2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: > > On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2014-02-13 12:29 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: > >> >> On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> >> 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: >> >>> >>> On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: >>> >>>> >>>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: >>>> >>>> On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: >>>>> >>>>> That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated >>>>> in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. >>>>> >>>>> Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this >>>>> is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all >>>>> universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different >>>>> geographies. >>>>> >>>> >>>> So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, >>>> according to comp? >>>> >>>> >>>> Not completely, as you will still have all the computations >>>> approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without >>>> observers, and in that sense, those "realities" exist, but they might not >>>> be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can >>>> violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the >>>> infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only >>>> approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer >>>> win the "a measure battle", so that the computations going through you >>>> states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows >>>> them to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?) >>>> >>>> >>>> Is that not tautological? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early >>>> universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers >>>> create it (somehow) ? >>>> >>>> >>>> We select them. See above. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your >>>>> theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That >>>>> makes it impossible to test. >>>>> >>>>> Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than >>>>> evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. >>>>> It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough >>>>> to >>>>> find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ >>>>> Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate >>>>> everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to >>>>> AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner >>>>> and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in >>>>> decent condition. >>>>> >>>>> I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something >>>> like "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!" >>>> >>>> >>>> This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. >>>> But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we >>>> can observe ([]p & <>t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is >>>> the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp >>>> predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all >>>> from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can >>>> compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp. >>>> >>> >>> I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because >>> whatever you could measure about reality could just be "geographical" and >>> so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you >>> precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ? >>> >>> >>> If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing into >>> CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and >>> everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can "travel" >>> in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent. >>> >>> This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever Undecided" >>> (page 47): >>> >>> "The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds >>> for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible >>> state of affairs". >>> >>> Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is >>> those observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, >>> and laws means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should >>> means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= >>> KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not only everywhere, but even in all >>> branch of the universal wave. >>> >> >> >> But it can't be true everywhere with comp, >> >> >> >> >> It must be true at the physical level, about the "real" (by comp) >> physical reality. >> >> >> because, I can write a virtual world where this does not hold, and as it >> is a virtual world, an infinity of computations approximate it at any level >> in the UD deployement (like our reality).... hence, that "virtual" world is >> as real as ours by UDA (and not so virtual)... >> >> >> It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics. >> > > Why, it is as real IMHO, because it is also implemented by an infinity of > computations... why would our reality be more real ? Peter Jones realness > ingredient ? > > > No, it is not the same. If you asked what mean "real" to Peter Jones, he > could only use ostensible means, or, reifying the notion of reality. In our > case "real", i.e. "physically real" means obeying to the comp-physics (and > thus defined by the correct 1p-ratio of computations, and thus with a > physical logic (probability 1) given by the logic of []p & <>t, or slight > variant). > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. >> >> >> So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it ostensibly >> (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are >> dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented >> on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole >> UD in a non computable). >> > > I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any measure > you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can invalidate it. > > > I guess you mean any "measurement" I made is geographical. > I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but what I > measure might be physically universal, unless physics is only geography, > but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to the non collapse of the > modal logic brought by the intensional variants. > Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common to all > geographies, and that is what I call "physical laws", as the rest will be > sort of