On Thursday, January 23, 2014 2:18:50 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 23 Jan 2014, at 15:29, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 6:14:35 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > > Consider the posts by Craig. He said clearly "no" to that question, > > making his assumption (existence of a primitive sense) coherent. But > > he used his assumption to justify his negation of comp, but that is > > usually invalidated by the fact that machines get the same conclusion > > than his. His assumption are also quite fuzzy, but there has never > > been any trouble with him, notably because he does never insult or > > patronized others. > > > > > > > > Thanks Bruno, I appreciate that. For the record, I would submit that > > your ability to see your way through the stereotypical machine > > beliefs personally suggests that you are setting a double standard > > whereby a particular machine (namely you, or anyone who subscribes > > to comp) is exempt from "the fact that machines get the same > > conclusion". > > What makes you believe any machine, including me, can be exempted from > that? > > It would be exempted for someone who is certain that he is this or > that machine. But no machine can be in that state, when consistent. >
Isn't the thesis that no machine can be in that state a form of certainty? If we were to say 'the first symptom of being a witch is being sure that we aren't a witch', then we are effectively saying that we can be objectively certain about the objectively unreliable nature of our subjective objectivity. > > > > > > It's a bit of a loaded question. > > Yes. Even diabolically loaded. There is here some philosophical trap. > We navigate on the verge of inconsistency. > But this is also the place where the math will show the consistency > and the necessity. > But we should not assume that the math has access to the aesthetic qualities of awareness. > > > > If I agree with comp then I am in some sense more than machine, > > > Which I sum up often by: IF my body is a machine, my soul is not. > With body = the 3-I, and soul = the 1-I. > I was thinking of the sense that by agreeing with comp, I am rising above the belief that you are saying machines have about comp being untrue. I'm becoming smarter than the average machine who won't believe comp. > > > > > > but if I claim my own authority independent of comp, then my claim > > is false by comp. > > > Absolutely not. > > All I said is that your claim cannot be use against comp in a valid > way. But your claim remain correct. Your soul is not a machine. > How is my soul not a machine if it is reducible to the actions of machines? > My point is that this does not refute comp, because with comp it is a > theorem: all machine's soul are not machine. > Then what are they, and what are they doing with machines? > > It means that you are introspectively correct. You say something true > about you, but not about the machines when you deprived them of a soul. > I don't deprive them of a soul, I deprive them of autonomy. Like Bugs Bunny. It's not a question of whether BB has a soul or not - in a sense, he is a record of a character which could be considered more representative of soul than an ordinary personality...he is a cartoon exaggeration of personality within our experience. What Bugs Bunny lacks is a genuinely proprietary perspective. Bugs Bunny is a picture of something in our mind. A machine is similarly a four dimensional picture in our mind - an expectation that we can decide whether we want to project onto the function or form of the machine or not. > > The wonderful things is that if you identify soul and the knower or > the first person pov, using the oldest definition (Theaetetus, > Plotinus, the true believer), you get, thanks to incompleteness > exactly that. > > You get a machine's soul, I think just the opposite. You get the collective absence of all soul which all machines potentially share. The machine's soul equivalent is real estate within Nous, not the royal inhabitants of the Psyche or even the sub-personal peasants whose bodies are our cells. > which is even worst that not being a > machine, it is even a non nameable, by the machine, entity. > > To anticipate an answer to David Nyman, it might be the universal > conscious first person. A common inner God shared by all good willing > machines. > I think that it is the universal unconscious 0p unperson. A common exo-gnostic anesthesia shared by all synchronized logics. > > > > > > > > > I see it the other way around. If sense is primary, then logic is > > the extension of sense into the unsensed. It is mechanized > > inference, aka, computation. It uses the 'space between' sense to > > infer measurement, and as such, does indeed access a kind of > > interstitial Platonic matrix of eternal truths...however, in my > > view, they are only truths about how sense interacts with itself > > from a distance - very close to sense, but not quite as fundamental. > > In this way, computation is something like the 'perfect imperfect' - > > the imposter, an emulator and digitizer of proprietary content into > > public, anonymous 'films' of sense. > > Because you see only the body. I think. > I think that I'm just observing and interpreting the actual evidence of how mechanism manifests in reality rather than assuming mechanism's theory of itself. > > > > > From that perspective, I think that it makes sense that logic > > mistakes itself for sense, so that the fact that logic itself would > > reflect the assumptions that those with logical minds tend to make > > is consistent. > > I hope you follow the modal thread. Eventually, that is all what the > math will be about. > > I have no problem with your theory, as long as my sun in law can go in > your restaurant. > He can go in a simulation of my restaurant, any time. > I have never said that your theory is not correct, just that your use > of it against comp was not valid. Indeed, your theory will match the > third machine hypostase. > > Comp, like the Gödel sentence, is a bit diabolical, because it > explains that you cannot really believe in comp, from your first > person perspective. People who find comp obvious (like many > materialist) get it wrong. It is truly unbelievable, and the more you > understand it, the less easy you can believe in it. > I don't take issue with its unbelievability though. My skepticism stems only from comparison with the sense primitive making a more complete framework. I think that it is not diabolical because it confounds us, or confounds common sense, but just because it amputates the very thing it is trying to explain, and then sells us on the amputation. Craig > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
