2015-10-07 11:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
> On 7/10/2015 6:06 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > 2015-10-07 7:49 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>: > >> On 7/10/2015 3:58 pm, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 10:37 PM, Bruce Kellett < >> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: >> >> They do affect you, because identical conscious states are, (by >>> definition), indistinguishable from that point of view. So when you are >>> experiencing a particular conscious state, and there are different paths, >>> or future extensions of that conscious state, you can never be certain of >>> which one will follow. Consider these various sequences of conscious states: >>> >>> H->N->J >>> W->N->Q >>> X->N->Y >>> >>> If each letter represents a conscious state, then anyone experiencing >>> conscious state "N" cannot predict with any certainty whether their next >>> experience will be that of "J", that of "Q", or that of "Y". The reason >>> this is relevant is because the statistics of computations appears to share >>> many of the properties/consequences of quantum mechanics, in particular >>> with the many-worlds/many-minds interpretations: there exist an infinite >>> number of conscious minds (all minds perhaps), which differentiate/combine >>> when as they diverge or converge upon common states. >>> >>> This is an oversimplification. It is not at all clear what a "conscious >>> state" actually is. >>> >> >> Here a conscious state is that which you cannot (even in theory) >> subjectively differentiated from another identical "conscious state". >> >> >> Hmmmm! 'Identical' *means* that they cannot be differentiated, >> theoretically or subjectively. How do you know that two conscious states >> are identical? >> >> For instance, how long does it last? Does it consist of one thought or >>> two? Or the space between thoughts? >>> >> >> Make it as long or as short as you'd like, it doesn't matter for the >> purposes of the above reasoning to work. >> >> There is a similar problem with the simplistic equation of brain states >> with conscious states. How many brain states make up a conscious state? >> >> This is physicalism. A physical time slice of a brain is not the same as >> a conscious state (under computationalism). >> >> OK. Since I do not accept computationalism, I am cool with that. I >> believe, in accordance with all the available evidence, that consciousness >> supervenes on the physical brain. So states of the physical brain are >> relevant to consciousness. >> >> What is a brain state? How long does it last? Is it an instantaneous >>> snapshot? Or a Planck time, Or a femtosecond? Or what? >>> >> >> Like a CPU, a complex computation and computational state may require >> many sub-computations to occur and accordingly occurs over a long period of >> time (especially for a highly serial CPU). The computation of a conscious >> state by a brain is spread out over time and space. >> >> >> Hence it is almost impossible to duplicate. Once the time scale >> increases, environmental interference becomes increasingly important. And >> you still haven't specified how you determine that two conscious states are >> identical. >> >> Quantum mechanics is of little relevance here. The brain is hot, and >>> quantum events decohere so rapidly that it is clear that any conscious >>> processes in the brain are entirely classical. So quantum analogies are >>> seriously misplaced. It is even more misguided to hang you theory of mind >>> on a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics. >>> >> >> I don't. This is not QM explains the mind/consciousness. It's the >> mind/consciousness explains QM. >> >> >> Bullshit. In spades. >> >> MWI is an interpretation of a theory, not a theory in its own right. >>> >> >> MWI is so far, the only theory of quantum mechanics, in so far as its the >> only well-defined, mathematical and consistent account of quantum >> mechanics. Collapse theories, say that the laws of QM are only obeyed some >> of the time, and are unclear about those times it supposedly does not. As >> such, they are incomplete half-baked ideas, not theories; they offer no >> explanations about when QM's equations are or aren't followed. >> >> >> Bullshit, in double spades. You seem to think that QM is a *final >> theory*. This is by no means clear. The best one can do is treat it as an >> effective theory: it is a calculational tool that enables one to calculate >> probabilities with remarkable precision. Beyond that, one cannot claim >> anything. >> >> And why do MWI enthusiasts think that collapse theories are the only >> alternative to many worlds? That is simply not the case -- there are many >> other possibilities. Including my favourite, which is that QM is merely an >> effective theory that is useful for calculating probabilities in the >> quantum domain. Eschew ontological commitments! >> > > So again, as it seems, you dislike metaphysical discussions, yet, you do > that for months... you don't want to commit to anything, nor discuss > ontology, fine, but please stop implying this is stupid or bullshit. Here > we *don't* make ontological commitments, we discuss ontological > possibilities... what we believe (or not) is our personnal choice. > > > I called your ludicrous statements about quantum mechanics and its > interpretations bullshit, > That's not my statement, please check to whom you're to talking to and replying. > and I make no apology for that, because that is a precise characterization. > You should, as I'm not the one who made such statement... > > "Here we don't make ontological commitments.....". Pull the other one. Its > got bells on it. > > So if your stance, is that we can't perceive any ontology beyond our > theories, that they're merely tools and cannot give any insight at all > about the true nature of reality, we're wasting time continuing discussing > with you... because all you'll say is "bullshit" to anything (which is fine > for you if you believe that, but useless in ontological discussion). > > As a philosopher friend was prone to say, epistemology precedes ontology. > Until you understand your data processes, and the basis of your theorizing, > you are in no position to make ontological claims. And often, > instrumentalism is the best we can do, even if we would really like to get > to grips with the 'ding an sich', sadly, that frequently eludes us. > So if you have the instrumentalism stance, and you agree with the shut up ... and calculate, Do just that, without forgetting the shut up part then... thx Quentin > > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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