On 29 March 2014 03:24, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his > consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit or > implicit position on personal identity in functionalism. > > > This is weird. I guess you mean your notion of functionalism, which is too > much general I think, but I was still thinking it could have a relation > with "functionalism" in the math sense, where an object is defined by its > functional relations with other objects, and the identity *is* in the > functionality. > > Then "function" is always used in two very different sense, especially in > computer science, as it can be extensional function (defined by the > functionality), or its intension (the code, the description, the "body"). > > Could your functionalist say yes to a doctor, which build the right > computer (to replicate his consciousness), and add enough "original atoms" > to preserve the identity? Is someone saying yes to that doctor, but only if > a priest blesses the artificial brain with holy water a functionalist? > > Can you describe an experience refuting functionalism (in your sense)? > Just to help me to understand. Thanks. >
A person could conceivably say the following: it is impossible for a computer to be conscious because consciousness is a magical substance that comes from God. Therefore, if you make an artificial brain it may behave like a real brain, but it will be a zombie. God could by a miracle grant the artificial brain consciousness, and he could even grant it a similar consciousness to my own, so that it will think it is me. However, it won't *really* be me, because it could only be me if we were numerically identical, and not even God can make two distinct things numerically identical. I don't accept this position, but it is the position many people have on personal identity, and it is independent of their position on the possibility of computer consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
