On 14 Jul 2016, at 21:49, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 10:10 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>>> The better prediction was "W v M and I have no clue
which one".
>> The better prediction about WHAT?
> About the first person experience
There is no such thing as THE first person experience, there is
only A first person experience.
The Helsinki guy now that he will survive, and that he cannot have the
simultaneous first person experience of being in the two cities at
once, so he will have with P = 1 an experience of seeing one city and
not the other. "The" refers to that experience of seeing only one city
and not the other that the guy in Helsinki expect. It is a "a" in the
3-1 view, but it is a "the" for both copies.
> that is accessible to the candidate in Helsinki.
Both Moscow AND Washington are accessible because there are
people in BOTH Washington and Moscow who remember being the Helsinki
Man and neither city is more favored because both memories are
equally vivid.
Excellent. Both Washington AND Moscow are accessible equally. That is
why P = 1/2 is the most plausible candidate in this situation. Both
statements made by the copies confirm one city, and not the others,
and both deserve to be listened equally.
>With computationalism, the guy in Helsinki knows that he will
survive,
The guy in Helsinki knows that the guy in Helsinki will
survive, but the guy in Helsinki knows nothing about "he".
Refutation: he knows perfectly well that after pushing the button, he
will feel to be in either Moscow, or Washington, and never in both
cities, from the 1-p pov, with "the" explained as above.
> given that we know that both will live A 1p view. But
we know that the two 1p view are logically incompatible.
No, it would be logically incompatible only if people
duplicating machines did not exist.
You forget again to put yourself at the place of both copies, as this
shows immediately that you are plain wrong here. Like often, you stop
the reasoning in the middle. It is simply obvious, given the
assumption and protocol that the W and M 1p views are logically
incompatible. No observer at all will have the 1p experience of seeing
both cities.
You keep doing the same obvious mistake again and again.
For heaven's sake making those two views logically compatible is
the very thing that makes a people duplicating machine a people
duplicating machine! It's what they do!
The duplicating machine cannot introduce a telepathic link which would
be mandatory for having an experience of both cities at once, so that
the candidate would write "I see W and M". That simply never happens,
or computationalism is false.
>> All the 1-views that saw all those cities have an
equal right to call themselves John Clark, so the answer to the
question "what is the probability John Clark will see city X?" is
100%.
> Only in the 3p view.
What the hell does that mean?
It means that for the outsider who look at the experience, or for the
experiencer when he is in Helsinki, there will be a duplicated body,
with each an 1p experience, in both cities, so that indeed the
probability that JKC see city X is 100%, from the 3-1 view. But from
this it does not follow that all copies will see both cities. In fact
each copy will see only one city, and the Helsinki guy knew that in
advance, so the probability, for the 1-view, is P(seeing one city) =
1. And, as you argue correctly on the equally valid statement made by
both copy, we get the ¨=1/2. It is the perfect 3-1 symmetry which
entails the perfect indeterminacy P = 1/2.
> You agree that for the cities which are not X, the guy
will not see X, and so refute already what you say here.
I neither agree nor disagree because I have no idea who "THE guy
" is.
Because you stop the experience in the middle. You forget to consult
the diary of both copies, who both testify that they both see only one
city. You abtract away from that second part of the experience, for
unknown reason (you did this mistake very often).
People duplicating machines make it logically impossible for just
one guy to refute the prediction that John Clark the Helsinki Man
will see 2 cities, otherwise it wouldn't be a people duplicating
machine.
You keep forgetting that the question is on the 1-views, so trivially,
just one guy can refute a prediction. If he wrote "W and M" in
Helsinki, both guy will refute the prediction, as it is on the 1-View,
with "the" in the sense above.
You don't refute step 3, you just ignore it.
> The answer is crystal clear: it is: " Washington or Moscow,
and I can't be more precise than that".
The answer may be crystal clear but that's not the problem. To
hell with the answer, John Clark want's to know what the question
was.
What can the Helsinki guy write in his personal diary that the guy in
Helsinki expect to live. The question is as much cristal clear than
the answer. All ambiguities are resolved once we keep in mind that the
question is on the 1-views, which will be obviously incompatible from
both future copies povs.
>>> as we have agree that all John Clark are John Clark,
but after the duplication, each John Clark will see only one city.
So if the question is "how many city will you see",
>> Bruno Marchal uses "John Clark" 3 times and then sneaks
in a "he" in the most important place as if nobody would notice.
Who the hell is "he"?
> John Clark. That was easy.
Then the answer is also easy, John Clark will see 2 cities.
No John Clark at all will see both cities. That is obvious. No diaries
will contain "I open the door and see both W and M". Both will on the
contrary wrote "I see only one city". And one will write "I open the
door and I see W, not M", and the other will write "I see M, not W",
as any one can verify.
When you say "John Clark will see 2 cities", you mean, taken together
the John Clarks (note the plural) will see both cities, and that is
just part of the assumption and the protocol, so that is the correct
3-1 description. But that was not the object of the question.
If in doubt of that then just go to both cities and ask the person
in both cities who calls himself John Clark how many cities they see,
Yes, that is what you need to do. And both answered "I see only one
city and it is W (resp M)".
add up the numbers they give and see if they equal 2.
As the question was on the 1-view, adding the answer does not make any
sense, unless you want to know the 3-1 view, but that one was already
given in the protocol, so that move just ignore what all 1-view have
lived, and thus ignore the question asked.
You don't seem to try to refute an argument. You seem to change the
question so as to avoid the answer, given that here you get the
correct two answer made by the copies (1 and 1). Adding them is just a
way to abstract from the 1p lived to get the 3-1 protocol back, which
is only a way to quickly pass on the correct answer, and eliminating
the personal feeling involved necessarily through that experience.
I think they will because I'm pretty sure that 1+1=2, but as a
mathematician maybe you should check my arithmetic.
> the correct prediction is 1.
>>Tell me exactly what the prediction was
> The prediction was "I will see only one city, among W v M.
That's right Bruno, keep sweeping those foggy thoughts and fractured
logic under the "I" colored personal pronoun rug.
>>>after completion of the experience, all John Clark
agrees to be personally in front of only one city.
>> Yes, and that in no way implies that John Clark saw only
one city, in fact it implies the opposite.
> All John Clark will see only one city.
I know you're a mathematician and all, but are you sure that
1+1=1?
If John Clark marries a Moscow girl in Moscow, and if John Clark
marries a washington girl in Washington, he will still never do love
with both in the 1p sense.
To sum up: confusion between the 3p and the 1p, again.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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