon is a resident of the physical world, > where by physical I mean (along with Descartes) > "extended in space", > > 2) the quantum wave in nonphysical, being a resident of > the nonphysical world (the world of mind), which has no > extension in space. > > Under these conditions, there is no need > to create an additional physical world, since each > can exist as aspects of the the same world, > one moving in spactime and being physical, the other, like > mind, moving simulataneously in the nonphysical world > beyond spacetime. > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 1/12/2013 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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