Bruno wrote 3-28 at 2/32: *"I would say that we can work only from what we believe or assume today, and might indeed be shown wrong tomorrow."*
Thanks for adding 'belief' to my assume + suppose. *"How can I understand that without assuming that by using the word "and" you assume the same meaning than me, actually that both "assume" and "suppose" are inadequate.* *But then your statement is self-defeating. "* So be it: I do not go for the TRURH. *"On the contrary, science works by making assumptions all the times. Why not?" * We are not of the best appriciation of 'science' in general, are we? *"You don't seem agnostic on the question if there is really something more that numbers (in company of their laws)."* How about being agnostic on NUMBERS (in company of their laws)? I don't feel obliged to *know* things usually filling up the books. *"I just offer an argument showing that if comp is true, then it makes no sense to say that there is more than arithmetic. No machine can conceived something more complex than arithmetic "seen" from inside. That's beyond mathematics."* Huh? Is your(?) opinion how 'complex' a machine can conceive a fundamental truth? And now you call it mathematics? do you know the utter limits of it? (beyond!!). Granted, we start from SOME (belief) system and try to fill in the voids. There is no evidence that we do the right thing (me included - why I do not want to 'persuade' anybody to accept my ideas). I expose my argumentation to trigger some good responses what I can use in my further thinking. Thanks for the reply John M On Fri, Mar 28, 2014 at 2:32 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 28 Mar 2014, at 02:54, John Mikes wrote: > > Bruno: of course you cannot even fathom a 'Q-state' with so much > unknow/able/n in everything we KNOW about, or don't even KNOW ABOUT. . > Reproduce? No chance. You can work only on whatever is known today. (And > that, too, is questionable in your (my?) science) > > > I would say that we can work only from what we believe or assume today, > and might indeed be shown wrong tomorrow. > > > > > *Assume* and *suppose* are inadequate. > > > > How can I understand that without assuming that by using the word "and" > you assume the same meaning than me, actually that both "assume" and > "suppose" are inadequate. > But then your statement is self-defeating. > > On the contrary, science works by making assumptions all the times. Why > not? > > > > > Even "the *best possibility*" is hollow.. > Cloning would use all those infinite details we miss in repro. > Everything is an unidentified term, unless you add "everything OF WHAT" > (restricted), which of course makes the term laughable (everything of > something not everything).. > Your proclaimed fellow agnosticism must agree to that I suppose. > > > > You don't seem agnostic on the question if there is really something more > that numbers (in company of their laws). > > I am agnostic, on comp, and thus on its consequences too. > > I just offer an argument showing that if comp is true, then it makes no > sense to say that there is more than arithmetic. No machine can conceived > something more complex than arithmetic "seen" from inside. That's beyond > mathematics. > > Bruno > > > > > John Mikes > > > On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 4:37 PM, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com>wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote: >> >>> >>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>> >>> Bruno, >>> >>> How does cloning differ from "asking the doctor". >>> Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- >>> just to indicate that this is an important question. >>> >>> >>> No problem: I love all questions :) >>> >>> The non cloning theorem says that you cannot copy exactly a *quantum >>> state*. Note that you can still teleport it quantum mechanically, but you >>> have to detsroy "the original". >>> >>> But nobody pretends that your mind needs your exact quantum state. It >>> needs only a substitution level, which is usually estimate to be at a quite >>> higher level than the quantum state. >>> >>> You cannot clone this or that exemplary of "Alice in Wonderland", but it >>> is easy to make a copy of its classical information content, which is way >>> above the quantum level defining the "material" book. >>> >> >> Bruno, My concern is at what level is consciousness. I suspect that if it >> is below the substitution level, then consciousness will not be transmitted >> >>> >>> All the same with this present post. Once send it will be multiplied, >>> without any information loss, to all participant to this forum. >>> >> >> Right, except that I suspect that the post is not conscious. >> >> >>> Now, I should add that the consequence of comp remains correct, even if >>> our substitution level is sub quantum, and asks for the total quantum >>> state. WHY? because the consequences depends only on step 7, which does not >>> use any duplication of any states, but only their multi-preparation, which >>> is done automatically by the arithmetical reality, or the Universal >>> Dovetailer. Only the pedagogical step 1-6 are no more available except ... >>> as pedagogical steps. But a majority of people believe that the brain, >>> although plausibly a quantum object, works at a much higher level, so I >>> don't insist so much on this, given that we get a non-cloning result >>> directly by comp. >>> >>> OK? >>> >> >> Right, and I suspect that consciousness could be duplicated >> if the consciousness level is at or above the substitution level. >> Seems we have several levels: >> the particle and quantum levels, and the consciousness and the >> substitution level, The conscious level is fixed by nature. >> The substitution level seems to be fixed by mathematics. >> They both may be the same: nature and math, that is. >> Richard >> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Richard >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote: >>>> >>>> Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the >>>> first-person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem. Could you >>>> explain how? >>>> >>>> >>>> In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed in >>>> staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I decide to copy >>>> a piece of matter. >>>> >>>> Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is already >>>> not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy should be defined by >>>> something like a non distinguishability with respect to some set of >>>> instruments. >>>> Anyway, at some point, in your zooming toward finer and finer >>>> description of the piece of matter, you arrive at your own substitution >>>> level. At that level, the matter is no more made of subpart, but is >>>> undetermined, as you comp state is no more dependent of such details, and >>>> *you* diffuse on all the possible "subcomputations", where, by the FPI, all >>>> universal machines are somehow in competition (by the invariance of the 1p >>>> for the "length of the proof of the sigma_1 proposition, or computations). >>>> How could you clone that? We cannot clone an object, because an object is >>>> not a real thing, but an information pattern, which becomes necessarily >>>> fuzzy when we look at it below the substitution level. What we can see >>>> there is only an average of the many possible computations below our (first >>>> person plural) substitution level. >>>> >>>> OK? >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Fabric of Alternate Reality" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to foar+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to f...@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/foar. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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