On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 5:13 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> > Since more than one or two years, John Clark oscillates between "obvious >> > non sense" to "obvious, period". We might hope than in his "obvious, >> > period" >> > phase, he might go to the next step, > > > John Clark doesn't do that because John Clark knows that the lifetime of > the true but trivial phase can be measured in hours, or perhaps even > minutes, and then turn back into the gibberish phase. For example, Bruno > Marchal simply can not allow Bruno Marchal's previous statement " "you" > concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki" to stand as > is because it would render false other statements of Bruno Marchal, such as > "you" will see only one city. > > Thus at this very instant Bruno Marchal is probably adding lots of pee pee > and circular caveats to his statement ( such as "you" is what is seen from > the 1P view and what is seen from the 1P view is "you") and the transition > from trivial to gibberish will have completed yet another cycle.
John, you are the guy who explained Bell's inequality in a very compelling way. You're obviously smart, so why are you only engaging in personal attacks? I could understand that if personal attack were the only thing left in the discussion, but this is not the case at all. Why don't you instead address the issues that have been pointed about your position, namely: - that it renders the probability of a coin toss to either 0 or 1 - that if you refuse to accept the 1p/3p distinction, then you also have to refuse the MWI ? Telmo. > John K Clark > > > > > > > > > > > > On 1 November 2013 17:31, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 7:51 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> > A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and >>>> > 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball >>>> > changing color >>> >>> >>> Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until >>> there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a >>> red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they fork. >>> It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the simulation to >>> make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls that created >>> 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision made outside the >>> simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, that is to say the >>> simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure out what that decision >>> would be. >>> >>>> > B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number >>>> > generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether >>>> > the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times Then the AI >>>> > (or >>>> > AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred >>>> > first. >>>> >>> Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it >>> is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are >>> not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in >>> A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as >>> the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of >>> itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or >>> the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. >>> >>> So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A >>> was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no >>> difference. >> >> >> Thank you for answering. I think we are in agreement. >> >>> >>> >>>> > I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, >>>> > and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from >>>> > all >>>> > the views, the conclusion is the same. >>> >>> >>> Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound >>> conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's >>> grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as >>> dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big >>> buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. >> >> >> Well there is one difference: the entire protocol is explained to the AI, >> it knows exactly what will happen in each of the 256 possibilities, but from >> inside the simulation, it is no different than had the sequence of colors >> been chosen completely randomly. >> >> Also, you are mistaken if you think this is the grand conclusion of the >> UDA, it is only one small (but necessary) step in the reasoning. If you >> want to get to the grand conclusion you need only continue on to the next >> steps. It seems you have grasped the point of step 3 and are in agreement >> that subjective indeterminacy can arise in a fully understood and >> deterministic process. >> >> I'll re-post the link for your convenience. You are less than 2-3 pages >> away from finishing reading the UDA: >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm >> >> Jason >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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