On 2/17/2014 10:15 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 09:18:32PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/17/2014 8:58 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 07:30:23PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
But there is a weaker form.  However unlikely one thinks strings or
singularities or multiple-worlds are, one may still hypothesize that
there is *some* reality as the explanation for the intersubjective
agreement that is consistently observed.
Sure - one may hypothesise so. But does it assist in any scientific
experiment to do so? And is there any evidence to support the
hypothesis, or is it simply like pre-classical physics - good enough
to get the next meal.
The same kind of evidence as for any scientific theory.  It not only
assists, the repeatability of experiments by persons with different
minds tests it.
I don't see why. It merely tests _inter_subjectivity, not
objectivity. I cannot think of a single test of objectivity, off the
top of my head.

I don't think there's any difference between objectivity and inter-subujective agreement. I tend to use them interchangably.


Certainly independent of any single mind.  And the science
formulated so far is independent of mind - which is why Liz supposed
that the past existed before it was observed (and constitutes a
block universe past).
Supposed, maybe, but certainly not evidence of it. Whose to say that
"our" past is not simply hewn out of the primordial Multiverse by our
observations, which progressively fix which world (and history) we inhabit?
Why "our" then; why not "my" and why not a brain is a vat?  Why not
nothing but a momentary dream?  Some hypotheses are more fruitful
than others, lead to more predictions, provide a more succinct model
of the world.

Not sure what your point is here. It's our, because we're having this
conversation.

Not necessarily.  Maybe you're just imagining it.


The existence of
some mind independent reality is always the working assumption.

Really? I don't think working scientists need to think about the issue
much at all.
Because it's an assumption so common they only question it unusual
experiments - like tests of psychics.

Assuming the assumption is common for the sake of argument, can you
think of a situation where that assumption has any bearing on the
experiment being performed?
Sure. The experimenters don't try to think special thoughts about or
during the experiment to influence the result - contrast prayer.
What does that have to do with whether there is an objective reality
or not?

It has to do with whether what they do is mind-independent or not. You're taking "mind dependent" to mean "observed somewhere, sometime by some mind". So do you agree that the results of scientific observations (those for which there is inter-subjective agreement) are independent of which particular minds do the observing.



It _is_ reasonable to assume that one's private thoughts will not
affect the experiment's outcome. But that is not the same as assuming
the phenomena is due to some objective reality.

Whether they assume there is some kind of
mind-independent reality, or are outrageous solipsists would not
affect their ability to conduct experiments or do theory.
  One could still assume a mind-independent reality while assuming
that one was the only mind.  But they could not do either
experiments or theory if they assumed the result depended on what
they hoped or wished or expected.

I certainly have never asserted that. The reality we observe must be
compatible with our existence. Any observed reality must be compatible
with the existence of an observer. But we suppose that there are many
different possible observed worlds.
Real ones?

Some features of those worlds are
accidental ("mere geography"), and only shared by some worlds. Other
features are shared by all observable worlds (what we call
"physics"). The question is whether any feature shared by all possible
observed worlds
Is that possible worlds that are observed or worlds that might
possibly be observed?
possible worlds that are observed

But this is incoherent. When we formulate a theory about the big bang or how fossils were formed or how our Mars Rover is functioning the theory is that those things really happen whether anyone observes them or not. Now you may say that eventually someone will observe them, but that is already theory laden. The big bang is observed via satellite telescopes which send down digital images which are displayed on LED screens which send photons to your retina which sends signals along your optic nerve...and THEN observation takes place? But observation of what? nerve impluses? There is no observation without theory, which includes some kind of ontology to define the observation. You don't have to assume your theory includes what is really real, but it has to include a theory of observation if you are to go beyond from pure solipistic dreams.


is due to some reason other than the fact that
observers necessarily exist in those worlds. For there to be a mind
independent reality, there needs to be such a facts.
So a world must have physics that *permits* observers in order that
it be our world.  But worlds don't have to have *geography* that
permits observers, e.g. this universe between inflation and the
recombination.  So they can be mind independent.

Just so long as some geography permits the observers, such as on a
rocky planet on a middling start some 13 billion years after those events.

But the theory derived to explain that observation also entails that no one need have observed it.


It is my position
that no such fact exists - but I'd love to be proved wrong, it would
make things "interesting".

I could believe that mathematical facts (about say the integers) could
fit that category, and thus be the basis of a fundamental
ontology. But even in COMP, we cannot distinguish between an ontology
of Peano arithmetic, or of Curry combinators, say. Once your ontology has
the property of Turing completeness, you could choose any such
ontology and be none the wiser. Doesn't this make the whole notion of
an ontological reality rather meaningless?
Then you would have structural realism.
Yeah - fair enough. That position is largely a defeat of the idea that
we can know an ontological basis of phenomena.

But that's just the radical skepticism that we can't *know* anything. All theories are provisional.


Anyway, given some fact of our reality about which it is not known
whether it is necessary for the existence of an observer, how do we
distinguish between mind dependence (perhaps we may discover it to be
important later on when we have a better theory of consciousness),
mind independent physics or just mere geography?

You seem dismissive of geography, even though it includes us.  It
seems like a too convenient move to deny realism.

A mere geographical fact is not evidence of an objective reality. My
geographical facts differ from yours.

But a geographical fact that is unobservable is mind independent and our best theories entail that many such facts exists.

Brent




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