On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/12/2013 12:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Dec 12, 2013, at 11:00 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote:
On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Liz,
In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it
depends on various quantum states.
Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change
from your previous state.
If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same
since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor.
Rich
Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital
consciousness involves constant state changes, at the
substitution level and below. You end up with something like
David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred Hoyle's pigeon holes, or
someone, not sure who's "capsule" model of identity. It's all
very Heraclitean!
Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no
"snapshots". The computations that produce consciousness are
distributed in space and time and one "thought" overlaps another.
That isn't obvious to me. Are you saying the brain manufactures
10^43 thoughts per second? Would we know if the brain only made
~30 thoughts per second?
No, I'm saying, roughly, the latter. And those thoughts have
extension in both space and time (in the brain) as physically
realized, so they can overlap. The overlapping times them together
and provides an ordering, corresponding to the experience of
consciousness and time.
I really do not understand this. I don't see overlap possible, with a
continuum, nor do I see how a discrete machine can distinguish a
"primary physical continuum" from a FPI recoverable continuum. It
looks like you assume a non-computationalist hypothesis. I might miss
something.
Bruno
Brent
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