On 22 Dec 2013, at 14:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, December 22, 2013 7:21:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Mathematics is not enough for the mind and experience of ... the
machines.
i agree, of course, but how is that view compatible with
computationalism?
It prevents the use of the idea that mathematics is not enough to
circumscribe the human mind, to be applied against mechanism.
It means also that most proposition *about* machine, cannot be found
in a mechanical way.
The simplest examples are that no machine can decide if some arbitrary
machine will stop not, or no machine can decide if two arbitrary
machine compute or not the same function, etc.
If there is no complete theories for machines and/or numbers, it makes
harder to defend non-comp, etc.
>
> The issue though is whether that non-enumerablity is a symptom of
> the inadequacy of Noùs to contain Psyche, or a symptom of Noùs
being
> so undefinable that it can easily contain Psyche as well as Physics.
The Noùs is the intelligible reality. It is not computable, but it is
definable. Unlike truth and knowledge or first person experience.
The Noùs is intelligible, but why is it necessarily reality?
It is the world of ideas, and with comp it is the world of universal
numbers' idea, which rise up as a consequences of addition and
multiplication. It splits into G and G* (but you need to study a bit
of math for this).
> I think that Gödel interpreted his own work in the former and you
> are interpreting it in the latter - doesn't mean you're wrong, but I
> agree with him if he thought the former, because Psyche doesn't make
> sense as a part of Noùs.
That is too much ambiguous. The psyche is not really a part of the
Noùs, which is still purely 3p.
Cool, we agree.
> I see Psyche and Physics as the personal and impersonal
> presentations of sense,
Machine think the same, with "sense" replaced by arithmetical truth.
Except that the machine has to be confused and for her that truth is
beyond definability, like sense.
I don't think that Psyche can be strongly related to arithmetic
truth. There are thematic associations, but I would say that they
are by way of reflected Noùs. First person arithmetic truth is
intuition of Noùs, and Noùs is alienated sense.
No problem. The intuition of truth comes from the fact that sometimes
our beliefs are true. The Noùs is alienating us, as anything which is
not personal consciousness. The Noùs is a gate to the others.
The idea that confusion of truth would be necessary to transform
quantitative rules into qualitative experiences seems to be a shaky
premise at best. It smells like hasty reverse engineering to plug a
major hole in comp. It creates an unacknowledged dualism between
arithmetic truth/definitions and colorful/magic "confusion" of
"definition".
The idea comes from Plato and notably the Theaetetus idea of defining
knowledge by true belief. It works well. Socrate refuted the idea, but
Gödel's incompleteness refutes Socrate's refutation of Theaetetus.
Also, it is the only definition of knowledge which is coherent with
the dream metaphysical argument, and thus with comp. This wold be long
to be developed. All this is fully developed in "conscience et
mécanisme".
> and Noùs is the re-presentation of physics (meaning physics is re-
> personalized as abstract digital concepts).
The Noùs has nothing to do with physics a priori. It is the world of
the eternal platonic ideas, or God's ideas.
I understand, yes. I place it here on the upper left (West) side:
keep in mind the 8 hypostases:
- p (truth, not definable in arithmetic, but emulable in some
trivial sense)
Instead of p being truth,
"p" is just a symbolic way to represent "truth". "p alone means p is
true, when asserted by a machine which is supposed to be correct by
definition and choice.
I see truth as a narrow intellectual sensitivity, not primordial.
Truth encompasses everything. It is provably beyond anything
intellectual. In the Plotinus/arithmetic lexicon: Arithmetical truth
plays the role of the non nameable God of the machine.
The primordial capacity to experience, from which comparisons and
discernments can self-diverge *must* be more primitive than the
notion of right and wrong or is-ness and may-not-be-ness. Before
anything can 'be', there must be a the potential for a difference
between being and non-being to be experienced. That difference is a
quality, not a logic. The logic of the discernment I think must be
second order - the primary quality of discernment is a sense of
obstruction, a fork in the road which interrupts peace/solitude.
Perhaps.
- Bp (provable, believable, assumable, communicable). It splits into
a communicable and non communicable part (some fact about
communication are not communicable)
Instead of belief or proof being primitive or ontological,
Belief or proof are not primitive. They are consequence of addition
and multiplication.
Keep in mind that in the comp TOE: the only primitive (assumed)
element is 0.
And the only laws are logic + the following axioms/assumptions:
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
For matter of convenience, I often consider that 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...
are all primitive, but strictly speaking we need only the object 0.
The existence of machine and their beliefs, and their qualia, etc. is
all done in that theory, without assuming anything else (except
definitional theories of believe and knowledge, and there I take the
most standard theories). .
