On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > > On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> > wrote: > >> >> >> On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker < <meeke...@verizon.net> >> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker < <meeke...@verizon.net> >>> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> ... >>>> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter is >>>> primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that >>>> thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree. >>>> They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves >>>> like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. >>>> Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like >>>> a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle). >>>> >>>> >>>> But the problem with what you say is that on this list >>>> "computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer >>>> (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human". Bruno claims to have >>>> proven that your simple statement logically entails that all of physics and >>>> consciousness. But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone >>>> "reject computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the >>>> inferences Bruno claims it entails. >>>> >>> >>> I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the conclusions >>> he draws from it. >>> >>> >>> But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not >>> true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and >>> acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree." Those who >>> reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree. >>> >> >> If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended >> conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's >> argument is wrong. >> >> >> Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and others >> have done. >> >> > I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this? > > > No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the > arguments. > > 1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't instantiate > consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and doesn't logic entail > its conclusion. In fact the whole MGA is an argument from incredulity. > The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X by Y pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording shows. Therefore I don't see how one could argue (assuming computationalism) that a recording invokes the computation one presumes is necessary to instantiate a conscious state. > Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio to > prove computationalism is false. > So then what is his theory of mind? > > 2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while isolated. He > tries to make this plausible by supposing that his scenario takes place as > a dream; but this is not convincing. Even a dream needs prior experience > of an outside world. > Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that it could be isolated from the outside world? > So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist > independent of an external world. It may be that physics can be derived > from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that self-evaluation exists in > arithmetic. For the theory to work it must produce a world to be conscious > of, and so far it doesn't do that. Bruno just writes things like, IF comp > is true then physics must follow. But that's like saying IF Christianity > is true Jesus will return. > There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism. The Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate all human behaviors. A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea that we can have no reliable knowledge of our own conscious states + Church-Turing Thesis gives you computationalism. > > 3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is no > reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical abstraction. A > related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic is infinite in order to > use Godel's theorems about what a system cannot prove about itself. But > physics doesn't need infinities, they are just calculational conveniences. > Ultrafinitism is a fringe theory which leads to a break down of mathematics as we know it. I think it is an extreme length to go to reject the UDA, to say there is a biggest number to which 1 cannot be added to. > > 4. Bruno leans heavily on saying his theory explains QM, but it's not > clear to me that it's even consistent with QM. For example how is the > operation of Shor's algorithm consistent with the multiple threads of the > UDA? > > I think Bruce Kellet has also made some critiques of Bruno's argument. > Bruce's argument is that computationalism is false, and arithmetical realism is false. If you reject these, it is no conflict with the UDA, whose logic depends on those assumptions. Your argument in #1 and #2, also rests implicity on a rejection of computationslim. #1 implies the computations don't matter, and #2 implies the right computations don't matter if they are isolated. > It is a red herring to ask "where is the error" because I don't think his > argument is a fallacy; I think it is less than logic entailment. > You can dispute the assumptions (computationalism, infinity, arithmetical realism, etc.) but if you reject infinity or arithmetical realism, you must also reject Church-Turing's thesis, and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if you can no longer define computation or computability. So if you accept computationalism, you are implicitly accepting infinity and arithmetical realism. Given this, the rest of Bruno's result is a logical proof, which is either correct or has an error. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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