On 21 Sep 2015, at 02:49, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Sep 20, 2015 at Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Yes, arithmetic can simulates a Turing machine,
Arithmetic can't simulate anything unless it has access to
something physical like a biological brain or a electronic
microprocessor.
You confuse the notion a universal machine a implement a universal b,
with the notion of a physical universal machine c implements a
universal machine b.
I don't assume a physical universe to start with, if only because it
is one of the thing I want to have an explanation for (the appearance
or the reality, as I am agnostic at the start).
the machine a implements the machine b is an arithmetical notion. It
can be defined *in* arithmetic, and the existence of particular
computations and emulations of computations by other computations can
be proved already in Robinson Arithmetic.
> But a primary physical reality, well I have already not much
clue what that can be,
It means physics is the most fundamental science and mathematics
is just a tool humans have invented to help them figure out how
nature in general and physics in particular works; I'm not saying
that it true, I don't know if it is or not, I'm just saying that's
what it means.
I am OK with that epistemological version, no problem. And then what I
say is that digital mechanism, or computationalism is incompatible
with physics being the most fundamental science, even if physics is
quite important. the fundamental science is theoretical computer
science, alias mathematics, alias machine's (and other entities)
"theologies" (the science by machines of what is bigger than
themselves, like a "reality".
> if quantum field theory is correct, it is an analog imitation
of the digital.
The first word of the name should have tipped you off, if
QUANTUM field theory is correct then nothing is analog.
There is a continuous and a diecrete quantum teleportation technic,
and the existence or not of a physical continuum is an open problem,
both empirically (gravitation is not yet unified with the other
forces) and computer-science theoretically, even if they are
compelling argument for some continuum, if only the presence of some
random oracle due to the global FPI.
> You need to make precise your theory of primary matter to
proof that it can emulates all computations,
I'm just playing devil's advocate, unlike you
I don't claim to have proven anything.
Proving is my job. That is what I do. That is what mathematician does,
in math or in applied theoretical field. When I say that RA proves the
existence of the terminating computations, I am saying a standrd result.
You oppose this by introducing a notion of physical computation, which
you have not yet define.
You are using vague undefined notions to criticize standard result in
the field.
I don't know if math or physics is more fundamental; you don't know
either but you think you do.
I know nothing. I give a deduction that IF computationalism is
correct, then physics cannot be the fundamental science, and the proof
is constructive and shows how to derive physics, and I have used this
to derive the propositional logic of the observable, and it fits until
now with the empirical facts.
Advantage: it explains both the quanta and the qualia. Which was the
goal: to have a testable explanation of the appearance of a universe
without eliminating conscious and person.
>>> Physical water, like any physical stuff does not
rely on one computations, but on an infinity of them,
>> Nobody knows if that is true or not, maybe only an
astronomical number of calculations would be required to perfectly
simulate water, but if you're right and a infinite amount of
mathematics would be required to do what just a small amount of
matter can do so effortlessly then it's game over and physics is
more fundamental than mathematics, and mathematical models can
never be more than just approximations of the real deal.
> Not at all, as this is *derived* without any phsyical
assumption
You just assumed that any finite amount of mathematics can only
approximate what matter does. So how can mathematics be more
fundamental?
I prove this. I don't assume it. Matter is given by the FPI on all
computations in arithmetic. That is a priori not Turing emulable, but
for computationalism to remain coherent with the empirical facts, we
have to derive that the digital brains and the finite pieces of
mathematics can explain the local facts and allow for digital
universal machine to be enough stable, or we would not even exist in a
physical mode at all.
Bruno
John K Clark
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