On 14 Jul 2016, at 00:52, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> Which turned out to be the better prediction, Moscow or
Washington? And was the prediction about John Clark or was it
about some mysterious figure named "you"?
> The better prediction was "W v M and I have no clue which
one".
The better prediction about WHAT?
About the first person experience that is accessible to the candidate
in Helsinki.
Even after the experiment is over nobody knows what was the better
prediction because nobody knows who exactly the prediction was
supposed to be about.
Then you are already abandoning computationalism. With
computationalism, the guy in Helsinki knows that he will survive, and
that he will feel being experiencing the direct seeing of only one city.
>> Then asking the Helsinki Person "what city will you see?"
or "how many cities will you see?" is a nonsense question because
this is a world with people duplicating machines.
> Yes, but it should be obvious to anyone understand the
difference between the 1p and the 3p views
Then answer the question! After the experiment was over what
ONE city turned out to be the correct answer, Moscow or Washington?
In helsinki, the guy can predict "W v M". He can predict "(W & ~M) v
(M & ~W). He can predict that (W & M) will be false.
If you can't answer that question then it's not a experiment or even
a thought experiment and so it's not science and assigning a
probability to anything concerning it is just ridiculous.
I can predict, as well as I can predict that if I throw a dice, and
the usual default assumption, I will get with certainty 1 v 2 v 3 v 4
v 5 v 6. In the step 3 protocol, I predict W v M, and I can prove
(using computaionalism) that it is the best bet.
As for being obvious, if modern physics and mathematics has taught
us anything it's that common sense is not always a reliable guide,
and a lot of obvious things would not be true in a world with
people duplicating machines. We didn't evolve in a environment
where things move close to the speed of light so out intuition
in that area is poor, common sense tells us that Einstein's
relativity just can'r be true, but it is.
> When the H-guy pushes on the button in Helsinki, he knows
with certainty (assuming computationalism and the protocol and the
default hypotheses) that such a guy will find itself in a box, in
front of a door, behind which only one city will be seen (in the 1p
view).
If after it's all over you can't name what one city "he" ended
up seeing then "the" 1p view does not exist, only "a" 1p view does.
Read cautiously what you just said above.
>> you're interested in "THE 1p view" but as you just
pointed out in a world with people duplicating machine "THE 1p view
" is meaningless, there is only "A 1p view".
> Exactly, that is the root of the 1p indeterminacy.
We agree, although not very profound it is certainly true that a
meaningless question (like which ONE will have the THE 1p view) has
no answer, and that is the root cause of "1p indeterminacy".
We don't ask which one will have THE 1p view, given that we know that
both will live A 1p view. But we know that the two 1p view are
logically incompatible. We ask to one precise guy (the H-guy) what he
can expect to live after pushing on the button.
> You are asking about what one and only one city was seen
> The question concerns the future, or the next state.
The next state of what? I assume you mean the next state of
something that remembers being in Helsinki, if so then there is
certainly no law of physics that demands only one state can meet
those specifications. If you means something else then I repeat my
question, the next state of what?
The next mental state of the guy in Helsinki, from his/her first point
of view. As he does not die, and is reconstituted only in W and in M,
it can only be W, or M.
And please, no personal pronouns with no clear referent in the answer.
>> John Clark will see two cities.
> That is the 3-1-view.
All I know is that John Clark in his 1-view sees Moscow and
John Clark in his 1-view sees Washington and I have no idea what Mr.
3-1-view sees.
It is "John Clark in his 1-view sees Moscow and John Clark in his 1-
view sees Washington"
With only that you can get that the best Helsinki prediction is "W v M".
> As you are John Clark, you need to go out of your body to
conceive it. But to complete the thought experience, you need to re-
integrate your body after the duplication.
OK even better, after the re-integration I have vivid memories of
BOTH Washington and Moscow
and so I John K Clark from John K Clark's 1p ended up seeing
Washington and Moscow.
Assuming telepathy, or another notion of "integration" with no
relevance to the step 3 goal.
>>There are 2 "1-views", and Bruno Marchal demands to know
which ONE and only ONE *you* will see, and that demand is pure
gibberish.
> You seem to be unable to understand that despite there are
many 1-views obtained, all the 1-views feel to be one individual in
a specific city.
So what? All the 1-views that saw all those cities have an
equal right to call themselves John Clark, so the answer to the
question "what is the probability John Clark will see city X?" is
100%.
