On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker
<meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker
<meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker
<meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
Standard computationalism does not say anything
about whether matter is primary or not. It says
that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to
computationalism disagree. They believe either
that is not possible to make a computer that
behaves like a human because there is
non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger
Penrose), or that it is possible to make a
computer that behaves like a human but not one
that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).
But the problem with what you say is that on this
list "computationalism" tends to mean much more
than, "you can make a computer (or a robot) that
thinks and acts like a human". Bruno claims to
have proven that your simple statement logically
entails that all of physics and consciousness. But
that is not so generally accepted and so when
someone "reject computationalism" here, it may be
they are just rejecting the inferences Bruno claims
it entails.
I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism
plus the conclusions he draws from it.
But with that extended meaning, the following two
sentences are not true: "It says that you can make a
computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human.
Those opposed to computationalism disagree." Those who
reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree.
If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the
extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to
show where Bruno's argument is wrong.
Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I
and others have done.
I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?
No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the
arguments.
1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and
doesn't logic entail its conclusion. In fact the whole MGA is an
argument from incredulity.
The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X by
Y pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording shows.
Therefore I don't see how one could argue (assuming computationalism)
that a recording invokes the computation one presumes is necessary to
instantiate a conscious state.
"Presume" is the operative word there.
Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the
reductio to prove computationalism is false.
So then what is his theory of mind?
Dunno, probably physicalism. But he's not obliged to have an
alternative in order to reject one premise of a reductio.
2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while
isolated. He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his
scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not convincing. Even
a dream needs prior experience of an outside world.
Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that it
could be isolated from the outside world?
Yes. A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to sustain
consciousness.
So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can
exist independent of an external world. It may be that physics
can be derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that
self-evaluation exists in arithmetic. For the theory to work it
must produce a world to be conscious of, and so far it doesn't do
that. Bruno just writes things like, IF comp is true then physics
must follow. But that's like saying IF Christianity is true Jesus
will return.
There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism.
Name some that's not also compatible with physicalism.
The Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate all
human behaviors.
First, it's a "thesis", not a fact. Second, it doesn't mean that an
abstract computation can replicate human behavior. If human cogitation
is Turing emulable, it may still have to be physically realized, which
means its finite, which means the infinities of arithmetic are not
necessary to intelligence or consciousness.
A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea that we can have no
reliable knowledge of our own conscious states + Church-Turing Thesis
gives you computationalism.
But what do you mean by "computationalism"? Just that consciousness can
be instantiated by an artifact?...by a digital computer? Or does
"computationalism" imply all the inferences Bruno argues for, but which
are not commonly accepted.
3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is
no reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical
abstraction. A related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic
is infinite in order to use Godel's theorems about what a system
cannot prove about itself. But physics doesn't need infinities,
they are just calculational conveniences.
Ultrafinitism is a fringe theory which leads to a break down of
mathematics as we know it. I think it is an extreme length to go to
reject the UDA, to say there is a biggest number to which 1 cannot be
added to.
That's just your prejudice. Try reading Feng Ye and Jan Mycielski. I
think it's telling that you look at the mere existence of alternative
number theory as destroying "mathematics as we know it". Mathematics is
just a bunch of axiom/theorem systems. There's no one really real
mathematics any more than there's one real language.
4. Bruno leans heavily on saying his theory explains QM, but it's
not clear to me that it's even consistent with QM. For example
how is the operation of Shor's algorithm consistent with the
multiple threads of the UDA?
I think Bruce Kellet has also made some critiques of Bruno's
argument.
Bruce's argument is that computationalism is false, and arithmetical
realism is false. If you reject these, it is no conflict with the UDA,
whose logic depends on those assumptions.
Again it's not clear what you mean by computationalism. Bruce can
speak for himself, but I think he agrees that strong AI is possible.
Your argument in #1 and #2, also rests implicity on a rejection of
computationslim. #1 implies the computations don't matter, and #2
implies the right computations don't matter if they are isolated.
It is a red herring to ask "where is the error" because I don't
think his argument is a fallacy; I think it is less than logic
entailment.
You can dispute the assumptions (computationalism, infinity,
arithmetical realism, etc.) but if you reject infinity or arithmetical
realism, you must also reject Church-Turing's thesis,
Why? Arithmetic is system of propositions. Whether it is real or not
has no effect on Church-Turing.
and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if you can no
longer define computation or computability. So if you accept
computationalism, you are implicitly accepting infinity and
arithmetical realism. Given this, the rest of Bruno's result is a
logical proof, which is either correct or has an error.
No, you missed the point that it is not a logical proof. It's an
argument from incredulity.
Brent
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