2013/10/31 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> > On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 1:21 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>wrote: > > >> I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate >>> the following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be >>> given: >>> >> >>> >> "Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are >>> made, one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body >>> instantly destroyed?" >>> >> >> > This is not what is asked >> > > It's the question I asked! >
You do not have to choose the question to attack bruno's one... you either answer his and proceed, or you do not and abandon MWI for the same reason. > I don't give a damn if I see Moscow or Washington, I care if I live or > die > The point is about step 3 and for you to proceed to step 4 or not... I don't give a damn about what you give a damn. > and I suspect you are more interested in that question too. And if you > could reformulate that question (never mind the answer) so that it was > clear to you i might understand what you're talking about. > > > what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you >> measure the spin of the electron, the question is the probability you >> measure spin up >> > > As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After > Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person > No, in everett experiment like in the duplication experiment after the experiment there are two you, if you deny this, you deny *MW*I (as in *multiple world*) > is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who "you" > The experience as nothing to do about who is you *simply look at the goddamn diary*!!!! > is and easy to determine if predictions about what "you" will see were > right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be > clearly seen that have a equal right to the title "you" which means that > the predictions about what "you" will see are useless. And another > difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, > and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. > > > both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5. >> > > No, only one question is valid. In Everett's case we know who "you" is, > it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people > clear as a bell and both are called "you" and both saw different things, > and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday "what is the > probability "you" will see X?". > > Not that predictions, good bad or meaningless, have anything to do with a > sense of self. > > >> Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact >>> copies of the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in >>> Washington, and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed? >>> I would answer the question with a simple "no" without the need for >>> further explanations or caveats, >>> >> >> > That is still not the question asked. The question is about >> probability. The easiest way to rephrase it, is [...] >> > > Stop telling me how simple it is to rephrase the question and actually > rephrase it. Rephrase that question into a sentence so that the question is > clear to you (we'll worry about the answer another time) and then maybe > what you're talking about will be clear to me. > > > simply to look at the diary, and simply by repeating the experience and >> looking at the result of the diary you can infer the frequency of 0.5 and >> the correct probability. >> > > A diary is of absolutely no value in this matter because the diary was > written by "you" yesterday and today I'm looking at 2 people who have a > equal right to be called "you" because they both remember being the > Helsinki Man yesterday. > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