Only in the 3p view. You agree that for the cities which are not X,
the guy will not see X, and so refute already what you say here.
And if you ask just one John Clark how many cities he saw and he
just says only one that does NOT disprove the statement "John Clark
will see 2 cities" because there is still another John Clark out
there that you haven't asked yet.
That is why to get the prediction, the guy in Helsinki has to put
itself in the place of all copies (mentally), and then just take into
account the impossibility of the 1p-feeling of seeing the two cities
at once.
> By computationalism, you know that you will survive, and that
you can only feel to survive as a unique individual in only one
city. You *know* that in advance.
Ahhhhh, more duplicate people and more duplicate personal
pronouns with no clear referent!
All the referents have been given, and you did agree on them. Your
pronoun objection has been refuted last week (and much more times
before).
> remembering that the question was about that "future personal
memory".
I'm not the one who has forgotten that in the future 2 people not
just one will have memories of being in Helsinki, and 2 people not
just one will remember wondering about what city they will end up in;
So just get the conclusion from this. If the two people remember
having wondering about what city they will end up, by using
computaionalism, they know that any specific city prediction will be
refuted by one guy, and we were asking for a prediction, verified for
all resulting 1-view, and this fives the F¨PI.
I think you're the one who has forgotten about that and that's why
you call both of these people "he" and that is why demanding to know
what one and only one city "he" will see is ridiculous.
In your dream.
> Given that the guy knows he will survive, and that he will
feel to be in one city, the question is "what city will be seen
after pushing on the button".
If you can't tell me what the answer turned out to be (and you
can't because the question is incoherent)
The answer is crystal clear: it is: " Washington or Moscow, and I
can't be more precise than that".
then you should stop calling it a thought experiment and call it for
what it is, a thought muddle.
> The prediction is about one future first person experience.
It's not a prediction if nobody knows who the prediction is
about.
Sure. But we know perfectly well who is asked the prediction, and when.
> as we have agree that all John Clark are John Clark, but
after the duplication, each John Clark will see only one city. So if
the question is "how many city will you see",
Bruno Marchal uses "John Clark" 3 times and then sneaks in a "he"
in the most important place as if nobody would notice. Who the hell
is "he"?
John Clark. That was easy.
> the correct prediction is 1.
Tell me exactly what the prediction was
The prediction was "I will see only one city, among W v M. Exclusive
or, and provably non-constructive or".
and more important who it was about and after the experiment is over
I'll say if that was the correct answer or not. Until then it's
neither correct nor incorrect, it's just word salad.
To get the verification, you need to interview all copies.
>after completion of the experience, all John Clark agrees to
be personally in front of only one city.
Yes, and that in no way implies that John Clark saw only one city,
in fact it implies the opposite.
All John Clark will see only one city.
We have testimony from John Clark that John Clark saw Moscow and
have testimony from John Clark that John Clark saw Washington.
Therefore the conclusion is that the correct answer to the question
"how many cities will John Clark see?" is 2. Where is the
indeterminacy in that?
We have testimony from John Clark that John Clark saw Moscow and not
Washington, and that John Clark saw Washington and not Moscow, and by
computationalism, those experience cannot be lived together, and both
John Clark have differentiated into different person, despite being
the same old Helsinki guy. We have the testimony from both John Clark
that they got one bit of information.
If there is no indeterminacy, just give me an algorithm to predict
which city the H)-guy will live with certainty. We know that it cannot
be both, as the question is on the 1p experience, and only two
incompatible one are available.
> The problem is not the pronoun.
Of course the problem is pronouns!
See the preceding posts.
If it were not Bruno Marchal could end the controversy by simply
stop using pronouns, but if that were done there would be no place
to hide philosophical confusion and illogical thinking.
idem.
> you get the correct 3-1 view, and then forget to just ask all
the copies about the verification of the prediction made in Helsinki,
I forget to just ask all the copies?! !I'm the guy who
forgot?? Bruno Marchal hears one person say "I see only one city"
and claims that even in a world of people duplicating machines that
proves John Clark sees only one city!
Never said that.
The problem is not the proper name, nor the pronouns, but the
distinction between the 3-1 views and the 1-view, that you seem to
opportunistically forget each time you are trap in your contradiction.
Bruno
John K Clark
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