On 05 Feb 2013, at 14:14, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno,
The definitons of simulation and emulation I can find both use the
word "imitation".
Can you explain what you mean as being the difference between the
two ?
A computer can simulate a storm. It can also simulate another
computer. In this case, when we simulate digital events by a digital
machine, we can define a notion of totally faithful simulation. This
what is called an emulation. Some mac, for example, emulate some PC.
In fact any universal machine can emulate all possible digital
machinery. This is why they are said universal.
Bruno
Simulation - Definition and More from the Free Merriam-Webster ...
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/simulation
a : the imitative representation of the functioning of one system or
process by means of the functioning of another <a computer
simulation of an industrial process> ...
Definition of EMULATION
1
obsolete : ambitious or envious rivalry
2
: ambition or endeavor to equal or excel others (as in achievement)
3
a : imitation
b : the use of or technique of using an emulator
— em·u·la·tive adjective
— em·u·la·tive·ly adverb
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Telmo Menezes
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-02-04, 17:07:32
Subject: Re: context, comp, and multiverses
On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 6:05 PM, Craig Weinberg
<whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Monday, February 4, 2013 9:59:09 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 2:31 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>
wrote:
On Sunday, February 3, 2013 12:11:17 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Feb 2013, at 16:42, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
�
I would think that each universe provides its own distinctive
context to any燾alculation, including comp.
Comp is the assumption that we are Turing emulable.
That notion is made very solid by Church's thesis.
I don't think that we can assume that a Turing emulation of us is
actually "us". To the contrary, a Turing emulation of geometry is
not geometry. A Turing emulation of water can be the same as a
Turing emulation of water in another Turing emulated virtual world,
but no emulated drop of Turing water can ever be a genuine
drop of water within the world that we actually live in. It doesn't
matter that 17 is still prime when you are dying of dehydration.
Hi Craig,
Still trying to understand your theory better. What's your position
on the following statements:
- The human brain can be Turing emulated.
I see emulation is a figure of speech rather than a physical
reality. Can fire be Turing emulated? Maybe, but you can only use it
to emulate the cooking of emulated food. I can make a single
emulation of fire which will work for any number of virtual worlds,
but none of them can actualize fire on the level of the machine
itself.
Aren't you confusing emulation with simulation? If we emulate a
brain in a computer, we can connect its input and outputs to sensors
and actuators in the real world.
�
So can publicly detectable brain activity be Turing emulated? Sure,
but it is a sculpture.
I see what you mean, but more on that later.
�
- There is some (possibly mysterious) link between the physical
human brain and consciousness.
The human brain is the public facing spatial presentation of human
quality awareness. It's not a link between them because they are
actually the same thing, only expressed publicly rather than
privately.
Ok. I'm ok with that. I would still call it a link, but no
nitpicking is necessary.
�
It's a bit confusing since private awareness is longitudinal through
all time whereas public structures are orthogonal - latitudinal
across all space but constrained to as single instant of time.
See if my post from last night makes it clearer:
http://multisenserealism.com/2013/02/04/chalmeroff-scale-revisited/
Interesting post.
You say:�
"In other words, an experience is ineffable when the subject derives
meaning from generated information which supervenes on an extensive
personal history."
�
So my question is, why can't the generated information supervene on
an emulation of my brain?
Craig
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