On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:27, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 6:45 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> In Everett it's always obvious who I'm talking about when I use
the personal pronoun "you", it's the only other fellow in the room
with me; but in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing
to the right of the duplicating machine and a identical looking man
standing to the left of the duplicating machine and they both have a
equal right to use the grand title "you".
> But they know pretty well who they are in the first person way,
No they do not, not in a world with duplicating machines;
This is ridiculous. Here "who they are" means "who among the W and M
guy they are", and both know pretty well which city they are seeing,
and that is the "real" city, given the protocol (we don't fake them in
a virtual lie, by construction).
and by insisting that they do you're assuming the most important
part of the very thing you're trying to prove. Mr. You doesn't know
if he's the copy or the original.
Ridiculous, see above.
Mr. You doesn't know if he's 40 years old or 40 seconds old.
We have a precise protocol and default hypotheses. You make
distracting (correct) remark which have no relevance. You are playing
game.
Mr. You does know that he's the guy who is having this thought right
now, but in a worjd of duplicating machines that is insufficient
information to make a differentiation because that fellow over there
(or is it a mirror) could be having the exact same thought at the
exact same time.
Not when they have looked to which city they are confronted with,
which is the precise object of the experiment.
> One told me: I see in my diary that I predicted (in Helsinki) that
I would be at both places, but I see now that this was wrong
I predicted? In such a situation that would only be a half truth, it
would be much more accurate to say the Helsinki man predicted or
Bruno Marchal predicted. A pronoun has raised its ugly head yet again.
Because you have already agreed that both copy are instantiation of
the Helsinki person. They say "I remember having made that
prediction", for the same reason the guy survive the simple brain
transplant (it is the comp hyp.).
>>> Then you can't say that you will survive anything. We die at
each instant
>> OK, but then you can't say that survival is important, or that
the word means much of anything at all.
> That was my point. Indeed. Comp would lost his meaning.
At last we agree on something, "comp" has lost it's meaning.
You play with words. You know what comp is, and you just fail finding
a flaw in step 3.
>> 'Comp" is not trivial, "comp" is a gibberish word made up by you
that is almost as meaningless as "free will".
> Comp is the mechanist thesis. You confuse axioms and theorems.
It's the erroneous theorems that you claim to have derived from the
sound axioms of computationalism that I object to.
Exactly. But you fail in showing us what is erroneous.
And that's the difference between "comp" and "computationalism",
and that is why you insist on using your homemade silly little word
rather than the standard term.
comp is just shorter than computationalism. But it "my" comp, is only
a weaker version which imply all the one existing in the literature,
and thus the consequences applies to all of them.
> your preceding argument was shown to confuse the 1-view and the 3-
view
For several years now Bruno Marchal has accused John Clark of that,
but John Clark would maintain that there is not a single person on
the face of the earth who is confused by the difference between the
first person and the third person.
I doubt this. In the duplicating machine frame, *you* do that
confusion when predicting "W and M". Clearly.
You might be the only one, indeed.
>> why do you keep emphasizing what the various copies will predict
about their future and how accurate those predictions turn out to be?
> The point is that we need only a notion of first person self
I think therefore I am.
> and thrid person self
I know what a third person is, but what the hell is the "third
person self"?
Your body, or the Gödel number of your body, or the instantaneous comp
state that the doctor is handling.
Likewise, the third person self of PA is the description of PA in PA.
The third person self is the one studied in the Gödel-Löb mathematical
self-reference. It is the "Bp", as opposed to the first person self
which is well captured by Bp & p.
>> I honestly don't give a damn about "comp"
> You said that you believe in comp.
I NEVER said I believe in "comp",
Stop playing with word. There was no quote around comp.
I don't even know what your homemade word means,
For the billionth time: it is sum up by Church thesis + "yes doctor",
and you know that.
you claim it's just short for "computationalism" but that is clearly
untrue. For years I've tried to infer its meaning from your usage
but have been unsuccessful.
because you are stuck in the 1p/3p confusion. Or you fake that you are
struck, because in some post, it is pretty clear you got the point.
You fake not to understand the point, for unknown reason. But you fake
badly. I think this becomes clear to everyone.
> If you think there is no 1-indeterminacy
I don't think that either!
At last! So please move on step 4.
Bruno
It's not exactly a earthshaking discovery to state that we often
don't know what we will see next, I believe that was first found by
Og the caveman. So everything you say is true or original, the
parts that are true are not original and the parts that are original
are not true.
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
