On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-02-13 12:29 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:
On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as
contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have
different physics.
Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree
this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be
true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have
only different geographies.
So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist,
according to comp?
Not completely, as you will still have all the computations
approximating all possible geographical reality, including those
without observers, and in that sense, those "realities" exist, but
they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could
explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution
level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something
that one computation can only approximate). Your question can
depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the "a measure
battle", so that the computations going through you states are
asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example.
So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it
allows them to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic
Principle" ?)
Is that not tautological?
If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early
universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as
obsverers create it (somehow) ?
We select them. See above.
You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever
your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we
know of. That makes it impossible to test.
Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable
than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from,
and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the
laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon
contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this
needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate everything too
much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA.
Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the
dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue
the discussion in decent condition.
I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was
something like "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"
This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white
rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put
constraints on what we can observe ([]p & <>t), so
comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is the only theory
explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp
predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not
depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume *only*
comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature
physics, and test comp.
I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that...
because whatever you could measure about reality could just be
"geographical" and so comp is always in accordance with whatever
measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing
that would invalidate comp ?
If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing
into CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no
physical laws, and everything would be geographical. This would
predict that we can "travel" in the universe/multiverse, and
observe anything logically consistent.
This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever
Undecided" (page 47):
"The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that
holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic
study all possible state of affairs".
Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is
those observations which led us to believe that there are physical
laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our
universe (or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed
we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not
only everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave.
But it can't be true everywhere with comp,
It must be true at the physical level, about the "real" (by comp)
physical reality.
because, I can write a virtual world where this does not hold, and
as it is a virtual world, an infinity of computations approximate
it at any level in the UD deployement (like our reality).... hence,
that "virtual" world is as real as ours by UDA (and not so
virtual)...
It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics.
Why, it is as real IMHO, because it is also implemented by an
infinity of computations... why would our reality be more real ?
Peter Jones realness ingredient ?
No, it is not the same. If you asked what mean "real" to Peter Jones,
he could only use ostensible means, or, reifying the notion of
reality. In our case "real", i.e. "physically real" means obeying to
the comp-physics (and thus defined by the correct 1p-ratio of
computations, and thus with a physical logic (probability 1) given by
the logic of []p & <>t, or slight variant).
hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.
So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it
ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false,
or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the
UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD
but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable).
I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any
measure you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can
invalidate it.
I guess you mean any "measurement" I made is geographical.
I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but what I
measure might be physically universal, unless physics is only
geography, but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to the non
collapse of the modal logic brought by the intensional variants.
Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common to
all geographies, and that is what I call "physical laws", as the rest
will be sort of contingencies.
You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus +
we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a
higher level). OK?
Ok... but it is no more comp. The "we are at the base level of
physics" is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones realness
ingredient.
Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot be
tested, except trivially by being "conscious", as all virtual being
not implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter Jones
theory. This makes Peter Jones "realness" neither confirmable nor
refutable (and thus pseudo-religious somehow, or just a reification
philosophical mistake).
But in our case, that "realness" (defined by the satisfiability of
comp + theaetetus + "non-dream") is *refutable*. That is why I
explained (to Brett Hall, notably) that a computationalist can test if
he belongs to an (higher order, physical (in the comp sense))
simulation.
If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer, I can
derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any observation) and
compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I can't conclude anything
(and my 1p will overlap on reality and the simulation. I still derived
the correct laws of physics), but if I find a discrepancy (and if you
don't mess with my virtual brain so that I stay "correct") then I can
conclude that (~comp V ~Theaetetus V ~simulation). Then by being a
classical computationalist (meaning that I bet strongly on comp and
the S4 theory of knowledge), I can bet as much strongly that I am
failed by some people through a simulation, a bit like in some dream
we can become lucid by keeping attention to the detail of the dream.
Can you find something equivalent for Peter Jones "realness"? I doubt
so.
Bruno
Quentin
(I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back,
as this is not so easy).
In all case it is better than physics, which only compresses
information, without justifying its existence and the modality of
the compression, still less justifying a non communicable part of it
(the physical sensation) or linking sensation and bodies in ad hoc
ways without taking the FPI into account. With comp we don't have so
much choice. That we might be dreaming is also true for physics (and
that's why I often forget to mention the higher level dream, when I
say that comp is refutable---that is universally true).
Up to now, Everett-QM confirms comp, and Theaetetus *and* that we
are not dreaming or in a simulation.
Bruno
Quentin
But comp justifies this: the modalities of provability and
observation does not collapse, and so there are universal (in a
strong sense) laws or physical truth. Among those already predicted
by comp, is the Many-worlds aspect of reality, which appears under
the substitution level, and the existence of indeterminacy and non-
cloning. In particular, without QM, I would probably tend to
believe that comp is not plausible.
But comp gives the whole mathematics of observability, which leads
to infinitely many testable propositions. For example, a form of
Bell's inequality can be described in the logic Z1*, and, well, it
is still open if Z1* violates it. (because it is intractable,
despite the fact that Z1* is decidable, but it would be miraculous
that Z1* proves it, for some reason to lengthy to develop here).
But the point is that if Z1* proves that Bell inequality, then the
fact that nature violates it would refute comp. Z1* (and/or S4Grz1,
X1*) is (are) supposed to formalize the entire quantum logic, so we
can compare directly the quantum logics and the quantum logic of
comp.
Some hope comes from a paper by Rawling and Selesnick(*), which use
quantum logic, and even the modal logic B, which is the modal form
of quantum logic (by a result due to Goldblatt), to implement a
quantum NOR. All this can be tested in Z1*, and normally we can
test the existence of quantum computation in Z1* (or in his
quantified extension qZ1*). Imagine that someone can prove that
qZ1* cannot emulate a quantum computer, and imagine we succeed in
implementing a quantum computation, then comp (+ Theaetetus) is
refuted.
Yesterday (!), I have been sent new papers on quantum logic, which
shows that the field has progressed, notably with respect of
quantum computing, and this suggest that the best way to refute
comp, or improve the knowledge theory, will come from the ability
of qS4Grz1, or qZ1*, or qX1*, to simulate a quantum computer.
Bruno
(*) J. P. Rawling and S. A. Selesnick. Orthologic and Quantum
Logic : Models and Computational
Elements. Journal of the ACM, 47(4) :721-751, 2000.
Regards,
Quentin
However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how
it's testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA.
I hope to be able to explain enough so that you understand the
main line on this.
Meanwhile, more explanation, notably in my answer to Brent.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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