2014-02-13 18:07 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: > > On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: > >> >> On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. >>> >>> >>> So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it ostensibly >>> (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are >>> dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented >>> on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole >>> UD in a non computable). >>> >> >> I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any measure >> you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can invalidate it. >> >> >> I guess you mean any "measurement" I made is geographical. >> I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but what I >> measure might be physically universal, unless physics is only geography, >> but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to the non collapse of the >> modal logic brought by the intensional variants. >> Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common to all >> geographies, and that is what I call "physical laws", as the rest will be >> sort of contingencies. >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we >>> are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher >>> level). OK? >>> >> >> Ok... but it is no more comp. The "we are at the base level of physics" >> is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones realness ingredient. >> >> >> Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot be >> tested, except trivially by being "conscious", as all virtual being not >> implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter Jones theory. This >> makes Peter Jones "realness" neither confirmable nor refutable (and thus >> pseudo-religious somehow, or just a reification philosophical mistake). >> >> But in our case, that "realness" (defined by the satisfiability of comp + >> theaetetus + "non-dream") is *refutable*. That is why I explained (to Brett >> Hall, notably) that a computationalist can test if he belongs to an (higher >> order, physical (in the comp sense)) simulation. >> If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer, I can >> derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any observation) and >> compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I can't conclude anything (and >> my 1p will overlap on reality and the simulation. I still derived the >> correct laws of physics), but if I find a discrepancy (and if you don't >> mess with my virtual brain so that I stay "correct") then I can conclude >> that (~comp V ~Theaetetus V ~simulation). >> > > As long as you don't specify anything measurable that can be use to claim > a discrepancy... you can't do that... > > > I give an infinity of such specification. If my environment obeys to the > physics Z1*, qZ1*, I can't conclude anything, but I will still derive the > correct laws, either by introspection, or by observation. If my environment > does not obey to Z1*, I am in an artificial simulation. >
That's not something you can measure, please be specific, what do you see as experiment we could do to prove or disprove comp, what measurement would be able to falsify comp, please be precise. > > > > Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown, > > > It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which is > already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic). > > > the fact that I could write a virtual world where it does not hold, imply > that this virtual world exists in the UD deployement in an infinity of > computations which interfere like our reality, no difference here... > > > The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the artificial > simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which does not result > from the interference below the subst. level. > It must be below the substitution level as such world(s) also results from an infinity of computations... so it is below the substitution level, because the level is finite or comp is false. > > If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, > How would it proves that ? It can't, the proof is that there *can be* environments where F!=ma which also results from an infinity of computations. > it will looks "dreamy" to me, > No argument there proving that. > I will see that I am not in a real (comp) physical reality, I will see > the discrepancy. > You still haven't show of what consist comp physical reality beside vague manyworld like prediction... > > > > > > so by the same point as our "real" world, a conscious being in my virtual > world (if a UD exists, and in platonia of course it exists), then at the > next step he will be out *my* virtual world but not the consistent > extension of it where F=m*a still does not hold true... hence F=m*a cannot > be universal in this context and cannot be use to invalidate comp... so as > long as you can't say precisely what kind of measurement would invalidate > comp or what exactly comp physics encompass (IMO not much except > multiplicity of worlds), I can't see a way to falsify it, and certainly not > by a measurement. If you think otherwise, please state what kind of > measurement you think would qualify. > > > *All* physical measurement can refute comp V simulation in principle, as > anything physical can be both derived in comp, and then tested. > Seems totally bogus... no measurement can do that... that's on your shoulder to prove otherwise... Regards, Quentin > > Of course, if there were no physical laws, and that all number relations > measured by physicists are contingent, then that would be a pity for the > notion of physical laws. But then comp would predict that those > geographical laws have to be accessible and we should be able to derive > information on those relations. It would just made the multiverse very > smooth, and its global mathematical structure should still be derivable > from comp and arithmetic, although the testing would been harder to > do. The logic of Matter (observable) would be equal