On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 11:18:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >> >>> >>> Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though? >>> >>> >>> Human computationalism does. >>> >>> But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier to >>> define than human integers. >>> >> >> I'm not sure how that relates to computationalism being something other >> than quanta. Humans are easier to define to themselves than integers. A >> baby can be themselves for years before counting to 10. >> >> >> Phenomenologically? Yes. >> Fundamentally? That does not follow. It took a long time before >> discovering the Higgs-Englert-Brout Boson. >> > > It doesn't have to follow, but it can be a clue. The Higgs is a particular > type of elementary phenomenon which is not accessible to us directly. That > would not be the case with Comp if we were in fact using only computation. > If our world was composed on every level by computation alone, > > > Hmm.... It is not obvious, and not well known, but if comp is true, then > "our world" is not "made of" computations. > Our world is "only" an appearance in a multi-user arithmetical video game > or dream. >
That's the problem though, what is an "appearance"? How can an arithmetic game become video or dreamlike in any way? This is what I keep talking about - the Presentation problem. Comp is pulling aesthetic experiences out of thin air. without a specific theory of what they are or how they are manufactured by computation or arithmetic. > > > > > > it wouldn't make much sense for people to have to learn to count integers > only after years of aesthetic saturation. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> What can be computed other than quantities? >>> >>> >>> Quantities are easily computed by stopping machines, but most machines >>> does not stop, and when they introspect, the theory explains why they get >>> troubled by consciousness, qualia, etc. Those qualia are not really >>> computed, they are part of non computable truth, but which still bear on >>> machines or machine's perspective. >>> >> >> Then you still have an explanatory gap. >> >> >> But that is a good point for comp, as it explains why there is a gap, and >> it imposes on it a precise mathematical structure. >> > > But there's nothing on the other side of the gap from the comp view. > You're still just finding a gap in comp that comp says is supposed to be > there and then presuming that the entire universe other than comp must fit > in there. If there is nothing within comp to specifically indicate color or > flavor or kinesthetic sensations, or even the lines and shapes of geometry, > then I don't see how comp can claim to be a theory that relates to > consciousness. > > > There is something in the comp theory which specifically indicate qualia. > The gaps in the intensional nuances could very well do that. > But flavors and colors aren't gaps. It would be like painting with invisible paint. How does theory become visible to itself, and why would it? > > > > >> >> >> How can anything which is non-computable bear on the computation of an >> ideal machine? >> >> >> That is the whole subject of en entire field: recursion theory, or >> theoretical computer science. >> > > Ok, so what is an example of something that specifically bridges a kind of > computation with something personal that comp claims to produce? > > > That is technical, and you need to study AUDA. I would say that *all* > statements in X1* minus X1 produces that. No doubt many open problems have > to be solved to progress here. > But even if that fails, you have not produced an argument that it is not > possible. > What is an example of an X1* minus X1 statement that produces something personal and non-computable? > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> What connects the qualia to the quanta, and why isn't the qualia just >> quantitative summaries of quanta? >> >> >> Qualia are not connected to quanta. >> > > Then what is even the point of Comp? To me quanta = all that relates to > quantity and certain measurement. If they are not connected to quanta then > a machine that is made of quanta can't possibly produce qualia that has no > connection to it. That's no better than Descartes. > > > I realize that you have not yet really study comp. Physical Machine are > not made of quanta. Quanta appears only as first person plural sharable > qualia. They are observable pattern common to people belonging to highly > splitting or differentiating computations, most plausibly the "linear > computations" (like in QM). > I can agree with all of that, I would say that quanta is the splitting of qualia. Arithmetic truth, computation,.etc is all the splitting of primordial qualia. The split is generic and universal, but that which has been split - qualia, is diffracted - smeared across the split like the visible spectrum. > > > > >> Quanta are appearances in the qualia theory, and they are not >> quantitative, they are lived at the first person plural views. >> > > Quanta aren't quantitative? > > > They might be. The fact that they come from qualia does not prevent that > they have quantitative aspect. > I would hope that quanta would have quantitative aspect. What other aspect would they have? > > > > > >> >> >> >>> If Arithmetic truth is full of non nameable things, what nameable things >>> does it also contain, >>> >>> >>> The numbers, the recursive properties, the recursively enumarable >>> properties, the Sigma_i truth, well a lot of things. >>> You have the recursive (the simplest in our comp setting), then the >>> recursively enumerable (the universal machines, notably), then a whole >>> hierarchy of non computable, but still nameable set of numbers, or >>> machine's properties, >>> >> >> You say they are nameable, but I don't believe you. It is not as if a >> number would ever need to go by some other name. Why not refer to it by its >> precise coordinate within Arithmetic Truth? >> >> >> Because it is independent of the choice of the computational base, like >> volume in geometry. If you can name something with fortran, then you can >> name it with numbers, combinators, etc. Nameability is "machine >> independent", like the modal logics G, G*, Z, etc; >> > > What you are calling names should be made of binary numbers though. I'm > asking why binary numbers should ever need any non-binary, non-digtial, > non-quantitative names. > > > Your methodology cannot work. Even if I was not able to explain how > non-quantitive names appear, it is up to you, when saying that comp is > wrong, have to give he impossibility argument. > Then, in this case, I keep telling you why: the math shows why and how > those non quantitative relations develop, notably through an intersection > or conjunction between truth and self-reference. > Comp isn't impossible, it just happens not to be true. Because Comp is a theory about theory rather than reality, it is blind to its own artifice. In theory consciousness is not necessary, but in fact, it seems to be the case, so