On 3/25/2014 4:12 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 25 March 2014 16:58, chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com <mailto:chris_peck...@hotmail.com>> wrote:

    */>>I think you're missing Scott's point.  The universe is obviously 
isomorphic to a
    mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many different mathematical 
structures,
    all of which are in Borges Library of Babel.  Almost all of them are just 
lists of
    what happens.  Scott's point is that this is not very interesting, 
important, or
    impressive. It's only some small elegant compression of those lists that's
    interesting - if it exists. Scott seems to think that it does.  I think it 
does
    *only* because we're willing to call a lot of stuff "geography" as Bruno 
puts it,
    aka boundary conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness... /*

    Hmm, I just read Scott as saying that MUH is scientifically empty in the 
sense that
    it makes no significant predictions, the emphasis being on the word 
significant. The
    predictions it does make are a little wishy washy. Like, MUH predicts that 
science
    will continue to uncover mathematically describable regularities in nature. 
what
    would a non-mathematically describable law look like? And how is a 
mathematically
    describable regularity in this universe evidence of the existence of another
    mathematical universe? He also takes Tegmark to task on his use of anthropic
    reasoning because it allows Tegmark to have his cake and to eat it. The 
extent to
    which regularities are elegantly described by maths will be taken as 
evidence for an
    inherently mathematical ontology. The extent to which they are not will 
allow him to
    invoke the anthropic principle and say well it would be absurdly lucky that 
the one
    universe that existed just happened to have these wierd constants that 
supported life.

    I think in Popperian terminology Tegmark's predictions just are not risky 
enough.
    He's guaranteed to hit one or the other every time.


    I'll be interested in how Tegmark addresses Scott's last point concerning 
the
    physicality of universes beyond the cosmic horizon.

    I can see both points of view. I can appreciate Tegmark's view that a 
galaxy 1 light
    year beyond the cosmic horizon is just like Andromeda but just a bit 
further away.

    On the other hand I also see Scott's point that if it is just far enough 
away to
    prevent any causal interaction then it doesn't satisfy a reasonable 
definition of
    physical. To be physical is to be causally relevant. There doesn't seem to 
be much
    semantic difference between a non physical universe and one which is so far 
away
    that it couldn't ever effect us.


An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts.

That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. I think the idea is that the "stream of consciousness" is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not "multiple" per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams.

Brent


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Stathis Papaioannou
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