On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>>  On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
>> consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the
>> continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is
>> what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the
>> circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a
>> transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac).
>> This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics
>> of some particular continuation.
>>
>>
>>  So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?
>>
>>  This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I
> assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does
> computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state?
>
>
> Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone
> seems to be on their first consciousness.
>

Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be
made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite
lifetime? Well, because you have to start somewhere... This could be
similar - there may be reasons to expect everyone to be "on their first
consciousness" this near to the big bang, perhaps.)

   Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,

 I see no reason to assume that.
>

Hence the phraseology used above. If you say "given that X", that means
you're assuming it for the sake of argument. (Sorry, maybe I should have
said "if we assume that..." to make it clearer?)

  does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that "I am
he as you are he as he is me", etc).

 Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain
> physical processes?
>
> Since you can "see no reason to assume" the initial premise (see above) it
seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it!

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