to the logic of Thought > (boolean logic, classical logic, Boole laws of thought). > > Empirically, we don't see that at all, and empirically we have introduced > the notion of physical *law*, and indeed those laws on the observable are > obeying a non boolean logic, quantum logic. > > And then qZ1*, the comp logic of the observation with probability one > (which empirically obeys a quantum logic) does NOT collapse into classical > logic, and does obey a quantum logic. > So comp guaranties that there are quantum physical laws, correct for all > geographies, again (point above) under the condition they emerge *directly* > from the sum on all computations, and not from the dream or simulation of a > universal machine supported by that geography. > > You can in principle derived from all finite multiverse which consists in > counter example to negated theorem of qZ1* build a graph of Stern Gerlach > device refuting comp. We can compare the empirical quantum logics with the > comp quantum logic. Up to now it fits. > It would not have fitted, I would have concluded, from comp, that we are > in a normal, artificial simulation, like Boström, or like Tipler Omega > point. But apparently, until now, nature conforms to the comp quantum logic > and mathematics. > > OK? > > Let me speculate. I would not been astonished that the physics derived > from comp will be a quantum mathematics, with quantum numbers, and that > physics will be a sort of quantum group theory, and that some group can > manage the inflation of realities (like the unitary group, by introducing a > phase to the computations, and eliminates the extravagant more lengthy (in > the UD) path. I expect the SWE, or Dirac, or DeWitt-Wheeler equation, but > the Hamiltonian might be contingent, or geographical, even if cosmic. The > quantum vacuum does look like a quantum universal dovetailer. But here I > speculate. > > Best, > > Bruno > > > > > Regards, > Quentin > > >> Then by being a classical computationalist (meaning that I bet strongly >> on comp and the S4 theory of knowledge), I can bet as much strongly that I >> am failed by some people through a simulation, a bit like in some dream we >> can become lucid by keeping attention to the detail of the dream. Can you >> find something equivalent for Peter Jones "realness"? I doubt so. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Quentin >> >> >> >>> (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as >>> this is not so easy). >>> >>> In all case it is better than physics, which only compresses >>> information, without justifying its existence and the modality of the >>> compression, still less justifying a non communicable part of it (the >>> physical sensation) or linking sensation and bodies in ad hoc ways without >>> taking the FPI into account. With comp we don't have so much choice. That >>> we might be dreaming is also true for physics (and that's why I often >>> forget to mention the higher level dream, when I say that comp is >>> refutable---that is universally true). >>> >>> Up to now, Everett-QM confirms comp, and Theaetetus *and* that we are >>> not dreaming or in a simulation. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Quentin >>> >>> >>>> >>>> But comp justifies this: the modalities of provability and observation >>>> does not collapse, and so there are universal (in a strong sense) laws or >>>> physical truth. Among those already predicted by comp, is the Many-worlds >>>> aspect of reality, which appears under the substitution level, and the >>>> existence of indeterminacy and non-cloning. In particular, without QM, I >>>> would probably tend to believe that comp is not plausible. >>>> >>>> But comp gives the whole mathematics of observability, which leads to >>>> infinitely many testable propositions. For example, a form of Bell's >>>> inequality can be described in the logic Z1*, and, well, it is still open >>>> if Z1* violates it. (because it is intractable, despite the fact that Z1* >>>> is decidable, but it would be miraculous that Z1* proves it, for some >>>> reason to lengthy to develop here). But the point is that if Z1* proves >>>> that Bell inequality, then the fact that nature violates it would refute >>>> comp. Z1* (and/or S4Grz1, X1*) is (are) supposed to formalize the entire >>>> quantum logic, so we can compare directly the quantum logics and the >>>> quantum logic of comp. >>>> >>>> Some hope comes from a paper by Rawling and Selesnick(*), which use >>>> quantum logic, and even the modal logic B, which is the modal form of >>>> quantum logic (by a result due to Goldblatt), to implement a quantum NOR. >>>> All this can be tested in Z1*, and normally we can test the existence of >>>> quantum computation in Z1* (or in his quantified extension qZ1*). Imagine >>>> that someone can prove that qZ1* cannot emulate a quantum computer, and >>>> imagine we succeed in implementing a quantum computation, then comp (+ >>>> Theaetetus) is refuted. >>>> Yesterday (!), I have been sent new papers on quantum logic, which >>>> shows that the field has progressed, notably with respect of quantum >>>> computing, and this suggest that the best way to refute comp, or improve >>>> the knowledge theory, will come from the ability of qS4Grz1, or qZ1*, or >>>> qX1*, to simulate a quantum computer. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> (*) J. P. Rawling and S. A. Selesnick. Orthologic and Quantum Logic : >>>> Models and Computational >>>> Elements. Journal of the ACM, 47(4) :721–751, 2000. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> Quentin >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how it's >>>>> testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I hope to be able to explain enough so that you understand the main >>>>> line on this. >>>>> Meanwhile, more explanation, notably in my answer to Brent. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >>>> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >>> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. 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