On 27 Mar 2014, at 17:59, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/27/2014 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here.
The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent
to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after
a night's sleep.
I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here. Someone
who associates consciousness to its actual matter might say that he
is the same person after one night, but not after "seven
years" (assuming the whole material body constitution has been
changed).
That seems to be equivocation on "same".
OK. That is what I was trying to illustrate, in the case of some non-
comp axiom.
In a sense I'm the same person as Brent Meeker of 1944, but I'm
certainly very different. And not just because I'm made of different
atoms (which are indistinguishable anyway).
No problem.
Bruno
Brent
The person I was when I was 3 years old is dead. He died because
too much new information was added to his brain.
-- Saibal Mitra
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