On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > > On 10/13/2015 10:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:59 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> > wrote: > >> >> >> On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker < <meeke...@verizon.net> >> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker < <meeke...@verizon.net> >>> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker < <meeke...@verizon.net> >>>> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker < <meeke...@verizon.net> >>>>> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ... >>>>>> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter >>>>>> is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that >>>>>> thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree. >>>>>> They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves >>>>>> like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. >>>>>> Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves >>>>>> like >>>>>> a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> But the problem with what you say is that on this list >>>>>> "computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer >>>>>> (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human". Bruno claims to have >>>>>> proven that your simple statement logically entails that all of physics >>>>>> and >>>>>> consciousness. But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone >>>>>> "reject computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the >>>>>> inferences Bruno claims it entails. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the >>>>> conclusions he draws from it. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not >>>>> true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and >>>>> acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree." Those who >>>>> reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree. >>>>> >>>> >>>> If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended >>>> conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's >>>> argument is wrong. >>>> >>>> >>>> Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and others >>>> have done. >>>> >>>> >>> I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this? >>> >>> >>> No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the >>> arguments. >>> >>> 1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't instantiate >>> consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and doesn't logic entail >>> its conclusion. In fact the whole MGA is an argument from incredulity. >>> >> >> The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X by Y >> pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording shows. Therefore >> I don't see how one could argue (assuming computationalism) that a >> recording invokes the computation one presumes is necessary to instantiate >> a conscious state. >> >> >> "Presume" is the operative word there. >> >> > Okay, I think we agree then. You can have a theory that says a recording > is consciousness, but then that isn't computationalism. And if it isn't > computationalism then you can't use that as an argument against the logic > used in the UDA which starts from the assumption of computationalism. > > >> >> >>> Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio to >>> prove computationalism is false. >>> >> >> So then what is his theory of mind? >> >> >> Dunno, probably physicalism. But he's not obliged to have an alternative >> in order to reject one premise of a reductio. >> >> > I'm nor familiar enough with his argument to comment. > > >> >> >>> >>> 2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while isolated. >>> He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his scenario takes place >>> as a dream; but this is not convincing. Even a dream needs prior >>> experience of an outside world. >>> >> >> Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that it >> could be isolated from the outside world? >> >> >> Yes. A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to sustain >> consciousness. >> > > Can you dream? > > > Even when you're dreaming you are still interacting with your > environment. And complete sensory deprivation leads to the mind going into > loops. > > When your dreaming your brain is generating its own idea of an environment. > > >> >> >> >> >>> So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist >>> independent of an external world. It may be that physics can be derived >>> from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that self-evaluation exists in >>> arithmetic. For the theory to work it must produce a world to be conscious >>> of, and so far it doesn't do that. Bruno just writes things like, IF comp >>> is true then physics must follow. But that's like saying IF Christianity >>> is true Jesus will return. >>> >> >> There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism. >> >> >> Name some that's not also compatible with physicalism. >> > > Cochlear implants and artificial retinas give evidence toward multiple > realizability, and therefore, against mind-brain identity theory. > > > Mind/brain identity theory is only *functional* identity, it doesn't > assume material identity. > That is functionalism, which is a distinct theory from physicalism. > > > They show that it is functional equivalence, rather than > material/compositional equivalence that matters. > > > Right. But that doesn't prove that you can dispense with mater and the > material environment. > But it does mean if the computations exist, regardless of what implements them, they can instantiated the same functional states as a that of a conscious brain. > > > Since computers can realize any finite function, then assuming there are > no necessary infinities within the brain, computers can realize any > functional state the brain is able to realize. > > > Yes, that's Bruno's argument, but first it is not a question of a > "functional state" but of a process a computation. This process must > include the interaction with the environment. > I disagree but that is also no problem for computaitonalism. Simply expand the scope of the computation beyond that of the skull. > So what the computer must realize is a simulated world in which a > simulated consciousness exists. > No problem. If I were uploaded, I would hope I wouldn't find myself in a state of sensory deprivation. > But then this is no longer a reversal of physics and psychology - it is > just a mapping of both of them to a different simulated world. > It's a reversal of primacy. A large collection of programs implementing different computational/digital universes might contain sub-computations that implement the same mind. The only universes that are experienced are those that conscious minds experience, and conscious minds are explained by computations that exist platonically. > > > For physicalism to be correct, you have to believe either that functional > states are irrelevant to consciousness, or that physics can instantiate > functional states which Turing machines cannot. > > >> >> >> The Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate all >> human behaviors. >> >> >> First, it's a "thesis", not a fact. >> > > It's as well accepted as any theory in physics. > > >> Second, it doesn't mean that an abstract computation can replicate human >> behavior. >> > > It does. But you would say that it would result in a zombie. > > > Not at all. If the computer can interact with the world and replicate > human like behavior in that world I expect that it is conscious. > Even for an "abstract computation"? Are you saying you believe that a platonically existing computation that includes a physical world could explain conscious observers? > > > > >> If human cogitation is Turing emulable, it may still have to be >> physically realized, >> > > The Church-Turing thesis says nothing about computers having to be built > out of electrons and quarks. > > > That's because CT is about an abstract idealization. > "Computer science is not about machines, in the same way that astronomy is not about telescopes. There is an essential unity of mathematics and computer science." Michael R. Fellows (1991) > Fluid dynamics says nothing about fluids being made out of atoms and > molecules, but it doesn't follow that fluids exist without atoms and > molecules. > > > >> which means its finite, which means the infinities of arithmetic are not >> necessary to intelligence or consciousness. >> > > I don't think infinities are necessary to consciousness. It just so > happens that in arithmetical realism, there are infinite numbers of > platonically existing computations. > > >> >> >> A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea that we can have no >> reliable knowledge of our own conscious states + Church-Turing Thesis gives >> you computationalism. >> >> >> But what do you mean by "computationalism"? >> > > That the proper computation results in consciousness. > > > The computation written down on paper or realized in a world which it > interacts with? > > I've never argued a description of a computation written down on paper is a computation. I also don't agree that a computation needs to interact with something external to for it to be conscious. > >> Just that consciousness can be instantiated by an artifact?...by a >> digital computer? Or does "computationalism" imply all the inferences >> Bruno argues for, but which are not commonly accepted. >> > > My above insertion was that the "No zombie principal" + "Church-Turing > thesis = true" -> computationalism. It is the UDA which says > computationalism -> the reversal. If the UDA is correct, > > > What does it mean "correct"? > Free from error. > that there is a potentially infinite computer running the UDA? > This follows from arithmetical realism. > > > then transitively "No zombie principal" + "Church-Turing thesis = true" -> > the reversal. > > >> >> >> >> >>> >>> 3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is no >>> reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical abstraction. A >>> related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic is infinite in order to >>> use Godel's theorems about what a system cannot prove about itself. But >>> physics doesn't need infinities, they are just calculational conveniences. >>> >> >> Ultrafinitism is a fringe theory which leads to a break down of >> mathematics as we know it. I think it is an extreme length to go to reject >> the UDA, to say there is a biggest number to which 1 cannot be added to. >> >> >> That's just your prejudice. Try reading Feng Ye and Jan Mycielski. I >> think it's telling that you look at the mere existence of alternative >> number theory as destroying "mathematics as we know it". Mathematics is >> just a bunch of axiom/theorem systems. There's no one really real >> mathematics any more than there's one real language. >> > > Well then, if there are many mathematics, and they are all equally valid > (as you