I see as way down the line and probably only relevant to animals. My
Bp would be the split between qualities of experience. Bp's are
sense which is qualitative, but pre-split to private and public.
The split between public and private comes from the nuance: Bp versus
Bp & p. Knowledge is defined by a true belief. Knowledge is private.
We can never communicate that we know something as such.
They are presences felt within any particular perspective which has
diverged from p. Bp is p/*(=/=p), aka diffracted sense, aka
Tzimtzum, Dreamtime, or primordial qualia.
- Bp & p (the soul, the knower, ... the psyche is here). It does not
split.
This again places human experience far too high in the schema for my
taste.
Why human? All the hypostases exist for all (correct) machines.
The most profound experiences of psyche are not ones in which a
knower is present, but rather one in which notions of a defined self
are are challenged or evaporated.
That is *exactly* what we get with Bp & p. The 1-self of the machine
cannot be defined by the machine. The 1-self of the machine not only
challenge all possible 3-self, (material or not), but refute them
(even self-correctly).
For me, Bp & p is the juxtaposition of perspective between one Bp
and another. It is Bp*/Bp. The inter-gap between (all) Bp's is
reflected as Noùs (impersonal-public quanta) on one side of Bp and
Psyche (personal-private qualia) on the other. Psyche then should be
understood to be Bp(Bp) and Noùs to be Bp(pB) - the personal sense
of the impersonal unsensed.
- Bp & Dt (the intelligible matter, ... matter and physics is here).
It splits in two.
Is Dt distance and time?
D is an abbreviation of ~B~ (B is for a modal box, and D for the
dual diamond). I might come back on a bit of modal logic, if only to
enunciate the precise relationship between arithmetic, machines, and
modal logic. You might (re)read sane2004. it should help.
Bp & Dt = bewesibar('p') & not (beweisbar ('not p')), with p some
arithmetical proposition, and 'p' its Gödel number.
read Bp & Dp by provable(p) and consistent(p). Read Dt by consistency.
Dt = ~B~t = ~Bf = "I don't prove the false" = "I am consistent".
I see physics without matter as a theory within Noùs.
You need the consistency, to avoid the cul-de-sac world. This really
comes from the UDA. It is the simplest way to transform a provability
into a probability.
I would say that matter is Bp(pB(Bp)) - the qualia of the quanta-
masked alienation of Psyche.
- Bp & Dt & p (the sensible matter. the physical experience, (pain,
pleasure, qualia) are here. It splits also in two parts.
I don't think that it is possible for matter to be insensible.
Matter is only the "subject matter" of experience. It does not make
sense to make it sensible, like if there were material object.
Matter is microphenomenal experiences seen from a distant
perspective in which those experiences are deflated and tokenized
through insensitivity, irrelevance, entropy, aesthetic derangement
by scale , etc.
That is when the baby machine (driven by personal intuition Bp & p)
learn to cut her umbilic link with Mother Truth, and begin to be
civilized and talk without public reference to her divine mother :)
It is the passage from Bp & p to Bp. It is the passage from
incorrigible private consciousness to sharable, refutable modest
hypotheses.
It is the birth of science or of the scientific attitude.
>
> I accept the realism of arithmetic representation, and that they
> exist independently of us humans, but not that they exist
> independently of all experience or possibility of aesthetic
> presentation. I say no to theoretical realism.
Realism is always defined with respect to some theory.
Why do you think so. I see realism as undefined and non-theoretical.
Realism is the feeling of fact - the preponderance of sensory
agreements. I think that no information or theory is necessary or
sufficient to establish realism, however realism develops through
significance, which does require information to have accumulated but
not necessarily within the personal range of awareness. I doubt that
molecules experience realism. Realism is the private physics
equivalent of gravity, it takes a large accumulation of habits to
lend enough inertial mass to be 'real'.
I can understand, but I use the vocabulary in the sense the most used
by the expert in the field.
Realism in arithmetic = the belief that arithmetical truth is
independent of me.
Realism in set theory = the belief that set-theoretical truth is
independent of me.
Realism in physics = the belief that physical truth is independent of
me.
Comp requires realism in arithmetic (just to make sense of
computation). It does not require realism in set theory, and it
implies realism in physics (indeed arguably stronger than the physical
realism of phsyicists, because comp physical realism does not requires
a physical primitive reality; it explains it from arithmetic, making
physics much more secure, in some sense.
Arithmetical realism is not independent of experience, as arithmetic
produces them necessarily. They are concomitant.
