On 01 Apr 2015, at 04:25, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/31/2015 6:58 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Mar 2015, at 07:17, Bruce Kellett wrote:
So I would reject the computationalist program right at the start
-- I would not say "Yes, doctor" to that sort of AI program.
Nor do I.
That is why I say that my definition of computationalism is weaker
than most in the literature.
Computationalism, as I defined it, assumes only the existence of a
level of substitution such that you survive with a digital (Turing
emulable) functional substitution made at that level.
In which case you have physical supervenience, and nothing else.
The digital simulation of brain functions is achieved on a physical
computer after all, which is a physical object itself -- simulating
(primitive) physical processes.
In the six first step of the UD argument, I suppose the level high
(but still describing the biology of neurons and glials cells), to
make the reasoning more easy. But the conclusion hold up even for
someone who say that to get its relevant actual state, we need to
simulate the while universe, from the big bangs, at the level of
superstring theory, with (10^(10^100)) hexadecimals exact.
Don't count on superstring theory!
This is because that dumb little Robinson Arithmetic emulates that
"artificial brains", infinitely often, and with sometimes *much*
bigger number of decimals.
I find it hard to understand what you mean here. RA 'emulates'
artificial brains? The picture that comes to my mind is: if you
write out the numerical sequence of digits, 123456789101112......,
that sequence contains all possible subsequences. I cannot remember
whether this sequence is actually a normal number or not, but that
seems likely.
Within this sequence is the Goedel number for my brain (or for the
whole universe). And it does not matter which encoding I use for
Goedel numbers -- the normal number contains them all. A very
simple Turing machine (any modern computer) can churn out this
sequence of digits any time it likes (though it might take a long
time to get to me or anyone else!).
Is this anything like what you have in mind?
If it is, the mere existence of a static sequence does not comprise
the dynamical object.
The passage of time is not the sequence of computational steps. I
think the idea is that conscious states can be computed in any order
and their time relation is inherent (like Barbour's time capsules).
I see some problems with idea, but not the one you raise.
A sequence of states (physical or arithmetical) is never a
computation. To have a computation, you need a computer (physical or
arithmetical) which makes the passing from a state to the next.
It is a description, not the reality, and it confuses the map with
the territory. If the description of a brain can be conscious, then
the MGA fails.
My other main objection would be the white rabbit issue -- all
magical states that are nearly the same as me are also in the
sequence.
Of course, I assume the Church-Turing thesis. This assumes some
realism on the possible digital machines and machineries,
equivalent with realism on a tiny fragment on which intuitionists
and classical mathematicians agree. Most physicists used stronger
mathematical theories. And Brent made me realize that RA is even a
strct finitisme in Van Bendeghem sense. RA is consistent with
there is a biggest number.QM.
Does this not constitute an (insuperable) problem for the simplest
case? If RA is consistent with a biggest number, then the sequence
is not normal, and nothing useful need be included.
May be comp is false, but that is why I make it precise and look
for the consequence. Without Everett QM I would still be sure it
can't be true, but perhaps still study it, for the beauty of
mathematics.
You rely too much on Everettian QM -- which you can't even begin to
derive in your theory. The Everett relative state interpretation is
only that, an interpretation of QM. It is not an established
theory, and any other interpretation of QM that gives the same
observational results would do as well. The MWI program based on
Everett has many problems of its own. It is very likely that in the
final analysis, the Schroedinger equation will be seen to be
nothing more that a device for calculating probabilities -- it is
merely epistemological, not ontological. FPI is then an illusion,
and you cannot use physics to support your theory -- particularly
when there is no evidence that your theory is even consistent with
QM, much less physics.
Bruno's theory may fair better with a Quantum Bayesian
interpretation than with MWI, since he hopes to take conscious
states as more fundamental and derive the physics. It would lead to
idealism instead of Platonism.
Well, Russell's anthropic idea is closer to Bayesianism, and i do
consider that this might explain the geography, but the physical laws
are not bayesian, they are deduced from the universal measure on the
reelative computations, independently on any facts which could be use
in a formula à-la Bayes.
We are lead to immateralism, and the physics is "idealiste" (= drived
from psychology or theology). But the idealism is objective, as
psychology is also derived from arithmetic. So, "idealism" can be
ambiguous here.
Bruno
Brent
The irony, of course, is that proponents of the MWI rely on
physical realism to justify their position. Given comp, MWI
collapses (pun intended :-) ).
Bruce
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