we need to go back and question whether any theory can address a reality that includes consciousness when it does not discern between conscious experience and information about computations that need not be experienced. I think that the answer is definitely no. There is no theory which can apply to the reality that we actually live in unless it begins with awareness as fundamental. No logical path leads to awareness, only to gaps where, because we are aware, we might be tempted to insert ourselves, but that would only be the pathetic fallacy. > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> then you got the non nameable properties, like true (for number >>> relations) but very plausibly, things like consciousness, persons, etc. >>> Some of those non nameable things can still be studied by machines, >>> through assumptions, and approximations. >>> Above that you have the truth that you cannot even approximated, etc. >>> Arithmetical truth is big, *very* big. >>> >> >> Big, sure, but that's exactly why it needs no names at all. >> >> >> It is worst than that. Many things cannot have a name. >> > > what can they have? > > > Properties, relations, well, ... the nameable things are exceptional, in > fact. in arithmetic. Nameable sets of numbers are enumerable, non nameable > sets are non enumerable. Life and consciousness develops at the frontier > between the nameable, and the non nameable. Truth itself conditions > everything, yet is not nameable. > What is something that is nameable and why does it help to have a name? > > > > >> >> >> Each feature and meta-feature of Arithmetic truth can only be found at >> its own address. What point would there be in adding a fictional label on >> something that is pervasively and factually true? >> >> >> In science it is not a matter of decision, but of verifiable facts. >> > > That's what I am saying, what is the point of adding a fictional name to a > fact that is verifiable within Arithmetic truth? > > > ? > It seems like you must be using a specialized definition of what a name is. If I want to change the value of a memory register, and I want to do it a lot in a program, I can make up a name for that memory register and that's convenient for me, because I'm not only a machine and aesthetic qualia in verbal-linguistic symbols provide proprietary traction to myself (a proprietor). If I were only a machine, the binary code of the register would be just fine. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> and what or who is naming them? >>> >>> >>> The machines. (in the comp setting, despite the machines theology does >>> refer to higher non-machine entities capable of naming things. That's the >>> case for the first order logical G* (which I note usually qG*, this one >>> needs more than arithmetical truth, but it is normal as it describes an >>> intensional (modal) views by a sort of God (Truth) about the machine. here >>> the miracle is that its zero order logical (propositional) part is >>> decidable. >>> >> >> I don't think that names and machines are compatible in any way. >> Programmers of machines might use names, but once compiled, all high level >> terms are crushed into the digital sand that the machine can digest. No >> trace of proprietary intent remains. >> >> >> Not at all. The whole point is that such proprietary are invariant for >> the high or low level implementations. >> > > > Then why would we have to compile high level programs into low level > machine code? > > > Because it is simpler for a human to talk in higher level terms, and it is > easier for the engineer to build a universal machine from low level basic > components. > Then how can you say they are invariant? If Comp were true, there should be no difference between higher and lower 'terms' - there should be no terms at all. There should be no human talk, just engineers building. > Our brains have a low level (neuronal for example), and high level (as it > is apparent from its structure, not mentioning our introspection ability). > The high level uses the same biochemical computation as the low level though. Neither of them benefit from qualia or names. Introspection is not necessarily high level or low level relative to the brain, just as the plot and characters of the movie are not related to the (low level) pixels on the screen or the (high level) transmission protocols of the cable TV company. The low and high relate to each other directly, as they would under Comp. Our naming of those pixel configuration and frame refresh has nothing to do with the computational logic, other than the long way around by virtue of the universality of how brains, optics, and technology splits qualia. The qualia itself is not caused by the computation, any more than a computer is caused by a box full of Styrofoam packaging. > The modal logics I am using does capture high level properties of low > level defined by addition+multiplication. > I don't see how that relates to names. > > >>> If quanta is Löbian qualia, why would it need any non-quantitative names? >>> >>> >>> ? (to fuzzy question, sorry, try to make this more clear perhaps). >>> >> >> You said earlier that quanta is Löbian qualia, and then you are saying >> above that naming is one of the things that Löbians (persons? machines?) >> do, so I am asking why don't they just use quanta instead of >> non-quantitative qualia? >> >> >> Because, by the logical gaps Z/Z*, X/X* etc. (inherited from G/G*) it is >> shown that Löbian numbers/machines/person are confronted with them. They >> can names some things, and they cannot name other things. It is a theorem >> in their self-reference logics. It is "basic" machine's theology or >> psychology. >> > > It sounds like you're just saying "because that's how they work." > > > I say something like that, but I explain with computer science and logic. > The explanation is still the same, it's just "because". > Before Gödel we could think that machines are basically a simple notion, > amenable to complete theories. After Gödel, we realize that above a > threshold of complexity (the Turing universality threshold) we know about > nothing. And with comp, we can understand why, as universal machines > appears to be unknown to themselves, uncontrollable by themselves, full of > not predictible quantitative and qualitative surprises. > This does not prove that comp is true, but it defeats argument based on > easy comparison between us and possible machines. > I'm not trying to argue that simple machines are the same as hyper-complex machines in every way, but I see no reason that they would be any different in that specific way. I think complexity is used in comp as a smoke screen for Santa Claus. There's too many obvious instances where the nature of computation and mechanism is exposed clearly as fundamentally and permanently impersonal. It's not something that self-reference or self-elaboration can change because computation is impersonality itself - the gap, the qualia that is most generic and least qualitative. Craig > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