That's one way to see it, but I don't see that arithmetic makes
anything real,
OK, but this is because you refuse to assume comp. With comp, it is
only a tedious exercise to derive the reality of belief, knowledge,
quanta, qualia etc. And a more difficult subject of research to use
them to refute comp.
or that realism is dependent on arithmetic. Realism is more like
consistency and depth of qualia. Forms remind us of realism but
ultimately what gives the dream weight is that it finds us where we
live and brings with it the opportunity to be a burden of conscience
and commitment.
I can agree here. No problem between this and comp.
Arithmetic overlooks realism entirely. It reflects absolute
consistency, but as incompleteness shows, it is only an incomplete
reflector,
Incompleteness concerns theories and machines, not arithmetical truth.
Arithmetical truth is the big things that machines can never fully
grasp. It is the God of the machine, but this is incommunicable by the
machine, except if the machine assumes comp and self-correctness
(something which can be done consistently, but that needs for extra-
precaution).
so that what it reflects can never be known to be complete.
By any finite creature. But Arithmetical truth is everything but
finite, nor computable, nor computable with Oracle (except itself).
You must keep in mind that befoe Gödel we thought we knew what
Arithmetical Truth is. After Gödel we only can believe that we are
scratching the surface.
This to me is the exposed seam of Noùs, revealing its origin in
alienated Dreamtime rather than Platonic Truth.
Gödel Gödel
>
>
>
>>
>> The consistency objections similarly fail to recognize the core
>> capacity to discern consistency from inconsistency. It is not
>> possible to doubt our own consistency without also doubting the
>> consistency of our doubt.
>
> On the contrary, we, and/or machines, cannot not doubt our
> consistency.
>
> But we can't doubt the consistency of doubt.
Not sure what you mean. In fact we can doubt all assertion of
consistency.
That is an assertion of consistency which cannot be doubted.
Well, why? We doubt all 3p assertions.
We can doubt consistency, consistently.
Yes. Even more, if we don't doubt consistency, then we are already
inconsistent.
The doubter of sanity can only be sane on the level from which the
doubt is cast.
We cannot doubt that we doubt, but we can doubt of the
consistency of all the proposition.
That's a contradiction. If we can't doubt that we doubt, then we
can't doubt the consistency of that proposition (that we can doubt).
G does not contain any sentence
beginning with a D, and G*, on the contrary is close from
possibilitation (p ====> Dp).
Lost me there. When I look at logic variables I see signs in another
language that seem very rigid, incestuous, and uninteresting. Not
that you should care, or that it's something I should be proud of,
I'm just saying that unfortunately my experience of (p ====> Dp) is
identical to (%^^^^^|| $%).
"(p ===> Dp)" meant the rule saying that if you have a proof of p, you
can deduce the consistency of p. G* (the divine noùs, not the machine)
is close for that rule. For example G*, like G, prove t, but only G*
will prove Dt, DDt, DDDt, etc.
> We believe that it is within our power to disbelieve.
>
> What we cannot doubt is our raw consciousness "here-and-now", which
> might be the first person view of consistency. Consistency (Dt) and
> consciousness have many things in common, but incorrigibility works
> only for consciousness. A good first person description of
> consciousness would be Dt v t, making it non doubtable and trivial
> (which it is from the 1p view). But that is still only a sort of
> approximation.
>
> Eliminative physicalism is the embodiment of doubt of our raw
> consciousness.
OK. Nice.
Cool
> Computationalism and emegentism is also used that way by many.
Yes. Alas. But I think that this is specifically and definitely refute
with the UDA (and AUDA). Most people believe that comp is an ally to
materialism, but in fact comp is incompatible with most reasonable
form of materialism. of course primitve matter is a fuzzy notion, so
you can adapt it to be compatible with anything, and that's why in
step 8 we still need a bit of Occam, and that's normal as that has to
be the case when we apply a theory to "reality".
As the third wheel to the sensory-motive, matter-energy tricycle the
information-theoretic primitive can be thought of as either parallel
to the matter-energy or the antithesis of it, depending on where you
view it from. Like matter, information is structured and anesthetic.
Unlike matter is independent of spacetime. Physics has the same view
of information but from the other end. Information to matter is
spacetime itself. Spatial configurations in space and logical
functions through time allow matter to define itself. All of this is
consistent, however, with the absence of sensation and participation.
Only the sensory-motive wheel makes no sense in terms of either
information or physics, so we should, in my view, obviously assume
that it is the fundamental wheel, as it cannot be explained or
analyzed into simpler phenomena at all. From there, with the
aesthetic wheel as the front end of the tricycle, the physical and
mathematical wheels make perfect sense as orthogonal reflections of
the front wheel after dividing itself in two.
This is too vague for me, sorry. I can agree and disagree by
interpreting the terms in slightly different sense.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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