On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 07:30:23PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
> On 2/17/2014 7:09 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 06:32:35PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
> >>On 2/17/2014 5:21 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >>>On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 02:03:49PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
> >>>>On 2/17/2014 1:55 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >>>>>On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 05:33:48AM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
> >>>>>>Russell,
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>All of science assumes an external reality independent of human
> >>>>>>observation.
> >>>>>Who says? I must have been asleep when they announced this in Physics
> >>>>>101! Actually, I'm pretty sure they never did.
> >>>>I'd say science assumes that we can agree on observations. The
> >>>>success of this hypothesis is generally taken as evidence for a
> >>>>reality independent of human observation.
> >>>>
> >>>By whom?
> >>Vic Stenger for one. Me for two.
> >and David Deutsch, for three, IIUHC. To which we can add Bruno Marchal and
> >myself against the obviousness of that idea.
> >
> >But these are all rather unusual individuals, in a way.
> >
> >>>That is a serious question. Of course, some scientists might
> >>>speculate about this down at the pub, and certainly there has been
> >>>some discussion along these lines on this list, but in everyday
> >>>science, everyone is trained as a positivist, and tends to act as
> >>>such, which is probably a worse syndrome than naive Aristotelianism.
> >>>
> >>>The notion that there is a real reality there, with solid things like
> >>>tables and stones to stub your toes on has taken such a drubbing since
> >>>the beginning of the 20th century,
> >>I'd say positivism has taken a lot more of a drubbing since Mach than
> >>realism.
> >>
> >Hmm - I'm not so sure. It was certainly the prevailing opinion back
> >when I was closer to fundamental physics research. The sort of stuff I
> >deal with now is much less abstract, though, so things like tables and
> >stones (or people and dollars) are fundamental objects of
> >analysis. Are people doing string theory utterly realist about the
> >stuff they do? Seems hard to imagine it.
>
> There's a strong form of realism which says the real is whatever is
> in the ontology of our best theory. I think that is a mistake and I
> doubt anyone really holds that view. Of course it is our working
> assumption at any given time, but that is true even when we're
> pretty sure the theory is false. GR is our best theory of spacetime
> and so we think gravity waves exist, but we don't think
> singularities exist and consider GR almost certainly wrong. I think
> scientific realists are all falibilists.
>
> But there is a weaker form. However unlikely one thinks strings or
> singularities or multiple-worlds are, one may still hypothesize that
> there is *some* reality as the explanation for the intersubjective
> agreement that is consistently observed.
Sure - one may hypothesise so. But does it assist in any scientific
experiment to do so? And is there any evidence to support the
hypothesis, or is it simply like pre-classical physics - good enough
to get the next meal.
> Just consider the contrast
> with religions in which there is NOT intersubjective agreement about
> visions and revelations.
>
> >
> >>The replacement of tables and chairs by atoms and then by wave
> >>functions is just changing our best guess about ontology - it's not
> >>evidence that there is no mind independent ontology. The fact that
> >>there is intersubjective agreement on observations is still evidence
> >>for a mutual reality.
> >Yes a mutual reality, but not a mind independent one.
>
> Certainly independent of any single mind. And the science
> formulated so far is independent of mind - which is why Liz supposed
> that the past existed before it was observed (and constitutes a
> block universe past).
Supposed, maybe, but certainly not evidence of it. Whose to say that
"our" past is not simply hewn out of the primordial Multiverse by our
observations, which progressively fix which world (and history) we inhabit?
>
> >
> >>>that most everyday scientists usually
> >>>just focus on mathematical descriptions of phenomena, and leave it at that.
> >>But if you ask them why mathematical descriptions are so successful?
> >Wouldn't they just point at Occam's razor, if they've thought about it
> >at all, that is? Or even go with Max Tegmark and say its all mathematics.
>
> Mathematics is just a different substrate, a different but still
> mind indpendent reality. Notice that the main argument given for
> the reality of mathematics is the intersubjective agreement on the
> truths of mathematics; which gives the feeling it is discovered
> rather than invented.
>
Yes - but I really don't think this is Vic's, or David's view of a
mind-independent reality. But also see my comment below re COMP.
> >
> >>Or why do we all agree that's a chair over there?
> >That one is obviously convention. Someone from remote Amazonia who's
> >never seen a chair before wouldn't agree.
>
> They might not agree on the name, but they would agree there was an
> object there. The possibility of having a useable convention would
> seem to be a miracle if there is nothing mind-indpendent that
> correlates the perceptions of different persons.
>
The English language? Its clearly mind dependent, as there are minds
to whom English is complete gibberish.
> >
> >>The existence of
> >>some mind independent reality is always the working assumption.
> >>
> >Really? I don't think working scientists need to think about the issue
> >much at all.
>
> Because it's an assumption so common they only question it unusual
> experiments - like tests of psychics.
>
Assuming the assumption is common for the sake of argument, can you
think of a situation where that assumption has any bearing on the
experiment being performed?
> >Whether they assume there is some kind of
> >mind-independent reality, or are outrageous solipsists would not
> >affect their ability to conduct experiments or do theory.
>
> One could still assume a mind-independent reality while assuming
> that one was the only mind. But they could not do either
> experiments or theory if they assumed the result depended on what
> they hoped or wished or expected.
>
I certainly have never asserted that. The reality we observe must be
compatible with our existence. Any observed reality must be compatible
with the existence of an observer. But we suppose that there are many
different possible observed worlds. Some features of those worlds are
accidental ("mere geography"), and only shared by some worlds. Other
features are shared by all observable worlds (what we call
"physics"). The question is whether any feature shared by all possible
observed worlds is due to some reason other than the fact that
observers necessarily exist in those worlds. For there to be a mind
independent reality, there needs to be such a facts. It is my position
that no such fact exists - but I'd love to be proved wrong, it would
make things "interesting".
I could believe that mathematical facts (about say the integers) could
fit that category, and thus be the basis of a fundamental
ontology. But even in COMP, we cannot distinguish between an ontology
of Peano arithmetic, or of Curry combinators, say. Once your ontology has
the property of Turing completeness, you could choose any such
ontology and be none the wiser. Doesn't this make the whole notion of
an ontological reality rather meaningless?
Anyway, given some fact of our reality about which it is not known
whether it is necessary for the existence of an observer, how do we
distinguish between mind dependence (perhaps we may discover it to be
important later on when we have a better theory of consciousness),
mind independent physics or just mere geography?
--
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Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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