On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 10:37 PM, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> On 7/10/2015 12:38 pm, Jason Resch wrote: > > On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 at 6:49 PM, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> > wrote: > >> On 6/10/2015 9:54 am, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >> It's not clear to me who is arguing for what. Stathis may think that >> consciousness is independent of it's physical substrate, but I don't see >> that he's arguing that here. He's arguing that there can be more that one >> instance of "the same" consciousness. But it's not clear what is meant by >> "the same". Does one think of one's own consciousness as being the same as >> it was a second ago? an hour? a year? twenty years? I think there must >> be degrees of "sameness". Similarly, the degree will depend on the >> environmental context and interaction. If you became completely >> immobilized I think it would change your consciousness. Stephen Hawking is >> quite different than he was 50yrs ago. If you had a chip implanted that >> allowed you perceive the whole EM spectrum, including polarization, it >> might well change your consciousness. Drugs and accidents change people's >> personality and so, by inference, their consciousness. So does just plain >> learning. >> >> >> I agree. The argument has become a little unclear. As I understand >> Stathis's position, he is arguing that since consciousness is a >> computation, any physical instantiation of that computation lead to the >> same consciousness -- the same person in fact. My objection was really that >> such an idea makes no sense if you are considering instantiations of that >> computation in different universes, or times and locations outside out >> light cone. That is for two reasons -- first: there is no proof that any >> such 'copies' of our brain activity actually exist; and second, even if >> they exist you can never know that they exist, when or where. In addition, >> even if they do exist, they can have no effect on you here and now -- they >> are outside the light cone, after all. >> > > > They do affect you, because identical conscious states are, (by > definition), indistinguishable from that point of view. So when you are > experiencing a particular conscious state, and there are different paths, > or future extensions of that conscious state, you can never be certain of > which one will follow. Consider these various sequences of conscious states: > > H->N->J > W->N->Q > X->N->Y > > If each letter represents a conscious state, then anyone experiencing > conscious state "N" cannot predict with any certainty whether their next > experience will be that of "J", that of "Q", or that of "Y". The reason > this is relevant is because the statistics of computations appears to share > many of the properties/consequences of quantum mechanics, in particular > with the many-worlds/many-minds interpretations: there exist an infinite > number of conscious minds (all minds perhaps), which differentiate/combine > when as they diverge or converge upon common states. > > This is an oversimplification. It is not at all clear what a "conscious > state" actually is. > Here a conscious state is that which you cannot (even in theory) subjectively differentiated from another identical "conscious state". > For instance, how long does it last? Does it consist of one thought or > two? Or the space between thoughts? > Make it as long or as short as you'd like, it doesn't matter for the purposes of the above reasoning to work. > > There is a similar problem with the simplistic equation of brain states > with conscious states. How many brain states make up a conscious state? > This is physicalism. A physical time slice of a brain is not the same as a conscious state (under computationalism). > What is a brain state? How long does it last? Is it an instantaneous > snapshot? Or a Planck time, Or a femtosecond? Or what? > Like a CPU, a complex computation and computational state may require many sub-computations to occur and accordingly occurs over a long period of time (especially for a highly serial CPU). The computation of a conscious state by a brain is spread out over time and space. > Quantum mechanics is of little relevance here. The brain is hot, and > quantum events decohere so rapidly that it is clear that any conscious > processes in the brain are entirely classical. So quantum analogies are > seriously misplaced. It is even more misguided to hang you theory of mind > on a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics. > I don't. This is not QM explains the mind/consciousness. It's the mind/consciousness explains QM. > MWI is an interpretation of a theory, not a theory in its own right. > MWI is so far, the only theory of quantum mechanics, in so far as its the only well-defined, mathematical and consistent account of quantum mechanics. Collapse theories, say that the laws of QM are only obeyed some of the time, and are unclear about those times it supposedly does not. As such, they are incomplete half-baked ideas, not theories; they offer no explanations