On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:
On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated
in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.
Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree
this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be
true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only
different geographies.
So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist,
according to comp?
Not completely, as you will still have all the computations
approximating all possible geographical reality, including those
without observers, and in that sense, those "realities" exist, but
they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could
explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution level
(which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something that one
computation can only approximate). Your question can depend if a
quantum universal dovetailer win the "a measure battle", so that the
computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise
subdovetailing, for example.
So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows
them to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?)
Is that not tautological?
If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early
universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as
obsverers create it (somehow) ?
We select them. See above.
You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever
your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we
know of. That makes it impossible to test.
Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than
evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much
more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it
is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to
refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us
not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to
step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz
said, we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if
we want to continue the discussion in decent condition.
I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something
like "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"
This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits.
But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on
what we can observe ([]p & <>t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted
yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness
comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed
does not depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume
*only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature
physics, and test comp.
However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how
it's testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA.
I hope to be able to explain enough so that you understand the main
line on this.
Meanwhile, more explanation, notably in my answer to Brent.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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