On Sun, Jul 17, 2016, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> > > You say that the person in Moscow is the same person as the person in > Helsinki, > Yes. > > > and that the person in Washington is also the same as the person in > Helsinki. > Yes. > > > But also claim that the person in Washington is not the same as the person > in Moscow > Yes. > > The copy in Washington and the copy in Moscow, because they are distinct > physical objects, might well become different over time > I am certain they will, and that is exactly why th e person in Washington is not the same as the person in Moscow , although both will always be the person who saw Helsinki. > > > the differences that develop between the Washington and Moscow copies do > not suffice to make them different persons > The best way to test this would be to simply ask them if they felt like they were different people. I would bet money both would say "YES" in a loud clear voice. > > > This is where the closest continuer theory shows its strength: > Suppose I'm not the "closest continuer", does that mean I have no identity even though I vividly remember being John Clark as a child? Has some mysterious force emanated from that closer guy reach out and found me and destroyed my consciousness? If one or more things tomorrow remembers being John Clark today then John Clark has survived, and if that isn't what "survived" means then I don't care if I've " survive d" or not. I 'll never know if know if I'm the "closest continuer" and there is no reason I should care. John K Clark > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
