On Thursday, February 13, 2014 6:05:34 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 10:23:14AM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote: > > Craig, > > > > I also suspect Bruno's math skills are superior to mine, but his > > understanding of the place of math in reality seems pretty deficient, or > > perhaps just rigid. > > > > As I've pointed out his 8 steps may well be mathematically consistent > but > > that doesn't mean they have anything to do with the fundamental > structure > > of reality at all. To meaningfully apply a purely mathematical or > logical > > proof to reality, one must establish an actual correspondence of the > > variables in the proof to actual variables of reality. I don't see Bruno > > doing that at all. > > The strength of Bruno's approach is that that is implicit in the > assumption of COMP. Once you assume that one's consciousness can be > implemented by a computation, then necessarily ontological reality > (whatever that is) can also be implemented by a computation. This is a > simple consequence of the Church thesis. >
I understand that, but my argument has never been with Bruno's approach to Comp, it is with the assumption of Comp itself. I have a different understanding of the relation between information and consciousness which makes more sense, and it explains why Comp is false, and why it cannot be proved false logically. Craig > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au<javascript:> > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.