contingencies. > > > > > >> >> You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we >> are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher >> level). OK? >> > > Ok... but it is no more comp. The "we are at the base level of physics" is > the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones realness ingredient. > > > Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot be > tested, except trivially by being "conscious", as all virtual being not > implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter Jones theory. This > makes Peter Jones "realness" neither confirmable nor refutable (and thus > pseudo-religious somehow, or just a reification philosophical mistake). > > But in our case, that "realness" (defined by the satisfiability of comp + > theaetetus + "non-dream") is *refutable*. That is why I explained (to Brett > Hall, notably) that a computationalist can test if he belongs to an (higher > order, physical (in the comp sense)) simulation. > If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer, I can > derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any observation) and > compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I can't conclude anything (and > my 1p will overlap on reality and the simulation. I still derived the > correct laws of physics), but if I find a discrepancy (and if you don't > mess with my virtual brain so that I stay "correct") then I can conclude > that (~comp V ~Theaetetus V ~simulation). >
As long as you don't specify anything measurable that can be use to claim a discrepancy... you can't do that... Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown, the fact that I could write a virtual world where it does not hold, imply that this virtual world exists in the UD deployement in an infinity of computations which interfere like our reality, no difference here... so by the same point as our "real" world, a conscious being in my virtual world (if a UD exists, and in platonia of course it exists), then at the next step he will be out *my* virtual world but not the consistent extension of it where F=m*a still does not hold true... hence F=m*a cannot be universal in this context and cannot be use to invalidate comp... so as long as you can't say precisely what kind of measurement would invalidate comp or what exactly comp physics encompass (IMO not much except multiplicity of worlds), I can't see a way to falsify it, and certainly not by a measurement. If you think otherwise, please state what kind of measurement you think would qualify. Regards, Quentin > Then by being a classical computationalist (meaning that I bet strongly on > comp and the S4 theory of knowledge), I can bet as much strongly that I am > failed by some people through a simulation, a bit like in some dream we can > become lucid by keeping attention to the detail of the dream. Can you find > something equivalent for Peter Jones "realness"? I doubt so. > > Bruno > > > > > Quentin > > > >> (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as >> this is not so easy). >> >> In all case it is better than physics, which only compresses information, >> without justifying its existence and the modality of the compression, still >> less justifying a non communicable part of it (the physical sensation) or >> linking sensation and bodies in ad hoc ways without taking the FPI into >> account. With comp we don't have so much choice. That we might be dreaming >> is also true for physics (and that's why I often forget to mention the >> higher level dream, when I say that comp is refutable---that is universally >> true). >> >> Up to now, Everett-QM confirms comp, and Theaetetus *and* that we are not >> dreaming or in a simulation. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Quentin >> >> >>> >>> But comp justifies this: the modalities of provability and observation >>> does not collapse, and so there are universal (in a strong sense) laws or >>> physical truth. Among those already predicted by comp, is the Many-worlds >>> aspect of reality, which appears under the substitution level, and the >>> existence of indeterminacy and non-cloning. In particular, without QM, I >>> would probably tend to believe that comp is not plausible. >>> >>> But comp gives the whole mathematics of observability, which leads to >>> infinitely many testable propositions. For example, a form of Bell's >>> inequality can be described in the logic Z1*, and, well, it is still open >>> if Z1* violates it. (because it is intractable, despite the fact that Z1* >>> is decidable, but it would be miraculous that Z1* proves it, for some >>> reason to lengthy to develop here). But the point is that if Z1* proves >>> that Bell inequality, then the fact that nature violates it would refute >>> comp. Z1* (and/or S4Grz1, X1*) is (are) supposed to formalize the entire >>> quantum logic, so we can compare directly the quantum logics and the >>> quantum logic of comp. >>> >>> Some hope comes from a paper by Rawling and Selesnick(*), which use >>> quantum logic, and even the modal logic B, which is the modal form of >>> quantum logic (by a result due to Goldblatt), to implement a quantum NOR. >>> All this can be tested in Z1*, and normally we can test the existence of >>> quantum computation in Z1* (or in his quantified extension qZ1*). Imagine >>> that someone can prove that qZ1* cannot emulate a quantum computer, and >>> imagine we succeed in implementing a quantum computation, then comp (+ >>> Theaetetus) is refuted. >>> Yesterday (!), I have been sent new papers on quantum logic, which shows >>> that the field has progressed, notably with respect of quantum computing, >>> and this suggest that the best way to refute comp, or improve the knowledge >>> theory, will come from the ability of qS4Grz1, or qZ1*, or qX1*, to >>> simulate a quantum computer. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> (*) J. P. Rawling and S. A. Selesnick. Orthologic and Quantum Logic : >>> Models and Computational >>> Elements. Journal of the ACM, 47(4) :721–751, 2000. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Regards, >>> Quentin >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how it's >>>> testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA. >>>> >>>> >>>> I hope to be able to explain enough so that you understand the main >>>> line on this. >>>> Meanwhile, more explanation, notably in my answer to Brent. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >>> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. 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