On 10/8/2015 10:14 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>wrote:

    ​ >> ​
    Brains are not like ideal von Neumann computers or Turing machines
    that have "brain states" corresponding to "mental states".   If
    you simulated a brain using a computer you would find that an
    enormous number of "brain states" were required to instantiate a
    single conscious thought


​ You're talking about parallel processing,

No I'm not.

Brent

but a Turing Machine can simulate a parallel computer too. The only advantage that parallel computers have is that they're faster for most problems, but without external stimulus subjectively you would have no way of knowing if your mind was working fast or slow, or even if it had stopped completely for a billion years and then restarted.

 John K Clark


 ​









    On 10/6/2015 1:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

            On 6 Oct 2015, at 2:45 PM, Brent Meeker
            <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



                On 10/5/2015 6:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

                    On 6 Oct 2015, at 11:29 AM, Brent Meeker
                    <meeke...@verizon.net
                    <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:




                        On 10/5/2015 5:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

                         From this comment it seems that you have an
                        odd idea of how a person survives from moment
                        to moment, as if they have a soul that needs
                        to be transferred from one body to the other.
                        That isn't how it works. If A1 survives as a
                        later entity A2, it is necessary and
                        sufficient that A1 and A2 have certain
                        physical and psychological properties. No
                        spark or soul needs to jump from A1 to A2, and
                        they neither need to have any matter in common
                        nor do they need to have any physical
                        continuity, since these factors have no effect
                        on experience.

                    I disagree with that last.  It's commonly assumed,
                    because with shut our eyes and imagine scenes and
                    we can compose dialog in our heads; but I think it
                    is a mistake to think these can happen independent
                    of some underlying physics - even if it's not
                    "primitive" physics (whatever that is) which Bruno
                    dismisses.

                But lack of physical continuity will not necessarily
                make a subjective difference, even if physics is
                needed to instantiate consciousness.

Not necessarily if it is at a very low level, e.g. atoms. But if it's something noticeable, some difference in
            hormone levels, ... it will make a difference in
            thoughts.  If the thought sequence can different with the
            things happening at the physical level of say neurons then
            it implies that supervenience is false and the mental and
            physical can go their own way (which is what we call
            "delusional").

        I'm not sure I understand what you are getting at. I meant
        that if the normal sequence of brain states is s1-s2-s3 with
        corresponding mental states m1-m2-m3 and s2 is omitted, there
        is nothing in m3 to give any indication of the discontinuity.
        Of course, normally s2 is necessary in order to generate s1,
        but that doesn't change the argument.


    But I think that's wrong.  Brains are not like ideal von Neumann
    computers or Turing machines that have "brain states"
    corresponding to "mental states".   If you simulated a brain using
    a computer you would find that an enormous number of "brain
    states" were required to instantiate a single conscious thought
    and furthermore the brains states necessary for one thought
    overlapped with those necessary for the next thought.   So this
    overlap at the low level is part of the physical continuity needed
    for consciousness.  The fact that the physics can be simulated by
    discrete computation doesn't imply that the conscious states are
    discrete.

    Brent


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