On 01 Apr 2015, at 03:58, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Mar 2015, at 07:17, Bruce Kellett wrote:
So I would reject the computationalist program right at the start
-- I would not say "Yes, doctor" to that sort of AI program.
Nor do I.
That is why I say that my definition of computationalism is weaker
than most in the literature.
Computationalism, as I defined it, assumes only the existence of a
level of substitution such that you survive with a digital (Turing
emulable) functional substitution made at that level.
In which case you have physical supervenience, and nothing else.
But then consciousness is no more explainable by computations, and
there is no more reason to say "yes to the doctor".
Keep in mind that I am NOT defending the truth of computationalism. I
only argue that with computationalism we have to deduce the physical
laws from arithmetic, and I illustrates how to do that, and find (much
more quickly than I would ever have hope) already quantum logic and
many quantum weirdness (indetermincay, no-locality, orthomodularity,
incompatible observable, symmetries, etc.)
What I do not get is physical time, space, energy (which might be
geographical, but even if that is the ace, that we lust deduced).
The digital simulation of brain functions is achieved on a physical
computer after all, which is a physical object itself -- simulating
(primitive) physical processes.
Assuming a physical object, which I do not (nor do I assume they don't
exist). Comp, the hypothesis is nutral on what exist, except for what
is needed to have a UTM, so it assumes one UTM, if you want, but not
necessarily a physical UTM.
In the six first step of the UD argument, I suppose the level high
(but still describing the biology of neurons and glials cells), to
make the reasoning more easy. But the conclusion hold up even for
someone who say that to get its relevant actual state, we need to
simulate the while universe, from the big bangs, at the level of
superstring theory, with (10^(10^100)) hexadecimals exact.
Don't count on superstring theory!
This is because that dumb little Robinson Arithmetic emulates that
"artificial brains", infinitely often, and with sometimes *much*
bigger number of decimals.
I find it hard to understand what you mean here. RA 'emulates'
artificial brains? The picture that comes to my mind is: if you
write out the numerical sequence of digits, 123456789101112......,
that sequence contains all possible subsequences. I cannot remember
whether this sequence is actually a normal number or not, but that
seems likely.
That one is normal, I think. But anyway: it is not what I mean when I
say that RA emulates all digital brains. It means something subtler,
and which takes many pages to be proven. It is usually done in good
textbook of mathematical logic. If people insist, I can give the proof
here. It is not simple.
The library of Babel is not a univeral dovetailing, and the number of
Champernow (0,1234567891011 ..) does not emulates anything, despite
describing (in some ways) all computations.
Within this sequence is the Goedel number for my brain (or for the
whole universe). And it does not matter which encoding I use for
Goedel numbers -- the normal number contains them all. A very simple
Turing machine (any modern computer) can churn out this sequence of
digits any time it likes (though it might take a long time to get to
me or anyone else!).
Is this anything like what you have in mind?
No.
Your confusion is akin to the confusion between
"Obama is president of the USA" is true, and
"Obama is president of the USA" contains 6 words.
If it is, the mere existence of a static sequence does not comprise
the dynamical object.
I agree.
It is a description, not the reality, and it confuses the map with
the territory. If the description of a brain can be conscious, then
the MGA fails.
Yes.
But a description of a computation, and a computation are not the same
thing. It is hard to explain this without explaining more about the
difference between syntax and semantics in computer science or
mathematical logic.
My other main objection would be the white rabbit issue -- all
magical states that are nearly the same as me are also in the
sequence.
That is my point. It is not an objection: it is the problem which I
explain to exist.
Of course, I assume the Church-Turing thesis. This assumes some
realism on the possible digital machines and machineries,
equivalent with realism on a tiny fragment on which intuitionists
and classical mathematicians agree. Most physicists used stronger
mathematical theories. And Brent made me realize that RA is even a
strct finitisme in Van Bendeghem sense. RA is consistent with there
is a biggest number.QM.
Does this not constitute an (insuperable) problem for the simplest
case? If RA is consistent with a biggest number, then the sequence
is not normal, and nothing useful need be included.
It is not, as we need only the standard model of arithmetic. I just
add this to explain that at the ontological level, we can be strict
finitist. It is not important. RA is just a very weak theory. Comp
would be false in case a machine use that biggest number, but it can
be shown that this would violate Church-thesis.
May be comp is false, but that is why I make it precise and look
for the consequence. Without Everett QM I would still be sure it
can't be true, but perhaps still study it, for the beauty of
mathematics.
You rely too much on Everettian QM -- which you can't even begin to
derive in your theory.
Then comp is false. My point is that we have to derive it. Then comp
explains quickly the existence of the many dreams/computation-see-from-
inside, and the math gives the quantum logic, etc.
Well, it shows also that IF you prove that Everett QM is not deducible
from arithmetic, then Everett QM or comp is false.
The Everett relative state interpretation is only that, an
interpretation of QM.
Hmm..; Actually I disagree with this. By Everett I mean Everett's
theory, or formulation of QM: that is the SWE.
Adding the collapse makes another theory, which is non sensical with
comp.
It is not an established theory, and any other interpretation of QM
that gives the same observational results would do as well. The MWI
program based on Everett has many problems of its own. It is very
likely that in the final analysis, the Schroedinger equation will be
seen to be nothing more that a device for calculating probabilities
-- it is merely epistemological, not ontological.
I can agree. With comp, all physicalness is epistemological, not
ontological.
FPI is then an illusion, and you cannot use physics to support your
theory -- particularly when there is no evidence that your theory is
even consistent with QM, much less physics.
I have no theory. Only theorems. I just prove that if we are machine,
we cannot add any axiom to arithmetic to explain anything else.
The irony, of course, is that proponents of the MWI rely on physical
realism to justify their position. Given comp, MWI collapses (pun
intended :-) ).
I see the pun, but not the argument. With comp, we have to explain why
the many dreams cohere so well, because we got many much dreams, all
instantiate or processed by virtue of the additive-mutiplicative
structure of elementary arithmetic. Physical realism is OK with comp,
it is physical fundamentalism which is not OK.
Comp gives at once a "atheist" (with respect to universe) theory
explaining entirely why the universe can have a non physical
explanation. It is like Darwin with the species: it is an explanation.
To invoke a primitive universe does not explain more than invoking a
god. There are no evidence for a *primitive* universe (in contrary: we
have evidence for a physical universe, but there are no fact which
makes it in need to be assumed, or primitive).
Bruno
Bruce
The big discovery is the discovery of the universal machine, by
mathematician trying to clarify some paradoxes.
Bruno
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