On 28 Mar 2014, at 20:56, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno wrote 3-28 at 2/32:
"I would say that we can work only from what we believe or assume
today, and might indeed be shown wrong tomorrow."
Thanks for adding 'belief' to my assume + suppose.
OK. I almost identify "assume" and "belief". I don't pretend those are
equivalent concept, but for most matter, they are of the same nature.
The key point is that we don't assert them like if they were true. We
remain open it can be false. We might just find them plausible,
because we don't have nagative evidence, and they works better than
alternate assumptions/theories. But like the french poet said "De
mémoire de rose je n'ai jamais vu mourrir un jardinier" (roses believe
that gardener are immortal, as they usually don't see gardeners dying
during their short life).
"How can I understand that without assuming that by using the word
"and" you assume the same meaning than me, actually that both
"assume" and "suppose" are inadequate.
But then your statement is self-defeating. "
So be it: I do not go for the TRURH.
OK. You go at least for consistency. Inconsistency entails false indeed.
"On the contrary, science works by making assumptions all the times.
Why not?"
We are not of the best appriciation of 'science' in general, are we?
I think we can. If we do that "scientifically", it means only that we
cannot be sure not being saying big stupidities. I might do that right
now.
"You don't seem agnostic on the question if there is really
something more that numbers (in company of their laws)."
How about being agnostic on NUMBERS (in company of their laws)?
OK, nice. But here I pointed on the "only numbers (with their laws)"
consequence of the computationalist postulate.
I don't feel obliged to know things usually filling up the books.
But you might be supposed to believe in some of them, in some context
at least. In many threads, like on relativity, or on the climate,
absolutely nobody makes arguments like "you assume that the CO2
molecules obeys 1 CO2 + 1 CO2 = (1+1) CO2 = 2 CO2, and so assume
1+1=2, but nobody can be sure. Well, in computer science and
computationalist metaphysics, we assume also that 1+1 = 2. That
assumption is not metaphysical, it is only elementary arithmetic. We
just use logic to make *all* our assumptions explicit, even on the use
of elementary logical concept, like "and", "or," "implies" etc.
"I just offer an argument showing that if comp is true, then it
makes no sense to say that there is more than arithmetic. No machine
can conceived something more complex than arithmetic "seen" from
inside. That's beyond mathematics."
Huh?
Is your(?) opinion how 'complex' a machine can conceive a
fundamental truth?
I don't think it is a matter of opinion, but of theorem in computer
science. My opinion is only that computationalism is enough plausible
to get a theory precise enough to be refuted.
And now you call it mathematics? do you know the utter limits of it?
(beyond!!).
Yes, by lifting (by comp) the consequence of the theorem limiting the
formalism and machine. We can prove that some notion (like truth) are
not definable in general by the machine. I don't make this into an
absolute, but we can derive it in the context of the comp supposition.
Granted, we start from SOME (belief) system and try to fill in the
voids. There is no evidence that we do the right thing (me included
- why I do not want to 'persuade' anybody to accept my ideas).
Goo. We agree on this.To be persuaded on anything publicly
communicable is a result of violence, authoritaitive argument,
insanity, disease, etc.
I expose my argumentation to trigger some good responses what I can
use in my further thinking.
I know that and I appreciate.
Like with Craig, I can say that your feeling are not a long way from
the machine's feeling, including your quite sane doubting attitude
about comp, which I certainly share. But that is a reason for me to
dig on it, even if that is to refute it in some future.
Thanks for the reply
You are welcome, best,
Bruno
John M
On Fri, Mar 28, 2014 at 2:32 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 28 Mar 2014, at 02:54, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno: of course you cannot even fathom a 'Q-state' with so much
unknow/able/n in everything we KNOW about, or don't even KNOW
ABOUT. . Reproduce? No chance. You can work only on whatever is
known today. (And that, too, is questionable in your (my?) science)
I would say that we can work only from what we believe or assume
today, and might indeed be shown wrong tomorrow.
Assume and suppose are inadequate.
How can I understand that without assuming that by using the word
"and" you assume the same meaning than me, actually that both
"assume" and "suppose" are inadequate.
But then your statement is self-defeating.
On the contrary, science works by making assumptions all the times.
Why not?
Even "the best possibility" is hollow..
Cloning would use all those infinite details we miss in repro.
Everything is an unidentified term, unless you add "everything OF
WHAT" (restricted), which of course makes the term laughable
(everything of something not everything)..
Your proclaimed fellow agnosticism must agree to that I suppose.
You don't seem agnostic on the question if there is really something
more that numbers (in company of their laws).
I am agnostic, on comp, and thus on its consequences too.
I just offer an argument showing that if comp is true, then it makes
no sense to say that there is more than arithmetic. No machine can
conceived something more complex than arithmetic "seen" from inside.
That's beyond mathematics.
Bruno
John Mikes
On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 4:37 PM, Richard Ruquist
<yann...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno,
How does cloning differ from "asking the doctor".
Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory-
just to indicate that this is an important question.
No problem: I love all questions :)
The non cloning theorem says that you cannot copy exactly a
*quantum state*. Note that you can still teleport it quantum
mechanically, but you have to detsroy "the original".
But nobody pretends that your mind needs your exact quantum state.
It needs only a substitution level, which is usually estimate to be
at a quite higher level than the quantum state.
You cannot clone this or that exemplary of "Alice in Wonderland",
but it is easy to make a copy of its classical information content,
which is way above the quantum level defining the "material" book.
Bruno, My concern is at what level is consciousness. I suspect that
if it is below the substitution level, then consciousness will not
be transmitted
All the same with this present post. Once send it will be
multiplied, without any information loss, to all participant to
this forum.
Right, except that I suspect that the post is not conscious.
Now, I should add that the consequence of comp remains correct,
even if our substitution level is sub quantum, and asks for the
total quantum state. WHY? because the consequences depends only on
step 7, which does not use any duplication of any states, but only
their multi-preparation, which is done automatically by the
arithmetical reality, or the Universal Dovetailer. Only the
pedagogical step 1-6 are no more available except ... as
pedagogical steps. But a majority of people believe that the brain,
although plausibly a quantum object, works at a much higher level,
so I don't insist so much on this, given that we get a non-cloning
result directly by comp.
OK?
Right, and I suspect that consciousness could be duplicated
if the consciousness level is at or above the substitution level.
Seems we have several levels:
the particle and quantum levels, and the consciousness and the
substitution level, The conscious level is fixed by nature.
The substitution level seems to be fixed by mathematics.
They both may be the same: nature and math, that is.
Richard
Bruno
Richard
On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote:
Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the
first-person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem.
Could you explain how?
In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed
in staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I
decide to copy a piece of matter.
Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is
already not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy
should be defined by something like a non distinguishability with
respect to some set of instruments.
Anyway, at some point, in your zooming toward finer and finer
description of the piece of matter, you arrive at your own
substitution level. At that level, the matter is no more made of
subpart, but is undetermined, as you comp state is no more
dependent of such details, and *you* diffuse on all the possible
"subcomputations", where, by the FPI, all universal machines are
somehow in competition (by the invariance of the 1p for the
"length of the proof of the sigma_1 proposition, or computations).
How could you clone that? We cannot clone an object, because an
object is not a real thing, but an information pattern, which
becomes necessarily fuzzy when we look at it below the
substitution level. What we can see there is only an average of
the many possible computations below our (first person plural)
substitution level.
OK?
Bruno
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