On 12/30/2013 6:09 PM, LizR wrote:
On 31 December 2013 07:44, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 12/30/2013 2:07 AM, LizR wrote:
    On 30 December 2013 21:02, Stephen Paul King <stephe...@provensecure.com
    <mailto:stephe...@provensecure.com>> wrote:

        Dear Bruno,

          Why do you not consider an isomorphism between the Category
        ofcomputer/universal-numbers and physical realities? That way we can 
avoid a
        lot of problems!
           I think that it is because of your insistence of the Platonic view 
that the
        material/physical realm is somehow lesser in ontological status and the
        assumption that a timeless totality = the appearance of change (and its
        measures) is illusory. I would like to be wrong in this presumption!

    The problem is that assuming the material / physical realm as fundamental 
gets you
    no further than assuming that "God did it!" It's a "shut up and calculate" 
(or shut
    up and pray) ontology.

    With materialism you just have a "brute fact" - well, maybe that's it, 
maybe there
    /is /just a brute, unexplained fact. But us ape descended life forms like 
to look
    for explanations even beneath the apparent brute facts!

    But "Everything happens" is just as useless as "God did it".  A theory that 
can
    explain anything fails to explain at all.

It can't explain /anything/. It just says that all outcomes of the laws of physics are instantiated. This requires less information than saying that a specific outcome of the LOP is instantiated, assuming the LOP allow more than one outcome.

But I feel that you must already know this. Are you just being Devil's Advocate, or do you honestly not see the usefulness of multiverse theories?

Stephen isn't talking about a multiverse as implied by physics, he's talking about an immaterialist theory, a "timeless Platonic totality", which I can only suppose consists of everything not self-contradictory or some such.

Brent

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