say), then we inhabit the ones that contain Universal Dovetailers. > > > An explanation that explains everything fails to explain at all. > I disagree. Computationalism and arithmetical realism explain a lot. See my earlier post to John Clark which states my motivations for leaning toward the primacy of mathematics rather than of physics. > > > > >> >> >> >> >>> >>> 4. Bruno leans heavily on saying his theory explains QM, but it's not >>> clear to me that it's even consistent with QM. For example how is the >>> operation of Shor's algorithm consistent with the multiple threads of the >>> UDA? >>> >>> I think Bruce Kellet has also made some critiques of Bruno's argument. >>> >> >> Bruce's argument is that computationalism is false, and arithmetical >> realism is false. If you reject these, it is no conflict with the UDA, >> whose logic depends on those assumptions. >> >> >> Again it's not clear what you mean by computationalism. Bruce can speak >> for himself, but I think he agrees that strong AI is possible. >> >> > Strong AI implies consciousness is substrate independent. > > > But it doesn't imply that it is independent of all substrate or > independent of an environment. > It does. This follows from the Church Turing thesis. Because any Turing Machine can emulate any other and implement any program, no program can ever know what the actual Turing Machine implementing it is. This directly implies multiple realizability, as Turing noticed in 1950, well before functionalism appeared in philosophy of mind: "The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine was to be entirely mechanical will help us to rid ourselves of a superstition. Importance is often attached to the fact that modern digital computers are electrical, and that the nervous system also is electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not electrical, and since all digital computers are in a sense equivalent, we see that this use of electricity cannot be of theoretical importance. Of course electricity usually comes in where fast signalling is concerned, so that it is not surprising that we find it in both these connections. In the nervous system chemical phenomena are at least as important as electrical. In certain computers the storage system is mainly acoustic. The feature of using electricity is thus seen to be only a very superficial similarity. If we wish to find such similarities we should took rather for mathematical analogies of function." So if we find mathematical analogies of function, even within mathematics, those analogous functions are adequate for equivalency. > > But I thought Bruce argued against consciousness being derivable from > mathematical computations, which would mean consciousness is substrate > dependent: that it depends on physically implemented Turing machines. > > > There's no such thing as a physically implemented Turing machine. A > Turing machine is an abstract idealization. > > What evidence do you have against the existence of non physical Turing machines? What led you to the belief that the world you see is all there is or can be? > > >> >> Your argument in #1 and #2, also rests implicity on a rejection of >> computationslim. #1 implies the computations don't matter, and #2 implies >> the right computations don't matter if they are isolated. >> >> >>> It is a red herring to ask "where is the error" because I don't think >>> his argument is a fallacy; I think it is less than logic entailment. >>> >> >> You can dispute the assumptions (computationalism, infinity, arithmetical >> realism, etc.) but if you reject infinity or arithmetical realism, you must >> also reject Church-Turing's thesis, >> >> >> Why? Arithmetic is system of propositions. Whether it is real or not >> has no effect on Church-Turing. >> > > Then you should be equally happy to have your brain implemented by "unreal > computations" as "real computations" :-) > > > I might be equally happy if my brain and whole world were implemented in > computations. Would you be happy to have your brain replaced by an > abstract computation. If so then your present self can be dispensed with > since your brain already exists (in the mathematical sense) as an abstract > computation in Peano arithmetic. > > Not if my present self is that abstract computation in Peano arithmetic. Jason > > >> >> >> and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if you can no longer >> define computation or computability. So if you accept computationalism, you >> are implicitly accepting infinity and arithmetical realism. Given this, the >> rest of Bruno's result is a logical proof, which is either correct or has >> an error. >> >> >> No, you missed the point that it is not a logical proof. It's an >> argument from incredulity. >> > > "A Turing Machine either reaches a halting state or runs forever" > "A Turing Machine can emulate any other Turing machine" > "A Turing Machine has an unlimited tape" > > None of the above items are true for physical approximations of Turing > machines. If these basic principals of computer science are not true for > physical Turing machines, then what kind of Turing machines are they true > for? > > > Hypothetical ones. > > Is Computer Science founded on lies, or does it concern itself with a > recently-discovered mathematical object for which these statements are true? > > > Hypotheses aren't lies unless you take them too seriously. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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