On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:
On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote:
No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of
consciousness
is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing
existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is
observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the
circle of
observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a
transcendent
expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This
expectation
is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some
particular
continuation.
So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past?
This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I
assume? -
or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational
theory
assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state?
Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone
seems to be
on their first consciousness.
Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be made for the
QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite lifetime? Well, because you have
to start somewhere... This could be similar - there may be reasons to expect everyone to
be "on their first consciousness" this near to the big bang, perhaps.)
Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness,
I see no reason to assume that.
Hence the phraseology used above. If you say "given that X", that means you're assuming
it for the sake of argument. (Sorry, maybe I should have said "if we assume that..." to
make it clearer?)
does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that "I am he as you are
he as he is me", etc).
Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain
physical
processes?
Since you can "see no reason to assume" the initial premise (see above) it seems a bit
odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it!
I wrote "no reason to assume" that consciousness is not the content of consciousness. The
premise I took is "everyone's on their first consciousness". For which you offered the
explanation of amnesia; and I offered a different one. If you're going to criticize logic
you need to parse correctly.
But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing up with different
experiences and memories in what sense could you be the same person. I John Clark and
Bruno's back and forth, the one thing they always agree on is that as soon as the M-man
and the W-man open the transporter doors and see different scenes they are different people.
Brent
Brent
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