Bruno, I have a problem with the Gleason Theorem because it appears to me to be saying that every possible quantum state is realized with equal probability at first, but the frequency at which each universe reoccurs is given by the FPI probabilities that are measured in controlled quantum experiments. If what I just said is true, I'm sure you can see my the source of my skepticism. So please correct my understanding of the Gleason Theorem. Richard
On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 01 Apr 2014, at 03:33, meekerdb wrote: > > On 3/31/2014 6:00 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 1 April 2014 06:04, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would >> consider a big price since all observation and record keeping which is used >> to empirically test theories assumes this unity. If you observe X and you >> want to use that as empircal test of a theory it isn't helpful if your >> theory of the instruments says they also recorded not-X. >> > > (I suspect some people would consider it a big price not to have a > unified self for other reasons, too!) > > I can't see how it's worse for your theory to say that your instruments > "will record X and not X" as opposed to saying they "will record X or not > X, but we don't know which". > > > That's before the fact. I didn't write "will". MWI is a theory that > says when you read your instrument and it says X, it's only one of an > infinite set some of which say X and some say not-X. > > The former explanation says there will be apparent but explicable > randomness, the latter says there will be intrinsic and inexplicable > randomness. > > > But is it explicable. Bruno is careful to refer to "uncertainty" or > "indeterminancy". Those are not necessarily probabilities unless they can > be quantified to satisfy Kolomogorov's axioms - and it's not clear to me > that they can. The axioms require that the set of "everything" have > measure 1. But in this case "everything" is ill defined and uncountably > infinite. > > > It might be definable though, like "the consciousness of the universal > machine". It is the least Turing emulable entity having some "futures" in > the arithmetical reality. It is the first person mental state in front of > the maximal FPI. > > > > In common applications of QM one assumes isolation and considers only a > small (at least finite) set of possible results - which works FAPP. > > > But in Everett and comp we "know" why, without having to invoke a > mysterious pseudo-God-like selection, apparently. ISTM. > > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