about when QM's equations are or aren't followed. > Any other interpretation of that theory gives exactly the same results. So > the interpretation is of no physical or psychological significance. > > As to your light-cone argument, the issue here is, I think, a confusion > between tokens and types. The word "the" is a type. But the particular > instance you see before you, made up of light and dark pixels on your > computer screen is a token representing that word "the". A hydrogen atom is > a type containing one proton and one electron. But the particular hydrogen > atom at very tip of your right pinkie's fingernail is a token. This token > hydrogen atom cannot leave your future light cone. However, many other > identical types (other hydrogen atoms) exist beyond your future light cone. > We don't need to travel outside your light cone to reach this conclusion, > as it is a consequence of our current, and most widely accepted theories. > > > This is all highly Platonic -- the theory of forms and their instances all > over again. As with quantum mechanics, it is a serious weakness to hang > your whole account of mind on an outmoded philosophy. > I think you're reading too much into what I am saying. You don't need to assume Plato's ideal forms to believe hydrogren atoms or the word "the" have many identical instances. You believe you are your atoms, but atoms are indistinguishable, and so in theory there can be multiple identical instances of you. The computationalist believes his experience is a computation, and any computation may be replicated by any Turing machine. > > > I would argue, that so long as any token instance of a particular type > exists, we can say that this type continues to exist. If the type refers to > some living being, or conscious state, or conscious mind, then so long as > any token (anywhere) exists, we might say that this living being, or > conscious state, or conscious mind exists. This follows regardless of > whether the other token implementing that type is within or outside the > future light cone of some other previous token implementing that type. > > Is a particular mind a natural type? Or is it only the generic 'mind' that > is a natural type? Maybe the particular mind is only a token of the generic > type 'mind', not a type in its own right. You beg the question in your > analysis. > You postulate some unknown difference between your distant doppelgangers that makes them not the same (despite being defined as the same (physically, organizationally, materially, computationally)). Stathis and I merely reject your theory that there is some unknown difference that makes a difference. > > > Given these considerations, I would argue that since we cannot know they >> exist, and they can have no effect even if they do exist, we can simply >> ignore the possibility. It can make no difference to our understanding of >> anything, one way or the other. >> >> I think the basic problem arises from an attempt to reify Bruno's >> computational theory. >> > > Define what the process of "reify"-ing involves. > > Exactly what it says: making "real". It means taking a theoretical > construct from your theory or model and saying that it is real, that it > "really" exists in the objective external world. > Theories cannot make things real or unreal. An object is either real or not, despite our theories. You happen to assume an ontology that is very limited (only that which you can see with your senses is real). Others on this list entertain the idea that much may exist beyond the reach of our senses. > > > Bruno's idea seems to be that our consciousness is essentially a >> particular computation, >> > > This isn't Bruno's idea, but the leading and currently dominant position > in the philosophy of mind. > > >> and that particular computation will exist many times (probably an >> infinite number of times) in arithmetic. So our particular consciousness, >> and the environment in which it is found, is made up of the statistics of >> the computations going through that conscious state. >> > > I'd say this is a good assessment of computationalism, in the context of > any theory that presumes arithmetical realism. > > >> But an essential element of this is that these computations exist only in >> arithmetic >> > > What do you mean by "only"? How is a computation in arithemetic less or > more real than any other computation? > > > A computation might use arithmetic, or combine arithmetical entities. But > that does not happen in arithmetic. As John Clark is known to have said: > arithmetic cannot compute diddly-squat! Only a physical computer (person) > can compute anything. > Which affirms your (and John's) sensorial biases and perhaps reveals an unfamiliarity with computer science. Our computers are only emulating (mimicking) mathematical objects which perform these computations. In the course of a physical computer's simulation, they may reveal the result of a computation to us, but that result (and computation) was already there. Just as 49 was always the square of 7. (Even before some guy built an abacus and "discovered" the multiplication of 7*7 = 49). If calculators can discover