On 05 Aug 2016, at 13:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 6:12 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 04:13, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 3:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
You use the assumption that the duplicated consciousnesses
automatically differentiate when receiving different inputs.
It is not an assumption.
Of course it is an assumption. You have not derived it from
anything previously in evidence.
See my answer to Brent. It is just obvious that the first person
experience differentiated when it get different experience,
leading to different memories. We *assume* computationalism. How
coud the diaries not differentiate? What you say does not make
any sense.
I have been at pains to argue (in several different ways) that the
differentiation of consciousness is not automatic. It is very easy
to conceive of a situation in which a single consciousness
continues in two bodies, with the streams of consciousness arising
from both easily identifiable, but still unified in the
consciousness of a single person. (I copy below my recent argument
for this in a post replying to Russell.) So the differentiation
you require is not necessary or automatic -- it has to be
justified separately because it is not "just obvious".
Your recent expansion of the argument of step 3 in discussions
with John Clark does not alter the situation in any way -- you
still just assert that the differentiation takes place on the
receipt of different input data.
I had thought that the argument for such differentiation of
consciousness in different physical bodies was a consequence of
some mind-brain identity thesis. But I am no longer sure that even
that is sufficient -- the differentiation clearly requires
separate bodies/brains (separate input data streams), but separate
bodies are not sufficient for differentiation, as I have shown.
That was shown and explained before and is not contested here.
I thought I was contesting it.
Please read the posts.
That is why I introduce a painting in question 2.
That still just gives differentiation on different data inputs -- it
changes nothing.
But let us first see if you agree with question 1.
Do you agree that if the H-guy is told that a hot drink will be
offered to both reconstitution in W and in M, he is entitled to
expect a hot drink with probability one (assuming computationalisme
and the default hypothesis)
I do not assume computationalism, I am questioning its validity.
Do you agree that P(X) = 1 in Helsinki, if X will occur in both city?
I think that it is entirely possible that the H-guy will, after the
duplication, experience drinking two coffees.
What is required is a much stronger additional assumption, namely
an association between minds and brains such that a mind can
occupy only one brain.
Not at all. We can say that one mind occupy both brain in the WM-
duplication , before the opening of the door, assuming the
reconstitution box identical. The mind brain identity fails right
at step 3.
Mind-brain identity need not fail: what fails in my interpretation
of duplication is the one-to-one correspondence of one mind with one
body. One need something stronger that mind-brain identity to
justify the differentiation on different data inputs because we can
have one-many and many-one mind-body relationships.
We can associate a mind to a body, but the mind itself (the 1p) can
be (and must be) associated with many different bodies, in the
physical universe and later in arithmetic.
You seem to accept my point -- there is still only one mind even
after different data are fed to the copies: one mind in two bodies
in this case (a one-many relationship).
(Whether a single brain can host only one mind is a separate
matter, involving one's attitude to the results of split brain
studies and the psychological issues surrounding multiple
personalities/minds.) In other words, the differentiation
assumption is an additional assumption that does not appear to
follow from either physicalism or YD+CT.
It follows from very elementary computer science, and in our case,
it follows necessarily, as the 1p is identified, in this setting
with the content of the personal diary, which obviously
differentiate on the self-localization result made by the
reconstitutions.
I think the diaries are just confusing you. The copy in M can write
M in the diary in Moscow, and the copy in W write W in the diary in
Washington. That is not necessarily different from me writing M in
one diary with my left hand while writing W in a separate diary with
my right hand. No differentiation into two separate persons is
necessary in either case. There is no "self-localization" if there
is only ever one consciousness -- the person experiences both W and
M simultaneously.
As I have further pointed out, one cannot just make this an
additional assumption to YD+CT because it is clearly an empirical
matter: until we have a working person duplicator, we cannot know
whether differentiation is automatic or not. Science is, after
all, empirical, not just a matter of definitions.
Once you agree with P(Mars) = 1 in a simple classical teleportation
experience (step 1), then how could the diary not differentiate
when the reconstituted guy write the result of the self-localization?
No self localization.... the diaries in the two cities may contain
records of the correct cities, but that does not mean that there are
two separate people (consciousnesses) involved. The diaries are
multiple -- the person is not.
No empirical test needs to be done, as the differentiation is
obvious: one copy experiences the city of Moscow, as his diary
confirms, and the other experiences the city of Washington, as his
diaries confirms too. If they did not differentiate, what would
they write in the diary?
He writes in the diaries what he sees: it is just a matter of the
protocol whether he writes the name of the city in which each diary
is located in that particular diary, or if he writes in both diaries
what he sees in total, in which case he writes W&M in both diaries.
It need be no different from my seeing one thing with my right eye
and writing that down with my right hand, and seeing something
different with my left eye and writing that down with my left hand,
or writing down both things with both hands. (This is not a split-
brain experiment.)
All the things that you bring up could easily happen without any
differentiation into two separate consciousnesses. You might find
the non-locality of the unified experience a little surprising, but
that is only because you are not used to the concept of non-locality.
I say again, even though it seems obvious to you that the
differentiation must occur,
It is just trivial, by the definition of first person experience.
If you were right, and using the definition I provided at the start,
we would have a situation where a guy is in Moscow, and write in his
diary "Washington". But then he did not survive sanely, and if that is
the case, P get ≠ from 1 at step 1.
that is just a failure of imagination on your part. Try to put
yourself in the situation in which some of the many strands of your
conscious thoughts relate to bodies in different cities. There is no
logical impossibility in this. You seem to accept that a single mind
can be associated with more that one body: "We can associate a mind
to a body, but the mind itself (the 1p) can be (and must be)
associated with many different bodies, in the physical universe and
later in arithmetic." (quoted from your comment above.) Hold on to
this notion, and consider the possibility that there is no
differentiation into separate conscious persons in such a case (the
1p is singular -- there is only ever just one person).
I love the idea, but it is not relevant for the problem of prediction.
And I am not sure it makes sense, even legally. If the W-man commits a
murder in W, with your bizarre theory, we can put the M man in prison.
Your non-locality assumption is a bit frightening. Some will say, we
are all that type of human, but not this type, etc. If you consider
the W-man and the M-man as the same person, then, all living creature
on this earth is the same person, and 'to eat' becomes equivalent with
'to be eaten'. Why not eventually, but this has no relevance at all in
the reasoning, where we assume digital mechanism, so that the M and W
man would not be aware of their existence in a protocol where they
would not known the protocol.
And the duplications gives a simple distinction between the 1p and 3p,
and we can see, in very simple simulation, that all copies feels 1p-
separate from the others, in the protocol described.
I hope you understand well that we assume computationalism, with an
open mind that the theory might lead to a contradiction, in which case
we would learn a lot. But up to now, we get only (quantum?) weirdness.
Bruno
Bruce
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