multiplication relationships, our computers can discover computational histories/traces of Turing machines. > > -- they do not exist in a physical world >> > > How do you define a physical world? Is there any test to differentiate a > "physical" world from a mathematical object isomorphic to that physical > world? > > Yes. Kick it and it kicks back. Mathematics does not kick back. > I think you missed the point of my question. How do you know that rock, or the pain of your stubbed toe are not themselves mathematical objects? Also, you might find that math kicks back against your pencil, as you attempt to pen a proof that 2+3=4. > > > Or more specifically, a conscious experience within a presumed physical > world, from a conscious experience of a simulation computed by a physically > or arithmetically instantiated computer/computation? > > If you want to believe that we are living in a simulation run on a > super-computer devised by some superior alien race, then be my guest. I do > not believe this, and see no relevance in the possibility. > *or* arithmetically instantiated computer/computation > Solipsism is always the last refuge of the seriously deluded. > Who brought up solipsism? > > > >> -- they are not physical operations of a physical "computer". >> > > What if physical worlds are just arithmetical worlds? > > > What if????????? > You have no evidence or argument against that possibility. Given Occam, it's simpler to suppose only mathematical objects exist, then to suppose there are mathematical objects, but also some other kind of physical objects, which are in some undefinable way different from the mathematical objects, and also the only type of objects imbued with the capability of creating conscious minds. > > > > So the attempt to identify these many computations running through my >> consciousness with the existence of multiple copies of me in the level one >> multiverse is simply a confusion of categories -- a confusion of the >> (Platonic) arithmetic level with the (real-world) physical level. >> > > Maybe the confusion stems from the belief that there is some "real" > difference between "concrete" and "abstract". > > > I can think of a perfect cube. But I can't kick it. > Again you are appealing only to what your senses have access to. You cant kick the space beyond the cosmological horizon, nor the center of a black hole, nor the dodo bird from the 1800s, nor your duplicate selves in other branches of the wave function, nor other rocks in other inflation events of eternal inflation, nor 99.999999....% of things we suppose to exist. So your kickability metric, is a poor choice for evaluating what may exist. > I can also think of a brick, and when I kick that I hurt my toe. That is > the difference between "concrete" and "abstract": concrete things exist, > abstract things don't. > But how do you know whether or not they exist? What is your ontological theory/assumption and how do you justify it? For many reasons, I believe all mathematical structures/objects/relations exist. I think this is the simplest theory that also congruent with all observations, and may offer additional insights and answers to other open problems: fine-tuning, weirdness of QM, etc. > > > Not unnaturally, this confusion leads to nonsense, such as the idea that >> one's consciousness might continue in another universe if something goes >> wrong in this universe. >> > > Types can have many tokens. If someone in another universe writes Moby > Dick, then Moby Dick continues in that universe, even after the heath death > of our own (assuming time comparisons between distinct universes could ever > make sense). > > > Ah, the perfect form again. > So do you agree or disagree that a copy of the story "Moby Dick" penned by an author in another universe, could be word for word, identical, and that it would constituted the same story? > > > The only way you can copy your consciousness, if that is indeed possible, >> is to gather the information and make a copy using standard physical >> processes. >> > > Proof? > > No proof? > > There is no magical "dual" fact about consciousness such that it exists >> without that substrate. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain: if >> you have two physical brains, you have two consciousnesses. >> > > If you have a hard cover copy and a soft cover copy of Moby Dick, you have > two books, but only one story. If the characters in the story were complex > enough creatures to have an inner view and life, their correlates across > the two copies would be identical and the same. Copying the book would not > create new conscious states, only more instances of the same conscious > states. > > The characters in a book are not conscious. > Not as text on pages, but potentially as subroutines within a computer program. A program which could be copied and re-executed elsewhere. > Copying a book produces new books. Copying a person produces new persons. > > Yes, but my point was that copying a book does not produce new stories. And copying a person, while creating new bodies, does not create new conscious states. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
